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Summary
This thesis is a collection of four independent essays on insurance, prevention, and public
policy.
The ﬁrst chapter is a short theoretical paper that investigates the issue of the optimal level
of prevention in a partial equilibrium, competitive agricultural economy with incomplete
state-contingent claims markets. The representative risk-averse farmer can make use of a
preventive input that reduces crop loss in case of an unfavourable climate event (such as
chemical or irrigation), but has no access to income insurance that would allow him to trade
contingent claims with the representative risk-averse consumer. In line with the natural
hedge argument, it is shown that the competitive equilibrium prevention level decreases
(increases) with the farmer's risk aversion if price elasticity of demand is elsewhere lower
(greater) than one in absolute value. In addition, the paper characterizes the conditions
for which the competitive prevention level is higher or lower than the social optimum.
Under assumptions that are reasonable in the context of an agricultural market, under-
prevention is much more likely to occur, providing a potential rationale for eﬃciency-
enhancing government intervention such as a prevention subsidy. Opening trade is shown
to have countervailing eﬀects on prevention choices through opposite changes in risk and
returns from prevention.
This second chapter, cowritten with Sabine Lemoyne de Forges, examines (re)insurance
ﬁrms' capital and pricing decisions in a context of imperfect competition. We develop a
model in which ﬁrms produce a non-stochastic output, (re)insurance coverage, which is
sold before the true cost is known. Competing ﬁrms behave as if they were risk-averse
for a standard reason of costly external ﬁnance. Competition is modelled as a two-stage
game: at stage 1, each ﬁrm chooses her internal capital level; at stage 2, ﬁrms compete on
price. We characterize the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria and analyze the strategic
impact of capital choice on the market. We discuss the model with regards to insurance
industry speciﬁcities and insurance regulation.
The third chapter, cowritten with Raja Chakir, investigates the determinants of rapeseed
hail insurance and pesticide decisions using an original panel dataset of French farms cover-
ing the period from 1993 to 2004. Economic theory suggests that insurance and prevention
decisions are not independent due to risk reduction and/or moral hazard eﬀects. We pro-
pose a theoretical framework that integrates two statistically independent sources of risk
faced by farmers of our sample hail risk and pest risk. Statistical tests conﬁrm that pesti-
cide and insurance demands are endogenous to each other, simultaneously determined. An
econometric model involving two simultaneous equations with mixed censored/continuous
dependent variables is thus estimated for rapeseed. Estimation results show that rapeseed
insurance demand has a positive eﬀect on pesticide use and vice versa. Insurance demand is
positively inﬂuenced by the yield's coeﬃcient of variation and the loss ratio, and negatively
inﬂuenced by proxies for wealth (CAP subsidies) and activity diversiﬁcation. The analy-
sis of marginal eﬀects shows that the greatest values of elasticities of insurance demand
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include the yield's coeﬃcient of variation (0.255), CAP subsidies (-0.192), and activity
diversiﬁcation variables (-0.161).
The fourth chapter studies prevention choices when agents have social preferences in order
to examine the role of solidarity in risk decisions. There is a growing body of evidence that
informal transfers play a substantial role in consumption smoothing across states of Nature,
providing an implicit safety net when formal risk-sharing arrangements are absent. But
informal transfers may also lower incentives to ex-ante risk management. In this chapter we
reconsider the Samaritan's dilemma game in the case of a prevention activity against risk.
Agents are risk-neutral and inequity averse. They choose a level of prevention that reduces
the probability of wealth loss. Once the state of Nature is realized, individual outputs are
mutually observable inequity averse agents make transfers to the unlucky. In contrast to
the previous literature on the Samaritan's Dilemma which mainly assumes pure altruism
preferences, we show that inequity aversion may lead to multiple prevention equilibria. We
also discuss the traditional normative conclusion concerning the welfare-enhancing role of
in-kind transfer of prevention.
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Résumé
Cette thèse propose quatre essais indépendents sur l'assurance, la prévention, et les poli-
tiques publiques associées à ces marchés.
Le premier essai, de nature théorique, s'intéresse au problème du niveau de prévention op-
timal dans un marché agricole en équilibre partiel sous l'hypothèse de concurrence parfaite
et de marchés contingents incomplets. Le producteur représentatif est averse au risque
et choisit un niveau d'intrant d'auto-assurance réduisant le niveau de perte de rendement
en cas de choc climatique. Nous montrons que si l'élasticité est inférieure (supérieure) à
l'unité en valeur absolue, le niveau de prévention diminue (augmente) avec le coeﬃcient
d'aversion au risque du producteur en raison de l'eﬀet de couverture naturelle du prix sur le
revenu. Nous nous intéressons également aux conditions telles que le niveau de prévention
à l'équilibre compétitif est supérieur ou inférieur à celui maximisant le bien-être social.
Sous des hypothèses typiques des marchés agricoles (demande faiblement élastique au prix
et au revenu, producteurs et consommateurs averses au risque), l'équilibre concurrentiel
conduit à une niveau de prévention sous-optimal, engendrant un niveau de risque sys-
témique trop élevé pour les consommateurs et les producteurs. Une intervention de l'Etat
sous forme d'aide publique à la prévention permet d'atteindre le niveau socialement opti-
mal. L'ouverture des frontières, par le lissage géographique des chocs climatiques qu'elle
engendre, a un eﬀet ambigü sur le niveau de prévention.
Le deuxième chapitre, de nature théorique et co-écrit avec Sabine Lemoyne de Forges,
s'intéresse à la détermination du prix de l'assurance et du capital interne sur une ligne
présentant un risque systémique dans un contexte d'oligopole. Pour cela, nous développons
un modèle dans lequel 푛 entreprises caractérisées par un coût de production stochastique
(inversion du cycle de l'assurance), leur produit étant vendu sur le marché avant que la
réalisation du coût ne leur soit connu. Les ﬁrmes sont supposées être averses au risque
en raison d'un coût croissant et convexe du capital externe. Nous considérons le jeu à
deux étapes suivant: en première étape, les entreprises déterminent simultanément leur
niveau de capital interne, en seconde étape elles se font concurrence sur les prix. Nous
caractérisons l'ensemble des équilibres de Nash en sous-jeu parfait du jeu, et montrons
que le capital interne représente un coût stratégique pour les entreprises. Nous montrons
alors que la concurrence imparfaite conduit à un niveau de capital interne inférieur à celui
assurant la maximisation du bien-être social, et discutons de l'opportunité d'une régulation
de second rang du capital dans ce contexte.
Le troisème chapitre, co-écrit avec Raja Chakir, est une étude économétrique des facteurs
inﬂuençant la demande d'assurance et de pesticides par les producteurs agricoles. Nos
estimations sont menées sur un panel non cylindré d'exploitations agricoles françaises du
département de la Meuse couvrant la période 1993-2004. La théorie économique suggère
que les choix d'assurance et d'intrant réducteur de risque sont simultanés en raison d'eﬀets
de réduction de risque et d'aléa moral, ces eﬀets pouvant être contradictoires. Nous pro-
posons un cadre théorique alternatif intégrant explicitement la prise en compte de deux
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risques statistiquement indépendants. Le producteur, supposé averse au risque, choisit
simultanément le niveau d'intrant et d'assurance contre ces deux risques indépendants.
Les tests statistiques conﬁrment l'hypothèse que les choix de pesticides et d'assurance
sont endogènes et donc déterminés simutanément. Par suite, un modèle économétrique à
deux équations simultanées à variables mixtes censurées/continues est estimé. Les résul-
tats de cette estimation montrent que la demande d'assurance colza a un eﬀet positif sur
l'utilisation de pesticides sur cette cuture et vice versa. La demande d'assurance est posi-
tivement inﬂuencée par le coeﬃcient de variation du colza et le loss ratio, et négativement
inﬂuencée par les proxies de la richesse (aides de la Politique Agricole Commune) et de
la diversiﬁcation de l'activité à l'échelle de l'exploitation. L'analyse des eﬀets marginaux
des variables explicatives montre que les valeurs d'élasticités les plus élevées concernent le
coeﬃcient de variation du rendement du colza (0.255), les aides de la Politique Agricole
Commune (-0.192) et la diversiﬁcation des activités (-0.161).
Le quatrième chapitre est consacré à l'inﬂuence des préférences sociales sur les choix de
prévention des agents. Les études empiriques montrent que les transferts informels entre
agents jouent un rôle important dans le lissage de la consommation entre états de Nature,
oﬀrant un ﬁlet de sécurité lorsque les instruments formels de partage ou de transfert des
risques sont absents ou coûteux. Cependant ces transferts informels peuvent être source
d'aléa moral sur les choix de prévention. Nous étudions formellement cet arbitrage à l'aide
d'un jeu de dilemme du Samaritain à deux étapes. Les agents sont supposés neutres
au risque et présentant de l'aversion à l'inégalité. En première étape, les agents décident
d'investir ou non dans un technologie de prévention. En seconde étape, l'état de Nature est
réalisé et les agents peuvent eﬀectuer des transferts inter-individuels. A la diﬀérence du cas
des préférences altruistes pures, l'aversion à l'inégalité peut conduire à une indétermination
du choix de prévention à l'équilibre. Nous discutons également de la capacité d'un transfert
de prévention en nature via un fonds de prévention des risques à augmenter le bien-être
social.
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Introduction
Because they dislike risks, people have developed a wide range of solutions to share, trans-
fer, reduce or avoid them in order to feel better. In a perfect world of selﬁsh expected
utilty maximizers, risks would be traded without transaction costs between agents. Idyos-
incratic risks would therefore be vanished because of the law of large numbers, and the
remaining social risk would be distributed according to the risk tolerance of individuals.
Risk prevention, investment decisions and many other decisions involving risks would be
chosen eﬃciently according to the price signal provided by risk markets. Such a perfect
world is certainly a guide for the social planner aiming at maximizing social welfare, but
not a description of real-world risk-sharing arrangements.
In reality, in several cases, insurance and prevention markets are plagued by a large set of
market failures on both demand and supply sides, preventing eﬃcient risk sharing, distort-
ing economic choices and creating inequalities in the opportunities to share risk between
individuals. The welfare consequences of such imperfections may be large, since risk shar-
ing modiﬁes the economic environment in which production and consumption decisions
are made. The lack of risk-sharing instruments can be of particular importance for the
poorest. Being obliged to cope with risk with their own means (technical choices, infor-
mal transfers), they can be driven to adopt low risk-low returns strategies, impeding their
chances to opt out poverty.
Identifying and understanding the limits to insurability and the ways to overcome them
are thus a major economic issue as well as an important subject for policy makers. A
major diﬃculty of this task is that imperfections are multiple and depend on the lines of
risks considered. This renders diﬃcult to ﬁnd appropriate policy responses if any, and to
apply the well-knwown targetting principle one objective, one instrument. The objective
of this thesis is to adress several of these imperfections, analyze their consequences and
the potential role that public policy should play to overcome them. Hence we propose four
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INTRODUCTION
independent but interrelated essays, three theoretical and one empirical, that each one
focus on a particular facet of market imperfections. Two of these essays  one theoretical
and one empirical are devoted to the agricultural sector , which is particularly exposed to
risks aﬀecting prices and production. Moreover, government intervention in crop insurance
markets as well as public price risks management programmes are more the rule than the
exception in this sector. In times of trade liberalization and agricultural policy reforms,
risk management is a crucial issue for both developed and developing countries. The two
other essays deal with more general issues of respectively, insurance supply and prevention
choices.
Chapter 1, Risk Prevention in Agriculture with Incomplete Insurance Markets investi-
gates the issue of optimal risk prevention against a systemic production risk in the absence
of insurance market in agriculture. Choosing technologies that reduce yield losses in case
of unfavourable climatic event allows to stabilize farmers' revenues and reduce consumers'
exposure to price risk. Several inputs, such as irrigation, pesticides, and the use of resistant
varieties not only increase expected yields but also have a preventive role by reducing yield
losses coming from natural events. It is well known from the literature on pecuniary exter-
nalities that farmers do not internalize the social cost of their production decisions when
insurance markets are incomplete. This has lead to reassess the desirability of government
intervention in this sector. Hence, several government policies that are usually been proved
to be ineﬃcient in a non-stochastic world have been shown to be Pareto improving in the
context of production risk and absent insurance markets. The most famous example in-
clude price stabilization schemes, target prices programmes and tariﬀs as insurance. This
chapter follows this literature but extends the analysis by focussing on the desirability of
a prevention incentive scheme that would reduce yield risk, and so food price risk in terms
of social welfare.
Chapter 2, Raising Capital in an Insurance Oligopoly Market deals with capital choices
of (re)insurance ﬁrms in the context of oligopoly. There are two fundamental motives for
these ﬁrms to hold costly internal capital. The ﬁrst one is to reduce default risk that
matter for insurees and alter their propensity to pay for the insurance contract. The
second one is the presence of costly external ﬁnance. In the latter case, capital and pricing
decisions are interrelated, since holding internal capital reduces the expected cost of risk
20
INTRODUCTION
for (re)insurance ﬁrms. The recent trend toward concentration in the insurance industry
suggests that pricing and capital allocations can be considered in a more strategic manner.
The objective of this chapter is to study the consequences of such strategic context on
pricing and capital choices with a theoretical model. To do so, we consider an oligopoly of
(re)insurers with stochastic marginal cost, featuring the inversion of the production cycle.
Competition is modelled as a two stage game. At stage one, ﬁrms strategically choose a
level of internal capital. In stage two, they compete in price on the insurance market. The
subgame perfect equilibria of this game are characterized and compared with the socially
optimal pricing and capital decisions. Then our analysis is discussed in the context of
(re)insurance markets and the need for government intervention is analyzed.
Chapter 3, Insurance and chemical use in French agriculture: an empirical analysis of
integrated risk management deals with multiple risks management in agriculture by in-
vestigating the determinants of insurance and pesticide use by French farmers. The context
of risk management is strongly evolving. First, current reforms of the Common Agricul-
tural Policy (CAP) tend to increase European farmers' exposure to price risk by removing
traditional price stabilization schemes. Decoupled direct payments that exist in the cur-
rent regime allow farmers to reduce the impact of risks on their activity but may be the
subject of negotiations in a near future. Second, environmental issues take more and more
importance in the agricultural policy making agenda, in particular pesticide use. The ob-
jective of this paper is to better understand the link between pesticide use and insurance
demand, and to identify the main factors that inﬂuence these choices. After an analysis
of the risk management context in the French agricultural sector and a description of the
French agricultural insurance system, we propose a theoretical framework that allow to
draw some predictions concerning the determinants of insurance demand and its link with
pesticide use. We then build an econometric model that is estimated using an original
panel dataset of French farms covering the period from 1993 to 2004.
Chapter 4 analyzes the incentives to invest in risk prevention when agents are inequity
averse. Several authors have underlined the importance of informal transfers in risk coping
as substitute to formal insurance contracts and compared their relative advantages and
weaknesses. Once the state of Nature is realized, inequity aversion transfers are desirable
since they express the individuals' desires to reduce inequality among agents. In a dynamic
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context, they may also have unvoluntary negative eﬀects on the incentives to invest in risk
prevention a situation often called the Samaritan's dilemma. Chapter two investigates
such problem with a theoretical model. To do so we consider a two-stage game between
two risk-neutral, inequity-averse agents. At stage one agents invest in an undivisible risk
prevention technology. At stage two they make inequity averse transfers. The subgame-
perfect equilibria of the game are derived and analyzed.
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Chapter 1
Risk Prevention in Agriculture with
Incomplete Insurance Markets
Abstract
This paper investigates the issue of risk prevention in agriculture in the absence of complete insurance
markets. The representative farmer can make use of a prevention input to reduce crop loss in case of a
natural unfavorable event. It is shown that, if price elasticity of demand is lower than one in absolute
value, then the competitive equilibrium prevention level decreases with the farmer's degree of risk aver-
sion. In addition, the paper characterizes the conditions for which the competitive prevention level is
higher or lower than the social optimum. Under assumptions that are reasonable in the context of an agri-
cultural market, it is shown that underprevention is more likely to occur, providing a potential rationale
for eﬃciency-enhancing governement intervention such as a prevention subsidy.
Keywords: Risk prevention, Systemic risk, Incomplete contingent-claims markets.
1.1 Introduction
In the context of climate change, the issue of prevention against natural hazards is becoming
a major preoccupation of researchers and policy makers, and citizens. For several reasons,
agriculture is certainly one of the most concerned sector. First, agricultural production is
very dependent on climate and biological hazards, and low price and income elasticities
of demand that are typical characteristics of basic food products make their prices very
sensitive to supply shocks, and so particularly unstable. Second, in spite of substantial
innovation for the provision of risk management tools in the agricultural sector in recent
years  notably the development of index-based insurance and futures markets in developing
countries (Cummins and Mahul, 2009), state-contingent claims markets remain often absent
or incomplete in many countries. Third, food price unstability hurt essentially the poor1.
The issue is not new and has inspired a large strand of research in economics as well as
policy interventions in the past in order to stabilize agricultural incomes and food prices.
1low-income consumers and poor farmers with limited access to ﬁnancial markets to diversify risk
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The nature of public intervention in this area has strongly evolved in the two recent decades,
both in developed and developing countries, and the debate is still open. Traditional public
policies such as price stabilization through public storage agencies, agricultural subsidies
targetted to the agricultural sector (fertilizers, investment in productive capital) are being
replaced by new forms of interventions favorizing the development of market-based risk
management instruments, such as innovative index-based insurance, futures and forward
markets. At the same time, some economists point out the importance of state intervention
speciﬁcally targeted to the agricultural sector, underlining the key role of agriculture in the
road to economic development and the vast set of market failures that still remains and
generates substantial welfare losses (Byerlee et al., 2009; de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2008;
Kanwar and Sadoulet, 2008).
The objective of this paper is to investigate the issue of risk prevention in agriculture in a
context of incomplete insurance markets. Following the classical contribution of Ehrlich and
Becker (1972), risk prevention can be deﬁned in two diﬀerent ways: self-protection, which is
a costly activity that reduces the probability of loss, and self-insurance, which reduces the
magnitude of the loss without aﬀecting its probability. In this paper, we consider the case
of self-insurance, which seems to be more realistic in the agricultural production context.
Self-insurance against crop losses by farmers can take several forms in practice. The most
known examples of self-insurance include irrigation water, phytosanitary products such
pesticids, herbicids, fungicides etc., and crop varieties that exhibit some form of robustness
in adverse states of Nature. The self-insurance formalization of Ehrlich and Becker (1972)
appears to be a reasonable description of these technologies. For example, it has been
shown that irrigation water modiﬁes the yield distribution in a non-linear way, pushing up
yields proportionnally more in high loss states than in low loss states (Roberts et al., 2004).
Typically, irrigation is more useful when there is a drought, and less when the weather is
rainy.
Related literature. Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) consider a competitive economy
with production risk and show that the market equilibrium is, apart from very special cases,
ineﬃcient when insurance markets are absent. The incompleteness of insurance markets
causes welfare losses because it prevents economic agents to smooth their consumption
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across states of Nature (direct eﬀect), and because it distorts production choices when the
latter modify the producers' risk exposures (indirect eﬀect). Following this fundamental
ineﬃciency result, further research has been devoted to the potential beneﬁts of second-
best governement policies in such incomplete markets context. Some typical real-world
government policies, usually critized for their deadweight losses, have been shown to be
Pareto improving under certain circumstances. Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) study the cases
of intertemporal price stabilization policies by a public storage agency, income taxation and
trade liberalization. Innes (1990) study the case of target prices in a similar closed two-
goods (food and numeraire) economy. He shows that under conditions that are realistic in
agricultural markets low price and income elasticities of demand, farmers and consumers
risk averse then there exists a Pareto-improving programme combining a target price
with lump-sum transfers between consumers-taxpayers and farmers2. Eaton and Grossman
(1985) show that tariﬀs as insurance can be a second-best Pareto improving policy3.
Nevertheless, to our knowledge, the issue of prevention against climate risks, which is the
subject of this chapter, has not been fully considered in the literature. In agriculture,
the choice of inputs has direct consequences on production risk. If all inputs increase the
expected yield, some do so with a collateral increase in yield risk (for example fertilizers),
while other have clearly a preventive action (e.g. irrigation water, pesticides, drought-
resistant seeds). In incomplete markets models, the possibility of Pareto improvement relies
on the ability of the government to redistribute risks between producers and consumers
when private markets are absent. The issue of prevention is a bit diﬀerent: the problem
is those of the optimal degree of reduction of a social risk that alternatively hurt farmers
and consumers. When some agents face a social (i.e. non diversiﬁable) risk they cannot
mitigate, a Pareto-eﬃcient allocation implies that the aggregate risk is shared according
to the agents' risk tolerances (Gollier, 2001). In the case of an agricultural market, state-
contingent claim markets are often incomplete but farmers can reduce the non diversiﬁable
risk by the mean of prevention.
2If all the policies cited above potentially increase social welfare, it must be kept in mind that they also
have various eﬀects on the distribution of the gains between producers and consumers-taxpayers.
3This line of research, developed during the 80's, have been subject of several types of criticism. The
most fundamental comes from Dixit, that argues that there is a fundamental weakness in these models,
which is that the reasons for private risk markets failures are not modelled explicitely. If a government
faces the same constraints (typically asymmetric information) than those causing private market failure,
the welfare gains may be quantitatively small, and even negative (Dixit, 1987, 1989a,b). Moreover, the
potential welfare gains are very sensitive to parameters values.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a presentation of the model, i.e. the
agents and their preferences, the nature of the risk and the prevention technology. Section
3 studies the competitive market and the level of prevention that arises at equilibrium,
and the Pareto-constrained eﬃcient level that would be selected under direct control by a
benevolent and omniscient government. The case of prevention subsidies is also analyzed.
Section 4 studies the potential eﬀects of opening trade on the market level of prevention.
1.2 The model
1.2.1 Preferences and endowments
We consider a two-goods closed economy4, with a competitive agricultural sector producing
a single good (푌 ), and a representative consumer initially endowed with an exogenous level
of numeraire (퐼). The representative farmer is assumed to be risk-averse in the sense of
von Neumann and Morgenstern, with an increasing and concave utility function 푢푃 (.), i.e.
푢′푃 (.) ≥ 0 and 푢′′푃 (.) ≤ 0. Denoting 휋˜ his random proﬁt, the expected utility 푈푃 of the
producer has the following form (E being the expectation operator):
푈푃 = E푢[휋˜] (1.1)
The assumption of competitive market implies that farmers are price takers, i.e. they
consider state-contingent prices of their output as given. It is also assumed that they hold
rational expectations, i.e. they correctly forecast the equilibrium state-contingent prices.
On the demand side we consider a representative consumer which is risk averse with re-
spect to consumption ﬂuctuations, his preferences being characterized by an increasing and
concave utility function 푢퐶(.) over the agricultural good, with 푢
′
퐶(.) ≥ 0 and 푢′′퐶(.) ≤ 0.
푢퐶 is not necessarily identical to 푢푃 . The consumer's preferences can be expressed by the
indirect utility function 푉 (푃, 퐼) which is deﬁned as follows
푉 (푃, 퐼) = max
푌
푢퐶(푌 ) (1.2)
s.t. 푃푌 ≤ 퐼
where 푃 is the price of the agricultural good and 퐼 his initial numeraire endowment. 퐼 is
4We will also discuss the consequences of opening trade using a simpliﬁed model with two symmetric
countries with anti-correlated shocks.
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assumed to be exogenous and non-stochastic. By Roy's identity, the consumer's demand
for the agricultural good 푌 푑 is given by
푌 푑 = −푉푃 (푃, 퐼)
푉퐼(푃, 퐼)
(1.3)
Facing a stochastic price of the agricultural good 푃˜ , the consumer's expected utility 푈퐶 is
written as
푈퐶 = E푉 (푃˜ , 퐼) (1.4)
For a small price risk 푃˜ , the consumer beneﬁts (loses) from stabilizing the price at the mean
E푃˜ = 푃 if 푉 is concave (convex) in price. The sign of 푉푃푃 depends on the consumer's
income risk aversion, but also on the income elasticity of demand and the price elasticity of
demand (see Appendix for an analysis in the context of a small price risk). Throughout the
paper, 휀 = 푑 log 푌푑 log푃 and 휂 =
푑 log 푌
푑 log 퐼 will denote respectively the price and income elasticities
of demand for the agricultural good, 휙 = 퐼푉퐼퐼푉퐼 the consumer's coeﬃcient of relative risk
aversion, and 푃 (.) the inverse demand function.
1.2.2 Prevention technology
The farmer can make use of a self-insurance technology (or prevention to be short) that
reduces yield risk coming from a particular climate event such as pesticides against biolog-
ical risks, or irrigation water against drought5. The climate risk is assumed to be systemic,
i.e. it aﬀects all agricultural producers at the same time. We focus on a static model
and consider the most simple formalization of self-insurance, that comes from Ehrlich and
Becker (1972). There are two states of Nature, a loss state (indexed by 1), occuring with
probability 푝, where the yield is 푌1 = 푌 − 퐿(푥) > 0 and a no-loss state (indexed by 2)
occuring with probability 1 − 푝, where it is 푌2 = 푌 , 푌 ∈ ℜ+∗. The loss function 퐿(.) is
assumed to be decreasing and convex in its single argument 푥, that represents the number
of units of the prevention good, which is available at the unitary cost of 푐. At last, we
suppose that lim푥→+∞ 퐿(푥) = 퐿 > 0 in order to ensure that state 1 is always the low
yield state, whatever the prevention eﬀort of the producer.
5There is no doubt that in the real world these techniques involve a complex set of sequential decisions.
In the case of irrigation, it includes the initial investment in irrigation capacities, the fraction of the area to
be irrigated, the choice of irrigation system (such as ﬂood, micro-sprinkler, or drip irrigation), and the level
of water on each acre (see Schoengold and Zilberman (2005) for further details on irrigation technologies).
It is not our purpose to consider the whole range of such choices and their dynamic aspect.
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1.3 Risk prevention in a closed market
1.3.1 Competitive equilibrium
Competitive equilibrium without redistribution.  In a closed market, the climate output
shock directly aﬀects the equilibrium price of the agricultural good, since it is impossible
to export or import. Let (푃1, 푃2) be the price vector anticipated by the farmer. Since
state 1 is the low yield state, we will always have 푃1 > 푃2 at equilibrium. The price vector
(푃1, 푃2) being considered to be ﬁxed for the representative producer making his choice.
His expected utility, 푈푃 , is
푈푃 = 푝푢 ((푌 − 퐿(푥))푃1 − 푐푥) + (1− 푝)푢 (푌 푃2 − 푐푥) (1.5)
One can easily verify that 푈푃 is concave in 푥 for a given price-vector (푃1, 푃2). Assuming
an unique solution, the market equilibrium (푥푒, 푃 푒1 , 푃
푒
2 ) is implicitely deﬁned by the fol-
lowing set of equations: the ﬁrst-order condition (5) and the two state-contingent market
equilibrium conditions (6) and (7).
−푝 [푃 푒1퐿푥(푥푒) + 푐]푢′(휋1(푥푒)) = (1− 푝)푐푢′(휋2(푥푒)) (1.6)
푃 푒1 = 푃 (푌 − 퐿(푥푒)) (1.7)
푃 푒2 = 푃 (푌 ) (1.8)
with 휋1(푥
푒) = (푌 − 퐿(푥푒))푃 푒1 − 푐푥푒 and 휋2(푥푒) = 푌 푃 푒2 − 푐푥푒.
A ﬁrst remark the second-order condition has an ambiguous sign, so 푥푒(.) may have dis-
continuity points:
Remark 1 There may be a multiplicity of equilibria.
The fact that the unicity of the equilibrium is not always ensured is a typical characteristic
of incomplete markets models, and we did not ﬁnd any restrictions on preferences or tech-
nology that would ensure unicity. We examine the eﬀect of the producer's risk aversion on
the market equilibrium. Intuitively, we can expect that more risk averse producers will buy
more units of the prevention good. After all, in a closed market with output shocks only,
the price distribution strictly reﬂects the output distribution. Hence, except in the very
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special case of unitary price elasticity of demand (where the farmer's income is the same
across states of Nature), reducing the variance of the output reduces the variance of the
price, leading at some cost to a less risky revenue for the producer. Following this line of
reasoning, a country with a more risk averse representative farmer should self-insure more.
We show that such a simple statement is not true in general, and may even be false in
the conditions that prevail in agricultural markets, i.e. systemic production risk and low
elasticity of demand for the agricultural product. A simple comparative statics analysis
allow us to derive the following proposition.
Proposition 1. If 휀 > −1 (respectively = −1, < −1), then prevention decreases (respec-
tively does not change, increases) with the farmer's coeﬃcient of risk aversion (absolute
under CARA, relative under DARA).
Proof. We consider the case of a power utility function (DARA), but a similar proof could
be obtained under CARA. For a level of wealth 푊 , let 푢 be of the followning form:
푢(푊 ) =
푊 1−훾
1− 훾 (1.9)
where 훾 is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion. Using this speciﬁcation, and substituting
the market equilibrium conditions (6) and (7) into the ﬁrst-order condition (5), we obtain
the following equation that deﬁnes the prevention at equilibrium 푥푒:
−푝 [푃 푒1퐿푥 + 푐] [(푌 − 퐿(푥푒))푃 푒1 − 푐푥푒]−훾 − (1− 푝)푐 [푌 푃 푒2 − 푐푥푒]−훾 = 0 (1.10)
Let 퐻(푥푒, .) be the LHS of this equation. Diﬀerentiating both sides with respect to 훾, and
rearranging terms, we get
푑푥푒(훾)
푑훾
= −Δ−1∂퐻(푥
푒(훾), 훾)
∂훾
(1.11)
where Δ = ∂퐻(푥푒(훾), 훾)/∂푥. Assuming that Δ ≤ 0, 푑푥푒(훾)/푑훾 has the sign of
∂퐻(푥(훾), 훾)
∂훾
= −푝 [푃 푒1퐿푥 − 푐] ln [1/휋1(푥푒)] [휋1(푥푒)]−훾 − (1− 푝)푐 ln[1/휋2(푥푒)] [휋2(푥푒)]−훾
(1.12)
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Note that when 휋1(푥
푒) = 휋2(푥
푒), which is the case under the isoelastic speciﬁcation case
휀 = −1, this expression reduces to
ln [1/휋1(푥
푒)]퐻(푥푒) = 0
since by deﬁnition 퐻(푥푒) = 0. It is straightforward that if 휋1(푥
푒) > 휋2(푥
푒) (respectively
<), then the expression is negative (respectively positive). A suﬃcient condition for this
to occur is 휀 > −1 (respectively < −1). For example, with the isoelastic speciﬁcation we
have
휋1(푥
푒)− 휋2(푥푒) = (푌 − 퐿(푥푒))푃 푒1 − 푌 푃 푒2 = [푌 − 퐿(푥푒)]1+1/휀 − 푌 1+1/휀
Since by assumption 푌 − 퐿(푥) < 푌 for all 푥, the sign depends on 휀 as described in
proposition 1. A similar proof can be obtained in the CARA case. This comparative
statics analysis relies on the assumption Δ ≤ 0, but in general the sign of Δ is ambiguous
(multiple equilibria). To ensure that this result is really possible, at least in certain cases,
we made numerical computations for several coeﬃcients of relative risk aversion, that
conﬁrm what is stated in proposition 1.
Proposition (1) states that, when markets are incomplete, the qualitative eﬀect of the
farmer's risk aversion on the equilibrium level of prevention can be reversed, depending
on value of the price elasticity of demand. In particular, if 휀 is less than one in absolute
value everywhere, then prevention decreases with the producer's risk aversion coeﬃcient
(absolute under CARA or relative under DARA). Although counterintuitive at a ﬁrst sight,
this result nevertheless relies on standard explanation, i.e. the pecuniary externalities
coming from the absence of market for state-contingent claims. Indeed, even if they hold
rational expectations, farmers act in a competitive market, and so are price distribution
takers. As a consequence, they only consider the marginal eﬀect of prevention on their
own output distribution, but not the aggregate eﬀect on the price distribution, which they
consider to be ﬁxed when making their decision. In the case of a prevention activity,
farmers do not take into account at the margin the price stabilisation eﬀect that comes
from the sum of their individual prevention decisions. The price distribution is a public
good for farmers. When the price elasticity of demand is elsewhere less than one, the
low output state corresponds to the high revenue state, and a marginal increase in self-
insurance for a given price distribution increases the quantity of output in the high price
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(and so revenue) state without changing the quantity output in the low price (revenue)
state. Prevention is then seen by the rational and competitive farmer as increasing the
variance of his revenue. So the more risk averse he is, the less he will self-insure. This occurs
under the assumptions of systemic production risk and low price elasticity of demand, that
seem reasonable in the context of agricultural markets. To give some ideas, according to the
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), an estimation for 1996 gives values for
price elasticities of demand that are generally greater or equal than −0, 5 for the majority
of food products. Concerning the nature of production risk, there are also some evidence
in the literature in favour of a high spatial correlation of crop losses (Miranda and Glauber,
1997), even if the polar case of perfect correlation across losses is a simplifying assumption.
Competitive equilibrium with redistribution.  In a non-stochastic economy
and/or with risk-neutral agents, a redistribution policy consisting in lump-sum payments
from one category to the other (for example from consumers to farmers) has no eﬀect
on the market equilibrium. When production is stochastic and farmers risk-averse, this
is no longer the case since a wealth eﬀect must be taken into account under IARA or,
more realistically, DARA. Under CARA, it is straightforward that redistribution does not
modify the equilibrium. The other eﬀect is the consumer's income, which we can assume
negligible since income elasticity of demand is in general low in agricultural markets.
1.3.2 Socially optimal prevention
We now characterize the socially optimal level of prevention under direct control. Let 푀
and푁 be respectively the number of producers and consumers in the economy. The socially
optimal level of prevention is the one that maximizes the social welfare function 푆푊 , which
is deﬁned as the sum (eventually weighted by 휆) of the representative producer's utilities
푈푃 and the consumer's utilities 푈퐶 :
푆푊 = 휆푀푈푃 +푁푈퐶 (1.13)
Let 훼 = 푀/푁 denote the fraction of agricultural producers relative to consumers in the
economy, and 휆 a parameter that reﬂects the preferences of the governement for producers
(휆 > 1), consumers (휆 < 1), or equal preferences (휆 = 1). The government, which is
assumed to be benevolent and omniscient, has a direct control on prevention and can
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redistribute wealth across the two categories of agents by the mean of a lump-sum transfer
푇 (eventually negative) from consumers to producers. The social welfare function can be
expressed as follows
푆푊 (푥, 푇 ) = 휆푀
{
푝푢
[
(푌 − 퐿(푥))푃1 − 푐푥+ 푇
훼
]
+ (1− 푝)푢
[
푌 푃2 − 푐푥+ 푇
훼
]}
+푁 {푝푉 (퐼 − 푇, 푃1) + (1− 푝)푉 (퐼 − 푇, 푃2)} (1.14)
where the ﬁrst term and the second term are respectively the expected utility of producers
and consumers. Assuming 푆푊 concave in (푥, 푇 ), the optimal government plan (푥∗, 푇 ∗) is
deﬁned by the the two following ﬁrst-order conditions:
∂푆푊
∂푇
= 0 = 휆푀
{
푝
[
1 + 푌1
∂푃1
∂푇
]
푢′(휋1) + (1− 푝)
[
1 + 푌2
∂푃2
∂푇
]
푢′(휋2)
}
−푁
{
푝
[
푉 1퐼 −
∂푃1
∂푇
푉 1푃
]
− (1− 푝)
[
푉 2퐼 −
∂푃2
∂푇
푉 2푃
]}
(1.15)
∂푆푊
∂푥
= 0 = 휆푀
{−푝 [푃 ∗1퐿푥(푥∗) + 푐]푢′(휋1(푥∗))− (1− 푝)푐푢′(휋2(푥∗))}
+휆푀
{
푝 [푌 − 퐿(푥∗)] ∂푃1
∂푥
}
+푁푝
∂푃1
∂푥
푉 1푃 (1.16)
Following Newbery and Stiglitz (Newbery and Stiglitz (1981)), using Roy's relation allows
to rewrite the second equation as follows
∂푆푊
∂푥
= 0 = 휆
{−푝 [푃 ∗1퐿푥(푥∗) + 푐]푢′(휋1(푥∗))− (1− 푝)푐푢′(휋2(푥∗))}
+푝 [푌 − 퐿(푥∗)] ∂푃1
∂푥
[
휆푢′(휋1(푥∗))− 푉퐼
]
(1.17)
We aim at comparing the competitive equilibrium outcome with the socially optimal one.
The term in the ﬁrst line of equation (1.17) corresponds to the ﬁrst-order condition char-
acterizing the market equilibrium (at a factor 휆). It is not necessary equal to zero when
evaluated at 푥푒, since 푇 ∗ ∕= 푇 푒 (i.e. the socially optimal lump-sum transfer is not the same
in the competitive market than in the social optimum). This is indeed the case in two
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situations: the ﬁrst one is when redistribution is not considered, the second one is when
the farmer's utility function has the CARA speciﬁcation. The term in the second line
of equation (1.17) represents the pecuniary externality due to the absence of contingent
claims markets, which is not taken into account by competitive farmers but is internal-
ized by the government. Hence, a suﬃcient condition for the market equilibrium to be
Pareto-constrained eﬃcient is that this term be equal to zero when evaluated at 푥푒, which
is ensured under a narrow set of very speciﬁc restrictions (Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981).
Hence Pareto constrained eﬃciency of the competitive market is not likely to occur in most
cases. Since we are concerned about a speciﬁc technological form, prevention, we focus on
the sense of deviation that arises between the competitive market and the social optimum.
In other words, we wonder if, for realistic values of the parameters, the competitive market
is likely to supply too much or too less prevention.
Characterizing the sense of deviation consists in comparing 푥푒 with 푥∗. To do this, we look
at the sign of the RHS of equation (1.17) at 푥푒. To avoid the potential ambiguity that
could arise from a wealth eﬀect caused by the redistribution policy, we consider the case
of a CARA utility function in what follows (but let it written as 푢(.)). Let (푥푒, 푇 푒) be the
the prevention level and optimal redistribution policy at the market equilibrium. Under
CARA, the term in the ﬁrst line of (1.17) vanishes, so (1.17) can be rewritten as
∂푆푊
∂푥
(푥푒) = 훼푝 [푌 − 퐿(푥푒)] ∂푃1
∂푥
(푥푒)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
[휆푢′(휋1(푥푒) + 푇 ∗/훼)− 푉퐼(푃1(푥푒), 퐼 − 푇 ∗)] (1.18)
From our assumptions concerning concavity, we have 푥푒 < 푥∗ if ∂푆푊∂푥 (푥
푒) > 0. The sign
of this expression, and thus the sense of the deviation, depend on the sign of the term
휉 = 휆푢′(휋1(푥푒))− 푉퐼(푃1(푥푒), 퐼). The following proposition gives suﬃcient conditions such
that there is under-prevention at the market equilibrium.
Proposition 2. If the following conditions are ensured: i. 푢 has the CARA speciﬁcation,
with 훾 being the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion, ii. 푉퐼푃 ≥ 0 (i.e. 휙 ≥ 휖), iii. 휖 > −1
(demand is suﬃciently price inelastic), iv. ∂푇 ∗/∂훾 ≥ 0, then there exists 훾 ≥ 0 such that
훾 ≥ 훾 ⇒ 푥푒 ≤ 푥푠.
Proof. We consider the term 휉 as a function of 훾, the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient:
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휉(훾) = 휆푢′(휋1(푥푒(훾)) +
푇 푠(훾)
훼
)− 푉퐼(푃1(푥푒(훾)), 퐼 − 푇 푠(훾)) (1.19)
We study the sense of variation of 휉(훾). To do so we calculate its ﬁrst derivative, which is
푑휉
푑훾
=
∂푥푒
∂훾
⎧⎨⎩휆
∂휋1
∂푥푒
푢′′
(
휋1(푥
푒(훾)) +
푇 ∗(훾)
훼
)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
− ∂푃1
∂푥푒︸︷︷︸
≤0
푉퐼푃 (푃1(푥
푒(훾)), 퐼 − 푇 ∗(훾))
⎫⎬⎭+⎡⎢⎣푢′′1 + 푉 1퐼퐼︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
⎤⎥⎦ ∂푇 ∗
∂훾
(1.20)
From proposition 1, we know that the sign of ∂푥
푒
∂훾 depends on the price elasticity of demand.
If it is less than one in absolute value, which is the most reasonable assumption for an
agricultural market, then it is negative. We now look at the following term
∂휋1
∂푥푒
=
∂푃1
∂푥푒
푌1(푥
푒) + 푃1
∂푌1
∂푥푒
− 푐 (1.21)
Again the sign of this expression depends on the price elasticity of demand. If 휀 > −1, then
it is negative because the increase in output at a given price is more than proportionnaly
(negatively) compensated by a decrease of the equilibrium price. The last term to study
in order to get the result is 푉퐼푃 (푃1(푥
푒(훾)), 퐼). Following Newbery and Stiglitz (1981), this
term can be expanded as follows
푉퐼푃 =
푉퐼
푃
(휙− 휂) (1.22)
where 휙 is the consumer's relative risk aversion and 휂 his income elasticity of demand for
the agricultural good . Thus 푉퐼푃 ≥ implies that 휙 ≥ 휂. In other words, it requires that the
consumer is suﬃciently risk averse and/or has low income elasticity of demand. Following
Innes (1990), this seems to be a reasonable for agricultural markets. Finally, combining
the signs of the diﬀerent terms gives the result that 푑휉푑훾 ≤ 0, so 휉 is decreasing under the
conditions that are exposed in proposition 2.
To conclude the proof, we show that lim훾→+∞ 휉(훾) < 0 to ensure the existence of a positive
훾. This is clearly the case since prevention tends to 0 when 훾 → +∞. Hence, the state 1
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price tends to inﬁnity and so the farmer's revenue. Hence, with lim푊→+∞ 푢′(푊 ) = 0, and
lim푃→+∞ 푉퐼(푃, 퐼) > 0 we get the result.
Proposition 2 states that, under conditions that are well-known characteristics of agricul-
tural markets, the level of prevention that arises at the competitive equilibrium is likely to
be less than would the constrained Pareto level. This means that in a competitive market
where contingent claims are absent, the expected price of the agricultural good will be
higher and more risky than would be socially desirable. What fundamentally runs this
result? First, as stated in proposition 1, the farmer's risk aversion is not a motive, and
even is a disincentive for prevention when price elasticity of demand is low. Their unique
motive for prevention is the expected beneﬁt they get from it. If price elasticity of demand
is strictly less than one, the more they are risk averse, the less they will self-insure, and
ﬁnally the more price will be risky, and so will be their income. In a certain sense, one
could say that the farmers' risk aversion generates price risk, and so farmers' income risk.
Intutively, one cannot expect such a mechanism to be optimal for the point of the view of
agricultural producers, since the more they dislike risk, the more they will get exposed to
it. Moreover, this exposes consumers to higher and more risky price for the agricultural
good. To get some insight of the nature of the Pareto improvement that would constitute
a mandatory increase in prevention, consider as a benchmark what would constitute the
socially optimal risk-sharing rule between the two categories. If state-contingent claims
markets are complete, the eﬃcient risk-sharing rule implies that
푢′(휋1 + 푇 )
푢′(휋2 + 푇 )
=
푉퐼(푃1, 퐼 − 푇 )
푉퐼(푃2, 퐼 − 푇 ) (1.23)
i.e. the ratio of marginal utilities of income in the two states are equal between individuals
(Gollier, 2001). If contingent-claims markets are incomplete, we cannot have such equality.
When prevention is suboptimal at the market equilibrium, the state 1 price is too high, so
we have
푢′(휋푒1 + 푇 )
푢′(휋푒2 + 푇 )
<
푉퐼(푃
푒
1 , 퐼 − 푇 )
푉퐼(푃 푒2 , 퐼 − 푇 )
(1.24)
When the government increases 푥 up from 푥푒 to its socially optimal level 푥∗, it reduces the
state 1 price, and so the farmer's proﬁt in this state. This also reduces his proﬁt in state 2
by increasing the expense in prevention. If price elasticity of demand is suﬃciently low, the
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producer's ratio will increase. At the same time, the consumer's ratio will decrease, since
his marginal utility is constant in state 2 and decreases (because of the decrease in price) in
state 1. Hence, a mandatory increase in prevention reduces the gap between the consumer's
and producer's ratios of marginal utilities. Perfect equality is however unattainable since
markets are incomplete and prevention is costly and exhibits decreasing returns to scale.
Perfect equality would imply 푥 =∞, which would be inﬁnitely costly for the producer.
1.3.3 Prevention subsidy
The previous analysis has shown that, under certain circumstances that are reasonable
assumptions for agricultural markets (risk-averse producer and consumer, price elasticity
of demand less than one, low income elasticity of demand), farmers may underinvest in
prevention because of incomplete markets. This provides a possible rationale for governe-
ment policies in favour of prevention in the agricultural sector, such as the use of irrigation,
or the development of drought-resistant seeds. Direct control of prevention by the govern-
ment is possible in theory, but limited in practice. Another way of reaching the socially
optimal level of prevention is to subsidize it. In many countries of the world, farmers
beneﬁt from substantial subsidization of irrigation water, either directly through a lower
unitary cost of water, or indirectly through government support in initial investment in
irrigation technologies. This kind of intervention is at most seen as an ineﬃcient way of
redistributing income from one category of agents to another, involving deadweight costs6.
This assertion, which relies on a standard welfare analysis of non-stochastic economy with
complete markets, is certainly realistic in this context, but can be challenged in the case
of production risk, incomplete markets and a prevention technology.
We consider the case of a prevention subsidy 푠 ∈ [0, 푐[ ﬁnanced by the consumer-taxpayer,
that lower the market price of prevention from 푐 to 푐 − 푠. Each consumer-taxpayer pays
individually 푓 to ﬁnance the programme. The economy being composed of 푀 farmers and
푁 consumers, the global cost of the programme is 푀푠푥, that has to be balanced by the
global contribution 푁푓 from consumers. Using 훼 = 푀/푁 ,the budget constraint is
훼푠푥 = 푓 (1.25)
6Note that in the case of input subsidies, the winners are not necessary the producers. When the price
elasticity of demand is low, consumers may globally beneﬁt from an input subsidy through a lower food
price.
36
CHAPTER 1. RISK PREVENTION IN AGRICULTURE WITH INCOMPLETE
INSURANCE MARKETS
A second constraint is that the consumers participation to the programme cannot exceed
their own resources, i.e. 푓 < 퐼 which we can always assume to be true by choosing
a suﬃciently high level of income. The regulator's problem is not much diﬀerent than
before. Instead of having a direct control over 푥, the regulator uses 푠 to raise prevention
up to its socially optimal level. With a subsidy 푠, the market equilibrium becomes 푥푒(푠).
Using the prevention subsidy and redistribution, the government's programme is
max
푠,푇
푆푊 (푥푒(푠), 푇 ) (1.26)
Again we assume that 푆푊 is concave in (푠, 푇 ). Under this condition, the government's
optimal plan (푠ˆ, 푇ˆ ) is, as before, deﬁned by the two ﬁrst-order conditions
∂푆푊
∂푇
= 0 = 휆푀
{
푝
[
1 + 푌1
∂푃1
∂푇
]
푢′(휋1) + (1− 푝)
[
1 + 푌2
∂푃2
∂푇
]
푢′(휋2)
}
−푁
{
푝
[
푉 1퐼 −
∂푃1
∂푇
푉 1푃
]
− (1− 푝)
[
푉 2퐼 −
∂푃2
∂푇
푉 2푃
]}
(1.27)
∂푆푊
∂푠
= 0 = 휆푀푥
[
푝푢′1 + (1− 푝)푢′2
]−푁 [푥+ 푠ˆ∂푥
∂푠
] [
푝푉 1퐼 + (1− 푝)푉 2퐼
]
+
{
푝
∂푃1
∂푠
[
휆푀푌1푢
′
1 +푁푉
1
푃
]
+ (1− 푝)∂푃2
∂푠
[
휆푀푌2푢
′
2 +푁푉
2
푃
]}
+휆푀
∂푥
∂푠
{
푝 [−푃1퐿푥 − (푐− 푠ˆ)]푢′1 − (1− 푝)(푐− 푠ˆ)푢′2
}
+푝
∂푥
∂푠
[푌 − 퐿(푥(푠ˆ))] ∂푃1
∂푥
[
휆푢′
(
휋1(푥(푠ˆ)) +
푇ˆ
훼
)
− 푉퐼
(
푃1(푥(푠ˆ)), 퐼 − 푇ˆ
)]
(1.28)
The ﬁrst-order condition (1.28) can be decomposed into four terms (each line of equation
(1.28)) that reﬂect the four eﬀects of a prevention subsidy: the term in the ﬁrst line
reﬂects the redistribution from consumers to producers that arises from a lower prevention
cost, which directly beneﬁts farmers. The terms in the second line represents the indirect
redistribution of expected utility through income eﬀect on the equilibrium state-contingent
prices. Provided that the income elasticity of demand is low, this term can be considered as
negligible. The term in the third line is the ﬁrst-order condition of the market equilibrium
(at a factor 휆푀), which equals zero under CARA (for the same reason as before, i.e. absent
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wealth eﬀect). At last, the term in the fourth line represents the pecuniary externality, as
seen in the case of direct control.
Proposition 3. If 휂 = 0 and 푢 has the CARA speciﬁcation, then equation (1.28) reduces
to
∂푆푊
∂푠
= 0 = −푁푠∂푥
∂푠
[
푝푉 1퐼 + (1− 푝)푉 2퐼
]
+
푝
∂푥
∂푠
[푌 − 퐿(푥푠)] ∂푃1
∂푥
[
휆푢′
(
휋1(푥
푒(푠ˆ)) +
푇ˆ
훼
)
− 푉퐼
(
푃1(푥(푠ˆ)), 퐼 − 푇ˆ
)]
(1.29)
Proof. If 휂 = 0, the state-contingent prices are unsensitive to variations in the consumers'
incomes, so the partial derivatives if state prices with respect to transfers vanish. In this
case, we note that the ﬁrst line of equation (1.28) is equal to the RHS of equation (1.27),
which is equal to zero at the optimum, plus the term −푁푠∂푥∂푠
[
푝푉 1퐼 + (1− 푝)푉 2퐼
]
. Under
CARA the term in the third line of (1.28) vanishes, hence the result.
The conditions under which a strictly positive prevention is Pareto improving is ∂푆푊∂푠 (푠 =
0) > 0. Since at 푠 = 0, prevention is equal to 푥푒 (competitive equilibrium without inter-
vention), this can be expressed as follows
∂푆푊
∂푠
(푠 = 0) = 푝
∂푥
∂푠
[푌 − 퐿(푥푒)] ∂푃1
∂푥
[
휆푢′
(
휋1(푥
푒) +
푇ˆ
훼
)
− 푉퐼
(
푃1(푥
푒), 퐼 − 푇ˆ
)]
> 0
(1.30)
Hence, the condition reduces to
휆푢′
(
휋1(푥
푒) +
푇ˆ
훼
)
− 푉퐼
(
푃1(푥
푒), 퐼 − 푇ˆ
)
< 0 (1.31)
This condition appears to be similar to the one studied in the direct control case. However
there is no presomption that 푇 ∗ = 푇ˆ , hence one cannot deduce that under conditions that
ensure underprevention are exactly the same that those that ensure a strictly positive sub-
sidy to be optimal. Since a prevention subsidy modify risk, but also redistribute income
from consumers to farmers, one can suppose that redistribution is lower with a subsidy
that under direct control. Hence, there may be ranges of parameters that ensure under-
prevention but under which a prevention subsidy is not optimal. We nevertheless shows
that under incomplete markets, under certain conditions that are not much unrealistic in
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agricultural markets, subsidizing prevention activities may be Pareto improving. Because
of incomplete markets, competitive farmers may underinvest in prevention, leading to a
more risky price. Because they are risk averse, consumers dislike price volatility, and so
have a propensity to pay for reducing it, i.e. they are characterized by a positive risk
premium.
1.4 The impact of opening trade
The precedent analysis has been conducted for the case of a closed economy, where price
ﬂuctuations are pure mirrors of output shocks. In these types of models, risk is shared
between producers and consumers through the price of the agricultural good. Because
of incomplete markets, there is always a potential for increasing social welfare through
an improvement in risk sharing through a governement intervention. Opening trade may
completely remove this justiﬁcation. For example, consider the same economy as before
as a small open economy with a perfectly elastic (possibly stochastic) world price. In such
situation, there is no link between domestic production and domestic price any more, and
so no opportunity to increase eﬃcieny through a better risk-sharing arrangement. How-
ever, one can imagine another situation. Suppose that because of comparative advantage,
one country (or region) gets specialized in the production of the given agricultural good,
providing it to its consumers and the rest of the world. In this case the underprevention
result holds. In the following subsections we consider an intermediate case, where two
identical countries of the same size are opening trade.
1.4.1 Two symmetric countries
Let 푌푠(푥) denote the state-contingent output of the domestic producer in state of Nature
푠, and 푌 ∗푠∗(푥∗) the foreign's one. More generally, all the variables and parameters with a ∗
symbol as a superscript are related to the foreign country. The two countries are similar
than the one described in the preceding section with competitive agricultural sectors. Fol-
lowing N-S, climate shocks are assumed to be perfectly negatively correlated across the two
countries, which means that when a loss occurs in one country, no one does in the other one,
and vice versa. Each state of Nature has the probability 푝 = 1/2 to occur. The domestic
producer chooses the level 푥 that maximizes his expected proﬁt provided that the foreign
one has chosen 푥∗, and vice versa. For each choice vector (푥, 푥∗) ∈ ℜ+2 and each state
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of Nature (푠, 푠∗) ∈ {(1; 2), (2, 1)} there is a resulting state-contingent price 푃 (푌푠푠∗(푥, 푥∗)),
where 푌푠푠∗(푥, 푥
∗) = 푦푠(푥) + 푦∗푠∗(푥∗) is the world production when states 푠 (domestic) and
푠∗ (foreign) occur, provided the farmers' choices (푥, 푥∗), and 푃 (.) the inverse demand func-
tion. Because shocks exhibit pure negative correlation with equal probabilities, this leads
to the following values for state-contingent production
푌12(푥, 푥
∗) = 2푌 − 퐿(푥) (1.32)
푌21(푥, 푥
∗) = 2푌 − 퐿(푥∗) (1.33)
Note that if farmers make a symmetric choice 푥 = 푥∗, then the world production will be
equal to 2푌 − 퐿(푥) in the two states of Nature, and so the world price will be perfectly
stable.
1.4.2 Symmetric equilibrium
We ﬁrst consider the symmetric equilibrium. Let 푈푃 (푥, 푥
∗) (respectively 푈∗푃 (푥, 푥
∗)) be
the expected utility of proﬁt of the domestic (respectively the foreign) farmer under the
strategy (푥, 푥∗). Under symmetry, farmers' choices are identical and so the world price is
perfectly stabilized. Denote 푃푤 the world price anticipated by the domestic farmer. His
expected utility is thus
푈푃 (푥, 푥
∗) = 푝푢 ((푌 − 퐿(푥)푃푤)− 푐푥) + (1− 푝)푢 (푌 푃푤 − 푐푥) (1.34)
Considering interior solutions, the prevention equilibrium in free trade 푥푡 is deﬁned by
the ﬁrst-order condition of the domestic (or the foreign) farmer (1.35) and the market
equilbrium condition (1.36) (using isoelatic speciﬁcation with 휖 = −1):
−푝 [푃푤퐿푥 + 푐]푢′ (휋1) = (1− 푝)푐푢′ (푌 푃푤 − 푐푥) (1.35)
푃푤 = 퐼 [2푌 − 퐿(푥)]−1 (1.36)
A simple comparative statics analysis on the eﬀect of 훾 on the market equilibrium gives
the following proposition:
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Proposition 4. In free trade with perfectly negative correlation of climate shocks and
symmetric countries, prevention increases with the farmers' risk aversion.
This contrasts with the case of autarky, where the eﬀect of risk aversion on prevention
may be positive or negative depending on the price elasticity of demand. We want to
compare the levels of prevention in autarky and free trade. We have seen that if 휖 = −1,
prevention in autarky is independent of the farmer's risk aversion. This leads to the
following proposition:
Proposition 5. Suppose that 휖 = −1 and let 푥푒(훾) and 푥푡(훾) be the prevention demand at
equilibrium, respectively in autarky and in free trade. There exists a level of risk aversion
훾ˆ > 0 such that 푠푖푔푛 [훾 − 훾ˆ] = −푠푖푔푛 [푥푒 − 푥푡]. If farmers are risk neutral, prevention is
lower in free trade than in autarky.
Proposition 5 illustrates the two opposite eﬀects that trade could have on prevention.
On the one hand, by smoothing climate shocks and so price variablity, trade reduces the
expected beneﬁt from prevention since farmers are deprived of rises in price when climatic
conditions are bad in their country. On the other hand the trade-induced price stabilisation
eliminates the natural hedge of their revenue and exposes them to output risk they can't
insure because of incomplete markets. If farmers are suﬃciently risk averse, opening trade
will increase the global demand for prevention by exposing them to output risk. If farmers'
risk aversion is low, the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates the second and opening trade leads to a
reduction in the global level of prevention.
1.5 Conclusion
We have studied the demand for prevention in an agricultural type market when contin-
gent claims markets are absent. We have characterized the competitive market equilibrium
under rational expectations and shown that when price elasticity of demand is less than
unity, prevention decreases with the farmers' risk aversion. We have characterized the so-
cially eﬃcient level of prevention, that internalizes the pecuniary externalities coming from
the absence of state-contingent claims markets, and given suﬃcient conditions that lead
to under-prevention at the market equilibrium and to the existence of a Pareto-improving
prevention subsidy. Considering the impact of trade, we have shown that opening trade,
by eliminating price unstability, leads to a lower expected beneﬁt from prevention, but also
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exposes farmers to greater output risk they cannot insure because of incomplete markets.
If risk aversion is suﬃciently high (low), prevention increases (decreases) after trade is
opened.
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1.6 Appendix
The link between income risk aversion and price risk aversion is recalled in this section. We
follow here the expositions of Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) and Chavas (2004). Considering
an indirect utility function 푉 (푃˜ , 퐼) with price 푃˜ stochastic and income 퐼 non-stochastic,
the consumer's attitude with respect to price risk can be analyzed in a similar vein than
income risk by deﬁning the willingness to pay to stabilize the price at its mean, 퐵, as
follows:
E푉 (푃˜ , 퐼) = 푉 (E푃˜ , 퐼 −퐵)
Computing a second-order Taylor series approximation of the LHS at the neighbourhood
of 푃˜ (respectively of the RHS at the neighbourhood of 퐵), we get
E푉 (푃˜ , 퐼) = E{푉 (E푃˜ , 퐼) + (푃˜ −E푃˜ )푉1 + 0.5(푃˜ −E푃˜ )2푉11}
= 푉 (E푃˜ , 퐼) + 0.5푉11Var푃˜
and
푉 (E푃˜ , 퐼 −퐵) = 푉 (E푃˜ , 퐼)−퐵푉2 (1.37)
Hence combining these two equations we get
퐵 = −0.5Var푃˜ 푉11
푉2
(1.38)
Since by assumption 푉2 > 0 consumers beneﬁt (lose) from stabilizing a small price risk at
its meann if 푉11 < 0 (> 0), i.e. 푉 is concave (convex) in the price argument.
It is possible to go further with the analysis by approximating 퐵 as a function of consumer's
relative risk aversion coeﬃcient and price and income elasticities of demand for small risks.
To do so, let us diﬀerentiate the Roy's relation 푌 푑 = −푉푃 (푃,퐼)푉퐼(푃,퐼) with respect to 푃˜ and 퐼.
We get respectively:
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푉11 = −푉12푌 푑 − 푉2∂푌
푑
∂푃˜
= [푉22푌
푑 + 푉2
∂푌 푑
∂퐼
]푌 푑 − 푉2∂푌
푑
∂푃˜
and
푉12 = −푉22푌 푑 − 푉2∂푌
푑
∂퐼
Hence we get
푉11
푉2
=
푉22
푉2
푌 푑2 +
∂푌 푑
∂퐼
푌 푑 − ∂푌
푑
∂푃
=
푌 푑
푃
[
퐼
푃푌 푑
퐼
푉22
푉2
+
퐼
푌 푑
푃푌 푑
퐼
∂푌 푑
∂퐼
− 푃
푌 푑
∂푌 푑
∂푃
]
=
푌 푑
푃
[
− 휙푃푌
푑
퐼
+ 휂
푃푌 푑
퐼
− 휀
]
Thus the beneﬁt from stabilizing 푃˜ at its mean can be approximated as follows
퐵 = −0.5Var푃˜ 푌
푑
푃
[
− 휙푃푌
푑
퐼
+ 휂
푃푌 푑
퐼
− 휀
]
(1.39)
퐵 increases with the size of the risk Var푃˜ , with the consumer's coeﬃcient of relative risk
aversion 휙, while it decreases with income elasticity of demand 휂 and price elasticity of
demand 휀 (which are respectively positive and negative).
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Chapter 2
Raising Capital in an Insurance
Oligopoly Market1
Abstract
We consider an oligopoly of ﬁrms that compete on price. Firms produce a non-stochastic output, in-
surance coverage, which is sold before the true cost is known. They behave as if they were risk-averse for a
standard reason of costly external ﬁnance. The model consists in a two-stage game. At stage 1, each ﬁrm
chooses its internal capital level. At stage 2, ﬁrms compete on price. We characterize the conditions for
Nash equilibria and analyze the strategic impact of capital choice on the market. We discuss the model
with regards to insurance industry speciﬁcity and regulation.
Keywords: Price Competition, Risk-averse Firms; Insurance Market, Capital Choice.
2.1 Introduction
This article presents a model of capital choice for an oligopoly of insurance ﬁrms with costly
external ﬁnance. Determining the appropriate levels of capital holding and investment in
risk management is a major component of insurers and reinsurers' activities, as well as a
prominent regulatory issue. Due to the trend towards consolidation of the last two decades,
insurance markets are far from being perfectly competitive. In the context of imperfect
competition, ﬁrms' price and capital decisions can be expected to become strategic vari-
ables. This leads to consider the question of capital regulation with a diﬀerent perspective.
In a market where capital choice and solvability are crucial and where cycles linking prices
and capital are observed empirically, it is useful to understand how capital decisions are
impacted by imperfect competition.
There are two fundamental reasons for an insurance ﬁrm to invest in risk management and
costly capital holding. The ﬁrst one is the concern for quality. The nature of the insurance
contract is essentially a promise to deliver indemnities ex-post in some states of Nature
1This chapter is coauthored with Sabine Lemoyne de Forges.
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in exchange for a premium paid in advance. The credibility of such promise is a major
preoccupation of policyholders. A contract with non-zero default risk has a lower value
for the policyholder than a fully credible contract, so consumers have a lower propensity
to pay for it. Hence proﬁt-maximizing insurance ﬁrms have a rationale to reduce their
probability of default because of consumers' concern, by investing in risk management
activities, and/or holding a suﬃcient level of capital that plays the role of a buﬀer stock.
This aspect refers to the solvency issue (Zanjani, 2002; Rees et al., 1999; Fagart et al.,
2002). The second explanation relies on direct state-contingent costs that make the ﬁrms'
payoﬀs becoming non-linear and so justify the use of risk management and capital holding
strategies, even if shareholders-managers, considered as the same entity, are risk neutral.
These non-linearities may include i. the presence of convex taxes on corporate earnings, ii.
ﬁnancial distress costs, iii. costly external funds due to costly state veriﬁcation (Gollier,
2007; Froot et al., 1993)2. These explanations are not mutually exclusive, and give so
many reasons for insurance and reinsurance ﬁrms to reinsure themselves, hedge, manage
risks and participate in insurance pools (Froot et al., 1993), as well as to hold internal
costly initial capital to reduce the cost of risk (Froot, 2007).
If such rationales for risk management and capital holding by insurers and reinsurers are
well understood (at least theoretically), less is known about the way these decisions operate
in the strategic context of imperfect competition. This lack of interest may come from the
fact that insurance markets are usually considered to be competitive. Although this as-
sumption is well-documented, there are also arguments in favour of imperfect competition
as a more appropriate framework in the cases of specialized insurance companies (Nye and
Hoander, 1987) and the reinsurance sector (Gron, 1990). Moreover, since the insurance
premiums are partly determined by the prices and capacities of reinsurance market, the de-
gree of competition in the reinsurance sector does matter for the insurance one. Intuitively,
the introduction of imperfect competition may have consequences on pricing and capital
decisions: when ﬁrms compete strategically in an oligopolistic market, risk management
decisions may be distorted by strategic eﬀects. These distortions may in turn aﬀect insur-
ance supply decisions, that is which lines of risks to cover and at which unit price. More
2Note that there is also a theoretical explanation that, on the contrary, supports the assumption of
risk-loving behavior of ﬁrms: limited liability, in a context of agency problems between creditors, who bear
the cost of distress if it occurs, and owners, who get the beneﬁts as long as they exist, but are protected
by a limited liability constraint if the ﬁrm goes bankrupt.
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capitalized ﬁrms would be able to accept more risks, and so capital holding could increase
their market shares on lines of risks that are characterized by high aggregate uncertainty.
The purpose of this paper is to study the endogenous choice of capital holding and pric-
ing decisions for an oligopoly of (re)insurance ﬁrms that face costly external ﬁnance. We
build on Froot et al. (1993), which provides one of the canonical explanations for ﬁrms'
risk management based on the assumption that internal capital is less costly than external
capital. We consider a price competition setting similar to Wambach (1999). Indeed as
argued by Rees et al. (1999), price competition seems more natural than quantity com-
petition if rationing the supply is diﬃcult once the price of the product has been posted
(Vives, 1999), as it is the case in the insurance sector. In the model, the number of insur-
ers is exogenous. Insurers cover a single line of risk which is characterized by aggregate
uncertainty, i.e. uncertainty on the level of the aggregate expected loss3. This uncertainty
may arise from correlated risks across policyholders, a typical feature of natural disaster
risks, such as earthquake, drought etc. Alternatively, it may also be interpreted as knigh-
tian uncertainty; this is typically characteristic of new technological risks, for which the
probability distribution cannot be derived from past observations.
In this framework, we analyze the strategic choice of capital for insurance ﬁrms. To do
so, we consider the following two-stage game: at the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrms choose their level of
internal capital which determines the ﬁrms' cost of risk, at the second stage, they compete
on price on the output market. Under imperfect competition, holding more capital reduces
the cost of risk for ﬁrms but has also consequences on competition through the ﬁrms'
price-setting game. As in Wambach (1999), we obtain a continuum of Nash equilibrium
prices at stage 2, allowing for positive oligopolistic rents. Under a stricter assumption of
decreasing absolute risk aversion, we ﬁnd that the ﬁrst-stage choice of capital is strategic for
the ﬁrms as playing safer on the capital market induces a harsher behavior on the product
market. We underline the importance of the cost of capital in the insurance industry
outcomes. Finally, we propose a diﬀerent approach to the question of capital regulation,
complementary to the classical quality argument (Plantin and Rochet, 2007): required
levels of capital may have an impact on competition prices, and thus be beneﬁcial in a
3When risks are statistically independent across policyholders, risk management and capital budgeting
decisions are still an issue since the probability of default is never null, but it is clear that the problem
becomes more stringent when there is aggregate uncertainty about the expected proﬁt from a line of risk.
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social welfare perspective.
Related literature. Our paper is related to both the oligopoly and ﬁnance literatures.
In recent years, the oligopoly literature has been extended to the case of risk-averse ﬁrms
facing diﬀerent sources of risk (demand, cost, rivals' characteristics). In this vein, Polborn
(1998) and Wambach (1999) study an oligopoly of 푛 ﬁrms with risk-averse managers,
producing a single output with constant but stochastic marginal cost. Firms commit to
the price of the output before the marginal cost is revealed, and then serve the whole
demand they face at the committed price, which is typically the Bertrand assumption.
Such assumptions appear to ﬁt very well with the insurance and reinsurance markets
where the cost of a given line of (re)insurance is not known with certainty at the time
contracts are sold, i.e. the production cycle is reversed4. In such setting, the authors
ﬁnd that the Bertrand paradox (Tirole, 1988) -i.e. the fact that at least two competitors
are suﬃcient to restore the competitive price outcome- can be resolved in the sense that
there exist Nash price equilibria above the expected marginal cost, which lead to strictly
positive oligopolistic rents. There are also multiple equilibria (Wambach, 1999) due to a
trade-oﬀ between expected proﬁt and risk for each of the competing ﬁrms. Asplund (2002)
generalizes the analysis to complementary or substitute strategies and takes into account
the possible covariations across ﬁrms' individual risks. He also notes the importance of
initial wealth and ﬁxed cost on the resulting Nash equilibria when ﬁrms display decreasing
absolute risk aversion. Duncan and Myers (2000) consider the same kind of model but
allow for free entry, so the number of insurers that serve the market is endogenous and
depends on their exogenous reservation utility. Because of ﬁrms' risk aversion in presence
of catastrophic and correlated risks, insurance supply that emerges at the equilibrium is
rationed. Powers and Shubik (1998) obtain as well an endogenous number of insurance
companies in a Cournot competition framework where the scale eﬀect is mainly a solvency
eﬀect due to the law of large numbers through the reduction of the number of customers.
Froot and O'Connell (2008) also introduce imperfect Cournot competition among risk-
averse reinsurers that pool insurers with correlated portfolios. They suggest that imperfect
competition tends to reinforce the overpricing of correlated risks when compared to the
fair price. Because we assume a price competition, our model is closely related to Polborn
4Other markets also have such characteristics: cost of research and development, cost of expertise among
others.
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(1998) and Wambach (1999), with the diﬀerence that they do not consider a capital choice
stage that takes place before the pricing decision.
Our analysis can also be related to the more general oligopoly literature. Indeed, introduc-
ing risk on marginal cost and considering risk-averse ﬁrms is quite similar than assuming
increasing and convex costs. After all, the cost of risk is ex-ante a production cost like other
ones, which can be measured in monetary terms by the risk-premium. Since the latter is
convex in the size of risk, the analogy with convex costs is quasi-direct. Price competition
with a convex cost function has been studied by Vives (1999) and Weibull (2006). They
show the existence of a compact set of multiple Nash equilibrium prices, some of them
being above the marginal cost. The speciﬁcity of our analysis comes from the endogenous
shape of the risk premium through capital choices and their wealth eﬀect. In a certain
sense, our stage 1 capital choice can be interpreted as a form of technological investment
that aﬀect the shape of the cost function, that is the risk premium in our setting. Thus
the wealth eﬀect is not only important in the pricing decision, but also at the heart of our
analysis of capital choice by ﬁrms.
Another source of inﬂuence is Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). At a ﬁrst sight, our two-stage
game approach with a capital followed by a price decision heavily recalls their setting. But
in fact our model is quite diﬀerent. First, in Kreps and Scheinkman, marginal cost is
constant while in our model it is not because the risk premium is convex. Secondly, our
capital choice refers to a level of internal wealth that modiﬁes the shape of the risk premium
through a wealth eﬀect, which diﬀers from Kreps and Scheinkman that consider the ﬁrst
stage capital decision as a commitment to produce not more than a certain quantity in
stage 2 whatever the price chosen. In other words, Kreps and Scheinkman endogenize the
choice of a quantity constraint while we endogenize the choice of the shape of the cost
function, measured in monetary terms by the risk premium.
A third strand of literature that appears to have some connections with our paper is the
theoretical work on debt versus equity in oligopolistic settings derived from Brander and
Lewis (1986), that analyze the strategic value of debt emission for ﬁrms in oligopoly mar-
kets. Brander and Lewis (1986) tackle the Modigliani-Miller neutrality result by consider-
ing that the ﬁnancial structure (i.e. the repartition of debt and equity in ﬁrms 'ﬁnancing
choice) may have a commitment value for the stage 2 production decision. Our timing is
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similar, with two-stages model where ﬁnancial decisions are taken at stage 1 and production
decisions at stage 2. The strategic value of debt holding depends on the type of uncertainty
faced by the market - demand or cost - and the type of competition (Wanzenried, 2003).
We depart here from this literature as we focus on the impact of risk aversion on the choice
of ex-ante equity capital, from the investor's point of view: risk aversion enhances the
weight of high cost states, rendering capital level a strategic choice as it modiﬁes the price
equilibria.
The paper is organized as follow: Section 2.2 lays out the competition game; Section 2.3
and 2.4 derive the results on the impact of capital holding on the competitive structure
of the market; Section 2.5 looks at the social welfare and capital regulation. Section 2.6
discusses these results in line with the insurance industry speciﬁcities and concludes.
2.2 The model
2.2.1 The oligopoly market
We consider an oligopoly of 푛 insurance ﬁrms, indexed by 푖 = 1...푛, that produce the
same non-diﬀerentiated single good 푞푖 that can be thought of as a quantity of insurance
coverage sold to a continuum of risk-averse insureds. The aggregate demand for coverage
is exogenous, non-stochastic, and deﬁned by 푄(푝) when all insurance companies charge the
same price 푝. 푄(푝) is continuous, decreasing in 푝 and lim
푝→+∞푄(푝) = 0.
Because of the inversion of the production cycle, insurance ﬁrms do not know ex-ante the
exact cost of supplying such coverage5. Let us denote 퐿˜푖 ∈ [0, 퐿푚푎푥] the stochastic loss per
unit of output (or coverage) 푞푖 sold by the ﬁrm 푖. We note 퐿¯푖 = E퐿˜푖. Cost uncertainty
may be particularly relevant in (re)insurance markets where individual risks exhibit positive
correlations which is a typical feature of catastrophic risks. Alternatively, cost uncertainty
may also reﬂect the imperfect knowledge of the "true" probability distribution of the loss,
due to a lack of data, a situation that is typical of new technological risks, or natural
disaster risks. Because of cost uncertainty, the proﬁt from exerting the insurance activity
is stochastic. For a ﬁrm 푖 and a given price 푝, let us deﬁne 휋˜푖(푝, 푞푖) as follows
5This cost can be approximated by the expected loss plus a loading factor that covers a set of various
transaction costs (administrative costs, ambiguity aversion, security margin and so on). Even in situa-
tions where the law of large numbers applies well, the cost of a given insured risk remains fundamentally
stochastic.
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휋˜푖(푝, 푞푖) = 푞푖(푝− 퐿˜푖) = 푞푖푚˜푖 (2.1)
where 푚˜푖 = 푝 − 퐿˜푖 is the stochastic unit margin. When the insurance coverage is fairly
priced, i.e. 푝− 퐿¯푖 = 0 and the insurance activity entails no transaction costs, the ﬁrm i's
expected proﬁt is equal to zero, as in the standard competitive model with risk neutral
insurers. If, due to market power, the per unit price is strictly above the expected loss per
unit, i.e. 푝− 퐿¯푖 > 0, then increasing supply 푞푖 (via increasing market-share) increases the
expected proﬁt of the ﬁrm, but also makes proﬁt riskier. This is the fundamental trade-oﬀ
that will be at the heart of the following analysis. To keep things simple, we will consider
that the loss 퐿˜ per unit of output is the same for all insurance ﬁrms. Whether they are
correlated or not is not important in our framework, since coverage is sold before the true
realization of losses.
2.2.2 Firms' objectives
The managers are supposed to maximize the value of the ﬁrm. Following Froot, Scharfstein
and Stein (Froot et al., 1993), such objective may lead to an apparent risk-averse behavior
when external sources of ﬁnance are more costly than internal ones. Let us recall their
model. The ﬁrm faces a two-period investment and ﬁnancing choice. The investment
requires an expenditure 퐼 and has a net return 퐹 (퐼) = 푓(퐼)− 퐼, where 푓 is an increasing
and concave function. This investment may be ﬁnanced through the ﬁrm's internal assets
푤 as well as through external capital 푒 acquired at a cost 푐(푒). The problem for ﬁrms is
that there are dead weight costs of raising such external ﬁnance, due to several reasons
including distress costs and informational asymmetries as argued in Froot et al. (1993).
Formally, these dead weight costs are captured by the fact that 푐(.) is convex. The solution
of the investment/ﬁnancing problem is given by
max
퐼
푃 (푤) = 퐹 (퐼)− 푐(푒) (2.2)
s.t. 퐼 = 푤 + 푒
The value of the ﬁrm, denoted 푃 (푤) is the maximand of the programme. By analogy
with the usual deﬁnition of the risk premium (Gollier, 2001), with the diﬀerence that the
function 푃 (.) replaces the standard von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function 푢(.), Let
푅(푊0, 푥˜) be given by
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E푃 (푊0 + 푥˜) = 푃 [푊0 −푅(푊0, 푥˜)]
where 푊0 is the level of initial wealth and 푥˜ a zero mean risk . Here, the ﬁrm 푖 is endowed
with an initial level of capital 푤푖. She covers an amount of risk 푞푖 of uncertain loss 퐿˜, at
price 푝. Her ﬁnal wealth is 푊˜ 푖 = 푤푖 + (푝− 퐿˜)푞푖. We note 푊¯ = E푊˜ 푖. The 0-mean risk to
which it is exposed is : (퐿˜ − E퐿)푞푖. For notational simplicity, we note the risk premium
푅푖(푊¯ 푖, 푞푖) and we have:
E푃 (푊˜ 푖) = 푃 [푊¯ 푖 −푅푖(푊¯ 푖, 푞푖)] (2.3)
We make the following assumptions :
∙ (A1) ∂푃∂푤 ≥ 1 and ∂
2푃
∂푤2
≤ 0
∙ (A2) ∂푅푖
∂푊¯
≤ 0
∙ (A3) for 푚 ∈ {1, ..., 푛} 푑푑푝E푃 (푤푖 + (푝− 퐿)푄(푝)/푚) ≥ 0
∙ (퐴4)The proﬁt maximizing output of the ﬁrms increases when the price increases.
The following comments are in order. (A1) follows from the concavity of 푓 and convexity
of 푐. This is just a consequence of the envelop theorem (Froot et al., 1993). It implies
the risk averse behavior of ﬁrms, and its corollary that managing, sharing and/or reducing
the risks on internal assets can increase their value. If this internal capital is stochastic,
the ex-ante value of the ﬁrm, and so the objective to maximize, is given by E푃 (푤˜). Since
푃 (.) is concave, it is clear that the pseudo risk premium has similar characteristics as
the standard risk premium. In particular, 푅푖 is increasing and convex in 푞푖. (A2) is the
standard decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) hypothesis. (A3) states that demand
is suﬃciently inelastic.
2.2.3 Timing of the game
We consider 푛 ﬁrms endowed with a level of initial capital 푤푖0, which can be interpreted as
their past proﬁts. The market equilibrium is modelled as a subgame perfect equilibrium
(in short equilibrium) of the following two-stage game
∙ At stage 1: Firms choose a level of additional capital 퐾푖 by issuing new shares (if
퐾푖 ≥ 0) or by buying them back (if 퐾푖 ≤ 0). Firm i's wealth becomes 푤푖1 = 푤푖0 +퐾푖.
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∙ At stage 2: Each ﬁrm posts its own price and commits to sell any quantity at this
price.
At stage 1, ﬁrms choose their additional capital level 퐾 by maximizing the expected net
value: 푃 (푤푖푓 )−(1+휏)퐾푖. The capital has an opportunity cost, 휏퐾, for the investors where
0 ≤ 휏 . At stage 2, a price competition, in the same manner as in Wambach (1999), takes
place between the 푛 value-maximizing ﬁrms. Firms compete on price before the true cost
is revealed by Nature: the ﬁrm with the lowest price catch all the market, and must serve
all the demand that it faces; if more than one ﬁrm set the same lowest price, the market
is shared equally among them.
Figure 2.1: Timing of the events
Finally, the state of Nature is realized: losses are revealed. The ﬁrms realize their invest-
ments choices, raising if needed additional ex-post external capital. The game is solved
backward in the two following sections.
2.3 Stage 2: Price competition
At stage 2, ﬁrms compete on price with the objective to maximize their expected value
E푃 푖(푤˜푖푓 ). The case of symmetric ﬁrms is ﬁrst characterized, results are then extended to
the case of ﬁrms endowed with diﬀerent levels of internal capital.
2.3.1 Symmetric ﬁrms
Suppose that at the beginning of stage 2, ﬁrms have the same level of internal capital, that
is for all 푖, 푗, 푖 ∕= 푗, 푤푖1 = 푤푗1. The functions 푃 푖(.) are supposed identical and will be by
now denoted 푃 (.). We have
E푃 (푤˜푖푓 ) = 푃
(
휋푖(푝, 푞푖)−푅(푤푖1 + 휋푖(푝, 푞푖), 푞푖)
)
(2.4)
55
CHAPTER 2. RAISING CAPITAL IN AN INSURANCE OLIGOPOLY MARKET
where 휋푖(푝, 푞푖) = 푞푖(푝−퐿) is the expected proﬁt of ﬁrm 푖. 푝 is a symmetric Nash equilibrium
if ﬁrms can not increase their value by undercutting price. Formally
E푃
(
푤푖1 + 휋˜
푖
(
푝,
푄(푝)
푛
))
≥ E푃 (푤푖1 + 휋˜푖(푝,푄(푝))) (2.5)
or, using the risk premium formulation
휋푖
(
푝,
푄(푝)
푛
)
−푅
(
푤푖1 + 휋
푖
(
푝,
푄(푝)
푛
)
,
푄(푝)
푛
)
≥ 휋푖(푝,푄(푝))
−푅(푤푖1 + 휋푖(푝,푄(푝)), 푄(푝)) (2.6)
Consider that ﬁrms have an outside option that gives them an expected value equal to
푉 표푢푡 ≥ 0, which is assumed exogenous.
Deﬁnition 1. We note 푝표푢푡 the price for which the ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between serving
1/nth of the market or their outside option 푉 표푢푡
E푃
(
푤푖1 + 휋˜
푖
(
푝표푢푡,
푄(푝표푢푡)
푛
))
= 푉 표푢푡 (2.7)
The following proposition, extending Wambach (1999)'s characterizes the Nash equilibria
of the price competition
Proposition 6. In the case of symmetric ﬁrms, under (A1), (A3) and (A4)
a) there exists a continuum 푃푁퐸 = [푝표푢푡, 푝푁 ] of Nash equilibrium prices 푝 ∈ 푃푁퐸, where
푝푁 is deﬁned by
E푃
(
푤푖1 + 휋˜
푖
(
푝푁 ,
푄(푝푁 )
푛
))
= E
(
푤푖1 + 휋˜푖(푝
푁 , 푄(푝푁 ))
)
(2.8)
b) the maximum Nash price 푝푁 is higher than the competitive price, lower than the maxi-
mum monopoly price when it exists, and provides a value of the ﬁrm higher than her outside
option.
Proof : see appendix.
The fact that price competition across risk-averse ﬁrms leads to multiple equilibria has
already been exhibited by Polborn (1998) and Wambach (1999). It has a strong link with
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the standard price competition literature when ﬁrms exhibit decreasing returns to scale6.
When price is higher than expected cost, cutting price increases the expected proﬁt of the
ﬁrm that makes a unilateral deviation, but also exposes it to the increased cost of risk that
arises from serving the whole market. For some values of price, the cost for the ﬁrms of
being exposed to more risk can be greater than the expected gain from catching the whole
market. In the present case, to the fundamental trade-oﬀ between expected proﬁt and risk
exposure must be added a wealth-eﬀect term which comes from the fact that the cost of
bearing risk itself is a function of the value of expected proﬁt.
This three-terms trade-oﬀ can be represented graphically. To keep things simple, let us
consider the case of a perfectly inelastic demand equal to 푄. Let 푠푖 = 푞푖/푄 denote the
market share of ﬁrm 푖. Serving more customers exposes the ﬁrms to a greater share of
cost uncertainty, at an increasing rate. In Figure 2.2, both expected proﬁt and pseudo
risk premium curves are drawn as a function of the market share in the case of two ﬁrms
and for two (not necessarily Nash equilibria) prices: 푝0 (thin line) and 푝1 (thick line), with
푝0 < 푝1. There are essentially two values of interest for the market share: 푄/2 and 푄.
For a given price 푝, the expected proﬁt of ﬁrm 푖, 푠푖푄(푝 − 퐿), is a linear function of the
market share. The certainty equivalent of ﬁrm's wealth is simply the diﬀerence between
the expected proﬁt and the risk premium, which is represented by the vertical arrows. As
a preliminary, let us consider the eﬀect of a price increase from 푝0 to 푝1. For all market
shares, the proﬁts will be higher for 푝1 than for 푝0. But the risk premium is lower because
of the wealth eﬀect: a higher expected price leads to a higher expected proﬁt, and so
a higher ﬁnal wealth of the ﬁrm. Under decreasing absolute risk aversion, this tends to
decrease the ﬁrm's sensitivity to risk. Hence, for a given market share, an increase in price
tends to increase the diﬀerence between the expected proﬁt and the risk premium.
Let us identify the Nash Equilibrium prices. Start at price 푝1. At this price each ﬁrm has
an incentive to slightly decreases its price in order to catch the whole market. The price
cut simultaneously decreases the slope of the expected proﬁt line and increases those of the
risk premium, so the two curves are getting nearer, as a scissorclosing movement. As the
increase in expected proﬁt more than compensates the increase in pseudo risk premium,
6This result has in fact an intuitive explanation: for some values of price, a slight price cut allows a ﬁrm
to catch all the market, which increases its revenue. But at the same time the ﬁrm is committed to serve
the whole demand (which is moreover slightly higher due to the price cut), exposing it to higher values of
marginal cost and so a higher average cost of production. For low enough output price, catching the whole
market could then reduce the value of the ﬁrm.
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Figure 2.2: Characterization of equilibrium prices for symmetric risk-averse ﬁrms competing on
price. - Case of inelastic demand.
price cutting is the optimal strategy. Symmetric ﬁrms cut prices up to a certain level. In
our ﬁgure, at 푝0, ﬁrms' value are equal at 푄/2 and 푄. If one ﬁrm slightly cut its price,
the increase in expected proﬁt that it would get from catching the whole market is inferior
to the loss due to the increase in risk premium. So when the indiﬀerence price, 푝푁 in
our formal analysis, is attained, no ﬁrm has an incentive to cut its price anymore. It is
graphically straightforward that this price is not the single Nash Equilibrium. As long as
ﬁrms get as much as their outside option, the ﬁrms participate to the market. Every price
between the outside option price and the indiﬀerence price is a Nash equilibrium, since no
ﬁrm has neither an incentive to slightly increase its price (its demand would be zero) nor
to decrease it (the subsequent increase in risk would decrease the value of the ﬁrm).
To characterize how internal capital impacts the maximum Nash price, we consider here
an assumption which is slightly stronger than DARA. Let us denote
Δ푅 = 푅(푤푖1 + 휋¯(푝
푁 , 푄(푝)), 푄(푝))−푅
(
푤푖1 + 휋¯
(
푝,
푄(푝)
푛
)
,
푄(푝)
푛
)
and assume that
∙ (A5) Δ푅 decreases in 푤.
With DARA (A2) only, the global eﬀect of a multiplicative risk on the risk premium
is ambiguous in general. This is linked to a double eﬀect: an increase of market share
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corresponds to 1. An increase in endowment decreasing the risk premium through the
DARA hypothesis 2. An increase in risk, increasing the risk premium through the risk
aversion hypothesis. (A5) states that prices are in a region were the risk eﬀect is ampliﬁed
by the wealth eﬀect: the more capitalised ﬁrms are less reluctant to serve higher demand -
and hold more risk-. For all the following results of the paper, assumption (A5) is necessary,
as it is necessary to obtain the following Lemma:
Lemma 1. For symmetric ﬁrms, under (A1) and (A3) to (A5), ∂푝
푁
∂푤1
≤ 0.
Proof : see appendix.
Thus when the level of ﬁrms' internal capital is high, i.e. ﬁrms are less risk averse, the
competitive pressure they can exert is then high, and leads to a lower the maximum Nash
price.
2.3.2 Asymmetric ﬁrms
Let us consider the asymmetric continuation equilibrium where ﬁrms enter stage 2 with
diﬀerent levels of capital. It is important to consider the asymmetric equilibrium of stage
2 since capital is the strategic variable at the ﬁrst stage, and we should be able to describe
how unilateral deviations modify the outcome of the game. We consider the case of an
oligopoly of ﬁrms 푖 = 1...푛: 푤푛1 > 푤
푖
1 > 푤
1
1. Under DARA, diﬀerence in the level of
available capital lead to diﬀerences in the degree of risk aversion, which impact the price
competition game. The less risk averse ﬁrm is the ﬁrm with the higher initial capital, that
is ﬁrm 푛.
Deﬁnition 2. We consider an oligopoly of 푛 risk averse ﬁrms. We note 푝표푢푡푚푎푥 the maximum
of the prices for which the ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between serving 1/nth of the market or their
outside option 푉 표푢푡
푝표푢푡푚푎푥 = max
푖=1..푛
{
푝표푢푡푖 : E푃 (푤
푖
1 + 휋˜
푖(푝,푄(푝)/푛)) = 푉 표푢푡
}
(2.9)
Hence we can state the following proposition, focusing on n-oligopoly prices, that is the
case where 푝표푢푡푚푎푥 < 푝
푁
푚푖푛
Proposition 7. In the case of asymmetric ﬁrms, under (A1) and (A3) to (A5), if 푝표푢푡푚푎푥 <
푝푁푚푖푛:
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a) There exists a continuum 푃푁퐸 = [푝표푢푡푚푎푥, 푝
푁
푚푖푛] of Nash equilibrium prices 푝 ∈ 푃푁퐸 for
the n-oligopoly, where 푝푁푚푖푛 is deﬁned as
푝푁푚푖푛 = min
푖=1..푛
{
푝 : E푃 (푤푖1 + 휋˜
푖(푝,푄(푝)/푛)) = E푃 (푤푖1 + 휋˜
푖(푝,푄(푝)))
}
(2.10)
b) The maximum Nash price 푝푁푚푖푛 corresponds to the indiﬀerence price for the less risk
averse ﬁrm between serving the whole market and serving 1/nth of it. 푝푁푚푖푛 is higher than
the competitive price, lower than the maximum monopoly price when it exists, and provides
a value of the ﬁrm higher than her outside option.
Proof : see appendix.
Note that in the case where 푝표푢푡푚푎푥 > 푝
푁
푚푖푛, the diﬀerence between the ﬁrms initial capital is
such that the competitive pressure exerted by the less risk averse ﬁrms 푖 leads to a situation
where the most risk averse ﬁrm cannot aﬀord to stay in the market at such price. But the
other ﬁrms 푖 can then still sustain the risk of all the market.
An equilibrium can be reach with asymmetrically capitalised ﬁrms. The less capitalised the
ﬁrm, the less oligopolistic rent it can extract. This leads to a situation where the market
is divided between less ﬁrms. Other Nash equilibria may be obtained in the case where
푝표푢푡푚푎푥 < 푝
푁
푚푖푛, with less than 푛 ﬁrms (see appendix).
A graphical explanation may give the intuition of the proof. For a same level of coverage
of the market, the risk premium of ﬁrm i 푅푖 is higher than ﬁrm j's risk premium 푅푗 . As
in the symmetric case, the case of inelastic demand is considered.
As ﬁrm 푖 is more risk averse than ﬁrm 푗, 푝푁푖 > 푝
푁
푗 . We focus on the case where 푝
표푢푡
푚푎푥 < 푝
푁
푚푖푛.
For all 푝 > 푝푁푖 , both ﬁrms prefer serving the whole market and thus may deviate from
price to conquer it; 푝푁푖 ≥ 푝 > 푝푁푗 ﬁrm j prefers the whole market and thus will lower the
price to conquer it; if 푝 = 푝푁푗 , then ﬁrm j is indiﬀerent between serving the whole market
or half of it, and ﬁrm 푖 prefers serving half of it, thus 푝푁푗 is a Nash equilibrium price.
Thus, with a similar argument than in the symmetric case, for 푝푁푗 ≥ 푝 ≥ 푝표푢푡푚푎푥 there is
a Nash equilibrium. Figure 2.3 illustrates this case. Both ﬁrms share the same expected
proﬁts. The risk premium curves correspond for each ﬁrm to the risk premium value for
their indiﬀerence prices. Firm i's risk premium curves is always higher than ﬁrm j's. We
can graphically see that the indiﬀerence price for ﬁrm i is higher than for ﬁrm j. Thus,
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Figure 2.3: Characterization of equilibrium prices for DARA ﬁrms with diﬀerent level of
capital competing on price - Case of inelastic demand - 푤푗1 > 푤
푖
1.
we have shown that in the case of a duopoly of asymmetric DARA ﬁrms, there exists a
continuum of Nash equilibrium prices 푝. The higher Nash equilibrium price 푝푁푗 corresponds
to the indiﬀerence price for the less risk averse ﬁrm, between serving the whole market and
serving only one half of it.
2.3.3 Selecting a unique equilibrium price
The existence of multiple equilibrium prices raises the question of their selection. This is
especially important in our two-stage setting since the anticipated Nash equilibrium price
will be determinant for ﬁrms' choices of capital holding in the preceding stage. A possible
argument relies on a collusion analysis7. Since ﬁrms do not collude in our model, it seems
natural to favour the Nash equilibrium price(s) that are more robust to collusion. Let
us consider a collusive group, but without punishment (short-run price competition) . For
collusion to be credible in this case, all collusive equilibria should be Nash equilibria, i.e. an
element of the set of Nash equilibrium prices between [푝표푢푡, 푝푁 ] since any price higher than
푝푁 does not resist to unilateral deviation (price undercutting). Thus without punishment
possibilities, the highest price of this set, 푝푁 is likely to be chosen and applied in a collusive
agreement.
7Another kind of argument in favour of 푝푁 can also be found in the framework of evolutionary game
theory, but we do not develop it in details here.
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Another argument also pleads for the selection of the highest price. Intuition suggests that
high equilibrium prices are more likely to deter collusion, since they let ﬁrms with high
oligopolistic rents and so reduce the size of punishment if a price war occurs after some
ﬁrms break the collusive agreement. Formally, let us consider a collusive price 푝퐶 strictly
above the maximum Nash equilibrium price, i.e. 푝퐶 > 푝푁 . Suppose that the 푛 ﬁrms are
identical with each ﬁrm's expected value written as 푉 (푝, 푛) for a given price 푝 when the
푛 ﬁrms share the market equally. Let 훿 be the discount factor, identical among ﬁrms, and
푇 the number of periods over which collusion is supposed to take place. Under collusion,
each ﬁrm gets
푉 = (1 + 훿 + 훿2...+ 훿푇 )푉 (푝퐶 , 푛) (2.11)
If a ﬁrm slightly undercuts the price to 푝퐶 − 휖, it get 푉 (푝퐶 − 휖, 1) in the ﬁrst period, which
is higher than 푉 (푝퐶 , 푛) for an 휖 close to zero. But such unilateral deviation triggers a price
war that leads to 푉 (푝푁퐸 , 푛) in the following periods, with 푝푁퐸 ∈ 푃푁퐸 . Hence, ﬁrms will
stick to the collusive price if
(1 + 훿 + 훿2...)푉 (푝퐶 , 푛) ≥ 푉 (푝퐶 − 휖, 1) + (훿 + 훿2...)푉 (푝푁퐸 , 푛)
Strict equality deﬁnes a threshold 훿푙푖푚 above which collusion occurs. For 푇 = +∞, this
threshold is equal to
훿푙푖푚 =
푉 (푝퐶 , 1)− 푉 (푝퐶 , 푛)
푉 (푝퐶 , 1)− 푉 (푝푁퐸 , 푛)
Since 푉 (푝푁퐸 , 푛) strictly increases with 푝푁퐸 , 훿푙푖푚 increases with 푝푁퐸 . Hence the intuition
that collusion is less likely to occur for higher equilibrium prices is veriﬁed. In this sense,
the highest Nash equilibrium price 푝푁 can be selected as the more robust to collusion.
In the following section, in which stage 1 choice of capital is characterized, ﬁrms will be
assumed to anticipate this 푝푁 as the outcome of price competition without any uncertainty.
2.4 Stage 1: Capital choice
At stage 1, ﬁrms non-cooperatively determine their levels of additional capital, 퐾푖. We
look for the Nash equilibria, that is a set of strategies (퐾1, ..,퐾푛) such that there is
no proﬁtable unilateral deviation for any ﬁrm. Since the ﬁrm(s) with the highest level of
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internal capital determine(s) the market price 푝푁 (max[퐾1, ...,퐾푛])8, while the competitors
take the price as given, one must distinguish price-making and price-taking ﬁrms when
studying the consequences of marginal deviations. The price-making ﬁrms take into account
the strategic, product-market eﬀect of their internal capital when choosing it, while price-
taking ﬁrms do not. We deﬁne the objective function of the ﬁrms below.
Deﬁnition 3. The value of the ﬁrm net of capital, 푉푖(.), is deﬁned as follows
9
푉푖 : (퐾
1, ..,퐾푛)→ 푃 [푤푖1 + 휋(푝푁 (퐾))−푅(푤푖1 + 휋(푝푁 (퐾)), 푄(푝푁 (퐾)))]− (1 + 휏)퐾푖
where 퐾 = max[퐾1, ...,퐾푛].
Depending on the status of the ﬁrm (price taking or price making), the behaviour of the
function is quite diﬀerent. For a ﬁrm where 퐾푖 = 퐾 the anticipated Nash price is a
function of 퐾푖. Otherwise, the anticipated Nash price only depends on an exogenous 퐾¯.
Such formal clariﬁcation being made, we are now able to study the stage 1 subgame in more
depth. The ﬁrst step is to characterize the behavior of 푉푖(.), and the sign of a marginal
deviation, in the symmetric case.
a) Marginal deviation of a price-taking ﬁrm
For a price-taking ﬁrm, 퐾 = max[퐾1, ...,퐾푛] ≥ 퐾푖. In the symmetric case, we are looking
at the sign of the ﬁrst order derivative of 푉푖, for an exogenous price equal to 푝
푁 (퐾푖)
푉 ′푖푇푎푘푒푟(퐾
푖) = (1−푅1)푃푤︸ ︷︷ ︸
푀퐵
− (1 + 휏)︸ ︷︷ ︸
푀퐶푑푖푟푒푐푡
(2.12)
The ﬁrst-order derivative formalizes the trade-oﬀ between the marginal cost of capital,
푀퐶푑푖푟푒푐푡, and the marginal beneﬁt of reducing the cost of risk for the ﬁrm, MB. If capital
is not costly to hold, i.e. 휏 = 0, the ﬁrst-order derivative becomes (1−푅1)푃푤 − 1 which is
always positive since by assumption 푅1 ≤ 0 and 푃푤 ≥ 1.
b) Marginal deviation of a price-making ﬁrm
For a price-making ﬁrm, 퐾 = max[퐾1, ...,퐾푛] = 퐾푖. The ﬁrst-order derivative of 푉푖(퐾
푖)
is written as
8The following results are true for all anticipated strategies of equilibrium prices 푝(퐾1, ...,퐾푛) such
that ∂푝
푁
∂푤1
≤ 0 (Lemma 1).
9The ex-ante value of the ﬁrm evaluated at 푝푁 is the same for serving a part of the market or the whole
market. For the sake of simplicity, we work on the whole market expression.
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푉 ′푖퐿푒푎푑푒푟(퐾
푖) = (1−푅1)푃푤︸ ︷︷ ︸
푀퐵
−
[
푄′(푝푁 )푅2 − ∂휋
∂푝푁
(1−푅1)
]
∂푝푁
∂퐾푖
푃푤︸ ︷︷ ︸
푀퐶푠푡푟푎푡푒푔푖푐
− (1 + 휏)︸ ︷︷ ︸
푀퐶푑푖푟푒푐푡
(2.13)
When the ﬁrm 푖 is the most capitalized, it has to take into account the strategic eﬀect due
to product market competition 푀퐶푠푡푟푎푡푒푔푖푐 in addition to the direct cost-of-risk reduction
incentive푀퐵 and the marginal direct cost푀퐶푑푖푟푒푐푡 in its capital budgeting decision. This
strategic eﬀect represents a cost, since increasing internal capital reduces the market price
set at stage 2 (Lemma 1). It is decomposed into two distinct terms that correspond to the
following eﬀects. The ﬁrst one, strategic wealth eﬀect, is equal to
푀퐶푠푡푟푎푡푊 (퐾푖) = −∂푝
푁
∂퐾푖
∂휋
∂푝푁
(1−푅1)푃푤
Indeed because of increased competitive pressure, the increase in expected ﬁnal wealth due
to more capital is partly counterbalanced by lower expected proﬁts. If the price-making
ﬁrm 푖 chooses its capital in a naive way, i.e. without considering this eﬀect, it would
overvalue its expected ﬁnal wealth, and so the real cost of risk in its capital budgeting
decision. The second term that we name strategic demand eﬀect is equal to
푀퐶푠푡푟푎푡퐷(퐾푖) =
∂푝푁
∂퐾푖
푄′(푝푁 )푅2푃푤
It is null when the demand is price-inelastic. By lowering the market price, a marginal
increase in capital commits each ﬁrm to serve a higher demand, and so exposes them to a
higher level of risk.
c) Assumption of concavity
The question of the sign of both marginal deviations is important to understand the trade-
oﬀ of the players. We make the two following assumptions and deﬁne in the following
manner the levels of external capital 퐾∗ and 퐾+
∙ (A6a) ∀ 퐾푖, 푉 ′′푖퐿푒푎푑푒푟(퐾) ≤ 0 and ∃퐾푖∗ : 푉 ′푖퐿푒푎푑푒푟(퐾푖∗) = 0
∙ (A6b) ∀ 퐾푖, 푉 ′′푖푇푎푘푒푟(퐾) ≤ 0 and ∃퐾푖+ : 푉 ′푖푇푎푘푒푟(퐾푖+) = 0
(A6) makes the analysis tractable. 퐾∗ deﬁnes the level of capital under which the price-
maker ﬁrm has interest to deviate by increasing its level of capital. Whereas 퐾+ deﬁnes
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the level above which the price-taking ﬁrm has interest to deviate by lowering its capital.
Note that 푉 ′푖퐿푒푎푑푒푟(퐾
푖) = 푉 ′푖푇푎푘푒푟(퐾
푖)−푀퐶푠푡푟푎푡푒푔푖푐. It follows directly that 퐾∗ < 퐾+.
d) Equilibria characterisation
Following the previous discussion, we place ourselves under assumption (A6) in the case of
a symmetric oligopoly of 푛 ﬁrms, characterized by their initial wealth 푤0. Since ﬁrms are
perfectly symmetric, for all 푖, 푗 퐾푖∗ = 퐾푗∗ = 퐾∗ and 퐾푖+ = 퐾푗+ = 퐾+ . We have the
following proposition
Proposition 8. Under assumptions (A1) and (A3) to (A5), if 푤10 = ... = 푤
푛
0 = 푤0, there
exists a continuum of symmetric equilibria 퐾1 = ... = 퐾푛 = 퐾 such that 퐾
∗ ≤ 퐾 ≤ 퐾+.
Proof : see appendix.
Figure 2.4: Equilibrium capital choices
Figure 2.4 provides a graphical illustration of the continuum of Nash symmetric equilibria.
The curve represents the net value function 푉 (.). The right-hand arrows correspond to the
marginal net value of an increase of capital for a price-making ﬁrm, whereas the left-hand
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arrows show the marginal net value of a decrease of capital, for price-taking ﬁrm. When
퐾 < 퐾∗, a ﬁrm has no incentives to decrease capital as the marginal net value of being
the follower is negative, whereas the marginal net value of increasing capital and being
leader is positive. Thus it is driven to 퐾 = 퐾∗. For all 퐾 between 퐾∗ and 퐾+, the ﬁrm
has no interest in increasing nor lowering its capital level as both would induce a lower net
beneﬁt (as taker or leader). For 퐾 higher than 퐾+ however, there is no incentive for the
ﬁrm to increase capital, but as a follower it has an interest in lowering her capital level as
marginal net value for holding one more units of capital is too low compared to the cost
of holding it. This leads to a continuum of Nash Equilibrium of which one can select the
set leading to the higher ﬁrm's value as in the case of the equilibrium price.
The case of asymmetric ﬁrms follows simply. To grasp the intuition of the game, consider
2 ﬁrms 푙 respectively ℎ, with a low, respectively high, level of initial capital: 푤푙0 < 푤
ℎ
0 .
First note that if assumption (A6a) holds for 푉푙퐿푒푎푑푒푟, it holds for 푉ℎ퐿푒푎푑푒푟 (see appendix
E). The ﬁrm with the lowest level of initial capital is the more risk averse. To have the
same level of risk aversion, ﬁrm 푙 has to hold much more costly capital than ﬁrm ℎ. As the
cost of capital is linear, they will both obtain their maximal net value for the same level
of wealth 푤¯ = 푤푙0 + 퐾
∗
푙 = 푤
ℎ
0 + 퐾
∗
ℎ. As long as ﬁrm 푙 does not have the same amount of
wealth as ﬁrm ℎ, it has interest to hold the same total of capital, up to 퐾+, level at which
it is too costly to hold capital. This leads to the following Proposition
Proposition 9. Under assumptions (A1) and (A3) to (A5), if 푤10 < ... < 푤
푛
0 , there exists
a continuum of Nash equilibria (퐾1, ...,퐾푛), where ∀ 푖 < 푛, 퐾푖 = 퐾∗1 + 푤1 − 푤푖, and
퐾∗1 ≤ 퐾푛 ≤ 퐾+1 .
Proof : see appendix.
For reasons similar to those developed to select the Nash equilibrium price, we focus on the
level of capital that maximizes ﬁrm's net value. Due to its implicit deﬁnition, 퐾∗ depends
on the initial level of capital 푤0. Intuitively a high level of initial capital could lead to a
Nash equilibrium of no additional capital. Following Proposition 8, we can show that in
this case, that is when 푉 ′푖 (0) < 0, 퐾 = 0 is a Nash equilibria.
e) Analysis of the results
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The model provides a framework with an endogenous choice of capital that accounts for
speciﬁcities of the insurance market. It enhances the strategic role of capital in the product
market competition of insurance ﬁrms. Indeed, ﬁrms have two diﬀerent ways to manage
risks. The ﬁrst one is by acquiring more capital at ﬁrst stage to lower their risk premium.
The second one is by setting a higher price everything else being equal at the second stage.
Both ways to hedge interact in a price competition setting. Indeed the opportunity cost of
capital limits the amount of capital an insurance company may hold before subscription.
A higher level of capital however induces a decrease in insurers' cost of risk. This allows
for a more aggressive attitude on the market, a decrease in their equilibrium prices and
thus an increase in the quantity insurers deliver. Thus the level of capital is limited by its
strategic cost in addition to the cost of holding it.
The model allows for a double set of continuum of equilibrium : continuum of equilibrium
prices at a ﬁxed capacity, and continuum of sets of capital choices, when anticipating
the maximum Nash Price 푝푁 . Following the arguments developed previously we focus on
the equilibrium extracting the highest rents for the ﬁrms, that is the set of 퐾∗ and the
equilibrium price 푝푁 .
Corollary 1. In the preceding framework, following a symmetric negative shock on initial
wealth level, prices rise and global market capacity decreases.
The same results hold in the case of a positive shock on the cost of capital.
Proof : The concavity of function 푉푖(.) leads to the result, derived from Proposition 8.
This result is interesting for the study of cycles. A high cost event in an industry with
uncertainty on costs leads to a decrease of the capital available. In our framework, a lower
initial capital leads to a lower level of capital (initial and external) at the end of Stage 1,
due to the cost of additional capital. The higher resulting price on the product market
leads in the case of an elastic demand to a contraction of the industry's global capacity.
Note that in the preceding symmetric framework, a higher cost of capital leads to higher
prices on the product market as capital is more costly to hold, and thus a contraction of
the quantity supplied to the market in the case of elastic demand. An asymmetry in cost
of capital for ﬁrms leads to interesting results. The ﬁrm with the lowest cost of capital
chooses the level of capital that maximizes her net value and leads the level of price on
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the market. The ﬁrms with the highest cost of capital follows her by choosing her level of
capital depending on the price ﬁxed by the other one. This result enhances the importance
of the cost of capital as a strategic variable in the insurance industry.
An other interesting question, regarding the insurance industry, is the inﬂuence of the
number of ﬁrms on capital choice and intensity of competition.
Corollary 2. Consider the 푛-ﬁrms oligopoly where the maximum initial wealth of the ﬁrms
is noted 푤푀 . Under assumptions (A1) to (A5), 푝
푁 decreases with 푛 when 푤푀 stays at the
same level.
Proof : see appendix.
This result is quite intuitive. Let us ﬁrst focus on the impact on the equilibrium price for
a ﬁxed level of capital 푤1. As the number of identical, best capitalized ﬁrms increases, the
trade-oﬀ between serving the whole market and a fraction 1/푛 of it is clearly modiﬁed. On
the one hand, when 푛 becomes large, the risk from serving 1/푛 becomes smaller, whereas
the risk associated with serving the whole market is unchanged. Thus the diﬀerence in
terms of risk premium increases between the two options. This tends to incite ﬁrms to
keep on serving a share 1/푛 of the market. On the other hand, from an expected proﬁt
perspective, the incentive to cut price clearly increases when 푛 increases, since expected
proﬁts are multiplied by 푛 for a ﬁrm which would follow such strategy.
Under Assumptions (A1) to (A5), this trade-oﬀ is no longer ambiguous. The graphical
intuition of the result is quite intuitive. Figure 2.5 illustrates this proposition in the case
of inelastic demand. An increase in the number of reinsurer, for the same price, diminishes
the surplus of the ﬁrm, as the quantity of the market served by the ﬁrm is lessened (from
1/푛푡ℎ to 1/푛 + 1푡ℎ). Due to the scissors eﬀect described previously, the maximum Nash
equilibrium price 푝푁푛+1 for a market with 푛+1 ﬁrms is below the maximum Nash equilibrium
price 푝푁푛 for a market with 푛 ﬁrms. Thus, the higher the number of less risk averse ﬁrms,
the lower the market price.
f) Monopoly case
As an extreme case, we consider the monopoly case. At stage 2, the monopolistic ﬁrm
is characterised by an initial wealth 푤0 + 퐾. The monopolistic price, noted 푝
푀 , is the
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Figure 2.5: Maximum Nash prices, for a market of 2 symmetric ﬁrms and 3 symmetric
ﬁrms - Case of inelastic demand.
classical solution of expected value maximization, and veriﬁes 푝푀 > 푝푁 (퐾). Note that the
monopolistic price is a decreasing function of the level of initial wealth - and thus of 퐾 -
as a higher level of capital induces a lower risk aversion.
At stage 1, the monopolistic ﬁrm chooses its optimal level of additional capital 퐾푀 by
maximizing her net value 푉 , anticipating the price 푝푀 (퐾). And we have 퐾푀 = 퐾∗(푝푁 ).
2.5 Social welfare and the need for capital regulation
In the symmetric case, social welfare 푆푊 is deﬁned as the sum of consumer surplus 퐶푆
and ﬁrms' proﬁts (i.e. the ﬁrms' values net of additional capital) with
퐶푆(푝) =
∫ +∞
푝
푄(푥)푑푥
The social welfare function is thus written as
푆푊 (퐾, 푝) = 퐶푆(푝) + 푛
(
푃
[
푤0 +퐾 + 휋 −푅
(
푤0 +퐾 + 휋,푄(푝)/푛)
]− (1 + 휏)퐾푖)
In the case of the insurance market, prices are seldom controlled except through diﬀeren-
tiation while capital regulation is much more common10. We thus place ourselves in this
10Note that it is equivalent for the government to play on the price or on the level of capital as they
both interact, when considering that ﬁrms anticipate the maximum Nash price. However in the case of a
continuum of equilibria, this may have a diﬀerent signiﬁcation
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second-best framework by supposing that government has direct control over the level of
ﬁrms' capital but not on prices.
Proposition 10. Under assumptions (A1) to (A5), the level of capital 퐾푔 that maximises
social welfare is higher than 퐾∗.
Proof. If the benevolent and omniscient government only control 퐾, then the ﬁrst order
condition is
푑푝푁
푑퐾
푄′(푝푁 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
푇1
+
1
푛
(
(1−푅1)푃푤 −
[
푄′(푝푁 )
푛
푅2 − ∂휋
∂푝푁
(1−푅1)
]
∂푝푁
∂퐾
푃푤 − (1 + 휏)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
푇2
= 0
The marginal consumer surplus (T1) is positive. The second term (T2) is equal to 0 for
퐾 = 퐾∗. Thus assuming 푆푊 concave leads to 퐾푔 > 퐾∗.
This result implies that imperfect competition leads to under-capitalization when compared
to the social optimal capital. In our imperfect competition framework, note that higher
capital requirements could lead to more competitive prices, as ﬁrms are less risk averse and
potentially to a better social welfare. It is interesting to point out that this model leads
to a rationale for capital regulation due to imperfect competition rather than standard
solvency arguments. Note that control of capital choice reduces the interval of equilibrium
prices available at the second stage of the game.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
The model extends Froot et al. (1993)'s framework by considering capital choices in a price
competition setting for risk averse insurance ﬁrms. The principal result is the existence of
a continuum of Nash equilibrium capital choices. Each level of capital leads to a continuum
of Nash equilibrium prices of which we distinguish the one leading to ﬁrms' maximal value.
We thus extend Wambach (1999)'s results, and provide a diﬀerent analysis based on an
associated risk premium: ﬁrms face the trade-oﬀ between higher expected wealth and higher
risk when expending their market shares, allowing for an endogenous rationale for raising
more capital. We show that the cost of capital as well as initial wealth levels of the ﬁrms
have direct impacts on the market equilibrium prices. The model provides a second-best
rationale for capital regulation: ﬁxing a capital level reduces the interval of equilibrium
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prices available at second stage and thus may enhance social welfare. The characterisation
of the dual interaction between ﬁnancial and product market imperfections is particularly
interesting to discuss in the case of the insurance industry.
Insofar we have considered a single strategic variable for stage two, i.e. price. One wonders
if our results are robust to a change, or an enlargement of the set of available strategies.
Considering alternative strategy spaces can indeed have subtle consequences on the eﬃ-
ciency of the market. For example, in a risk trading context, Biais et al. (1998) compare
three alternative market structures - ﬂoors, dealer markets and limit order markets - and
show that the eﬃciency of the market depends on the restrictions that are placed on the liq-
uidity supplier, but in a non-monotonic relationship. This underlines the eﬃciency impacts
of a change in the structure of the game. What happens if ﬁrms compete on quantities
instead of prices, or on mixed price-quantity schemes? Intuitively, if we consider quantities
instead of prices strategies at stage 2, the fundamental trade-oﬀ between reducing-risk and
increasing competitive pressure, which determines the non cooperative capital choice by
ﬁrms, is still at work. Indeed, an increase in the level of capital reduces the ﬁrms' cost of
risk and allows them to supply more quantity of insurance at stage 2, that is in prac-
tice to sell more contracts. By increasing the aggregate supply of insurance, this leads at
the market equilibrium to a lower price which can be detrimental to the insurance ﬁrms.
Oligopolistic rents would still be present, as well as a strategic eﬀect of capital at stage
one. The question of the uniqueness of such an equilibrium, at both stages, is still to be
thoroughly answered.
Concerning price strategies, our model assumes away the fact that ﬁrms can limit the
quantity they oﬀer once the price is posted. In the case of the insurance industry, the
reinsurance (or retrocession) markets allow insurance companies to control the quantity
of risk to which they are exposed. These contractual relationships between cedants and
reinsurance ﬁrms aims at pooling ﬁrms' lines of risk: reinsurance contracts can enter into
the set of available mixed strategies. Two distinct aspects must be considered. First, rein-
surance allows ﬁrms to reduce their cost of risk through the mean of risk sharing. In this
sense, it is a substitute to capital holding except that it does not modify ﬁrms' cost of risk
but risk itself. Hence, introducing reinsurance would certainly reduce capital holding by
a substitution eﬀect. In practice, it corresponds to the dual nature of reinsurance as both
a "risk management and a ﬁnancing decision" (Plantin, 2006). On the one hand it allows
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ﬁrms to serve a higher demand since risk is shared, but on the other hand expected proﬁts
also decrease. The second aspect is that there can also be imperfect competition at the
reinsurance level, which raises the issue of the repartition of oligopoly rents at both levels.
This is certainly an open question for future research.
Concerning the output price, the results are in line with the latest studies on the catastrophe
reinsurance market that show that pricing far exceed competitive pricing in excess of loss
contracts (Weiss and Chung, 2004; Froot, 2001; Froot and O'Connell, 2008). In our case,
capital market imperfections as well as product market imperfections are integrated in the
market price of risk. Furthermore, Froot and O'Connell (2008) have given evidence of
the impact of the cost of capital on the pricing of risks in the reinsurance industry (489
US-contracts over the period 1970-1994).
One of the main feature of the insurance industry is its cyclical behavior, that links out-
put price and capital depletion. In her review of insurance cycle literature, Weiss (2007)
analyzes the part of literature focused on real cycles: shock theories and explanations
for crises. In the literature, two basis models are used in the classical underwriting cycle
theory: capacity constraint and risky debt hypothesis. Capital constraints were at ﬁrst
taken as exogenous, for standard reason of regulation on the default risk - as it is the case
in (Gron, 1990). Our model is related to a capacity constraint that emerges endogenously
from the risk-aversion of the ﬁrms combined with costly capital and is reinforced by the
typical oligopolistic structure of the market. Despite the static nature of our model, it
provides an implicit dynamic interpretation of capital choice: internal capital choices of in-
surers at stage 1 can be interpreted as in Froot (2007) as a long-run target level of capital
while ex-post stochastic acquisition of capital exhibits increasing and convex adjustment
costs.
Another explanation has been proposed to understand the endogenous nature of ﬁrms'
capital choice. Zanjani (2002) considers risk neutral insurance companies, that have limited
liability. They face insolvency-carer consumers, and thus have incentives to hold costly
capital. The ﬁrm is thus confronted with a quality/cost trade-oﬀ and diversiﬁes between
the diﬀerent lines of risk. In this case, capital requirements to maintain solvency have an
impact on prices. In the same vein, it could be interesting to consider in our framework
multiple lines of risk and the marginal impact of each on the level of long-term capital
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chosen by the ﬁrm. Zanjani (2002) estimated from data over the period 1989-1998 the
capital cost for insurance to be up to 13% for reinsurance lines.
Froot et al. (1993)'s framework allows for the distinction between internal and external cap-
ital. It would be interesting in our case to compare both costs. In the reinsurance industry,
cost of external capital may be observed through the recourse to external capital after an
important catastrophic events. Since the end of the nineties, new ways for recapitalization
have emerged for this industry. Lane (2007) analyses their use by the reinsurance industry
following the costly 2005 year that had seen Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma. Total
cost was estimated for the whole industry to 86,5$ bn of which 42% were supported by
the reinsurance industry. During the 15 months following the hurricanes, Lane accounts
for 33,5$ bn raised by reinsurance industry11. Costs of hybrid capital may give a proxy for
the expensiveness of ex-post capital. Comparisons between recourse to external and inter-
nal capital are however not easy. In their study, Weiss and Chung (2004) use reinsurance
contracts over the period 1991-1995 in the US to analyze the impact of ﬁnancial quality
and global capacity on reinsurance prices. The coeﬃcients they ﬁnd do not support the
hypothesis that external equity is more costly than internal equity but they underline that
such results are to be taken with caution because recourse to external capital much more
easy to estimate than retained earnings. Further study would be needed on this point.
Finally, the impact of strategic interaction on the output market price we give is particularly
interesting to discuss from a regulation perspective. Higher level of capital retention could
lead to a lower price approaching pure competition and thus enhancing customer's wealth.
In the case of an oligopolistic market structure, this leads to interesting conclusions in a
regulatory approach. The model provides a rationale for capital regulation, that rely on
other arguments than solvency issues as classically social failure costs with limited liability
issues (Matutes and Vives, 2000). Each capital equilibrium leads to a continuum of Nash
prices from which the maximum-value maximising price is exerted. A regulation on capital
can avoid situations in which ﬁrms are under capitalised, leading to maximum Nash prices
all the more high, and lower welfare. Capital regulation could then have a double impact:
reduce ﬁrm insolvency as classically, but also enhance competition.
11This amount is split in capital raised by ancient companies (36%), and new companies (26%), through
Insurance Linked Securities (19%), Sidecars (19%).
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2.7 Appendix
We give here the proofs of the following propositions and corollaries.
2.7.1 A-Proof of Proposition 6
Let us note 푝푚 the monopoly price of the symmetric ﬁrms.
Lemma 2. 푃푁퐸∩]푝푚,+∞[= ∅
Proof (Weibull provides a similar proof in the case of convex costs of production):
Let us suppose that all ﬁrms price at 푝 ∈ 푃푁퐸 , with 푝 > 푝푚. Firm 푖 has a demand
푞푖 < 푄(푝). As 푄(푝) is continuous and lim푝→+∞푄(푝) = 0.
∃푝∗ > 푝 : 푄(푝∗) = 푞푖
E푃 (푤푖1 + (푝
∗ − 퐿˜)푄(푝∗)) = E푃 (푤푖1 + (푝∗ − 퐿˜)푞푖) > E푃 (푤푖1 + (푝− 퐿˜)푞푖)
By deﬁnition, as 푝푚 is the optimal monopoly price, E푃 (푤푖1 + (푝
푚− 퐿˜)푄(푝푚)) > E푃 (푤푖1 +
(푝∗ − 퐿˜)푄(푝∗)),
E푃 (푤푖1 + (푝
푚 − 퐿˜)푄(푝푚)) > E푃 (푤푖1 + (푝− 퐿˜)푞푖)
As 푝 > 푝푚, thus the ﬁrm 푖 can unilaterally deviate that enhances ﬁrm's value. Thus 푝 is
not a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 3. (Wambach): Under assumptions (A1) and (A3), if there is a price in the
market such that the 푛 ﬁrms have a value equal to their outside option, the value of any
ﬁrm serving the whole market at this price is strictly smaller, formally:
E푃 (푤푖1 + 휋˜
푖(푝,푄/푛)) = 푉 표푢푡 ⇒ E푃 (푤푖1 + 휋˜푖(푝,푄)) < 푉 표푢푡
Proof: See Wambach (1999) for Proof.
Lemma 3 leads to 푝 ∈ 푃푁퐸 if and only if E푃 (푤푖1 + 휋˜푖(푝, 푄(푝)푛 )) ≥ E푃 (푤푖1 + 휋˜푖(푝,푄(푝))) that
is equivalent to 푝 ∈ 푃푁퐸 if and only if 푝 ∈ [푝표푢푡, 푝푁 ]. Indeed, let us consider a deviation of
ﬁrm 푖 when all ﬁrms set a common price 푝 ∈ 푃푁퐸 . If 푖 raises her price, then it obtains no
demand, as all the residuals ﬁrms meet the demand. If 푖 lowers her price, she serves the
whole market, and decreases its proﬁt.
As 푃 is concave, we have
푑2
푑푞푖2
E푃 (푤푖1 + 휋˜
푖(푝, 푞푖)) = E
(
(푝− 퐿˜)2푃푤푤(푤푖1 + 휋˜푖(푝, 푞푖))
)
< 0
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As 푝푁 veriﬁes E푃
(
푤푖1 + 휋˜
푖(푝푁 , 푄(푝
푁 )
푛 )
)
= E푃
(
푤푖1 + 휋˜
푖(푝푁 , 푄(푝푁 ))
)
, a price-taker ﬁrm has
an optimal output between 푄(푝)푛 and 푄. From (A4), we directly obtain that the competitive
price is lower than 푝푁 .
Lemma 2 leads to the conclusion that 푝푁 is lower than the maximal monopoly price.
Let us consider 푝 ∈ 푃푁퐸 . As 푝표푢푡 = min(푃푁퐸), E푃 (푤푖1 + 휋˜푖(푝표푢푡, 푄(푝
표푢푡)
푛 )) = 푉
표푢푡. From
(A3), we obtain E푃 (푤푖1 + 휋˜
푖(푝푁 , 푄(푝
푁 )
푛 )) > 푉
표푢푡. Thus the value of the ﬁrms at 푝푁 is
higher than her outside option.
2.7.2 B-Proof of Lemma 1 :
Let us consider 2 ﬁrms with diﬀerent levels of internal capital 푤푗1 > 푤
푖
1. As 푝
푁
푖 is the
indiﬀerence price for ﬁrm 푖 for serving the whole market or half of it, then E푃
(
푤푖1 +
휋˜푖(푝
푁 , 푄(푝
푁 )
푛 )
)
= E푃
(
푤푖1 + 휋˜
푖(푝푁 , 푄(푝푁 ))
)
. As 푃 is strictly increasing, this is equivalent
for 푖, 푗 to
휋¯(푝푁푖 , 푄(푝
푁
푗 )/2)−푅(푤푖 + 휋¯(푝푁푖 , 푄(푝푁푗 )/2), 푄(푝푁푖 )/2)
= 휋¯(푝푁푖 , 푄(푝
푁
푖 ))−푅(푤푖 + 휋¯(푝푁푖 , 푄(푝푁푖 )), 푄(푝푁푖 )) (2.14)
Let us compare at price 푝푁푖 the expected value of ﬁrm 푗 for serving the whole market and
half of it. Assumption (A5) leads to:
푅(푤푗 + 휋¯(푝푁푖 , 푄(푝
푁
푖 )/2), 푄(푝
푁
푖 )/2)−푅(푤푗 + 휋¯(푝푁푖 , 푄(푝푁푖 )), 푄(푝푁푖 )) >
푅(푤푖 + 휋¯(푝푁푖 , 푄(푝
푁
푖 )/2), 푄(푝
푁
푖 )/2)−푅(푤푖 + 휋¯(푝푁푖 , 푄(푝푁푖 )), 푄(푝푁푖 ))
Using Equation 2.14:
푅(푤푗 + 휋¯(푝푁푖 , 푄(푝
푁
푖 )/2), 푄(푝
푁
푖 )/2)−푅(푤푗 + 휋¯(푝푁푖 , 푄(푝푁푖 )), 푄(푝푁푖 )) >
휋¯(푝푁푖 , 푄(푝
푁
푖 )/2)− 휋¯(푝푁푖 , 푄(푝푁푖 ))
Thus
휋¯(푝푁푖 , 푄(푝
푁
푖 ))−푅(푤푗 + 휋¯(푝푁푖 , 푄(푝푁푖 )), 푄(푝푁푖 )) >
휋¯(푝푁푖 , 푄(푝
푁
푖 )/2)−푅(푤푗 + 휋¯(푝푁푖 , 푄(푝푁푖 )/2) (2.15)
And as P is strictly increasing, the expected value to cover the whole market is higher than
the expected value to cover half of it. Thus the indiﬀerence premium is lower for the less
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risk averse ﬁrm, that is the ﬁrm with higher level of initial capital. The proof is the same
when considering a 푛푡ℎ part of the market covered.
Thus under assumptions (A1), (A2) and (A5), in the case of symmetric ﬁrms, 푤푗1 > 푤
푖
1 ⇒
푝푁푖 > 푝
푁
푗 . The equation 2.14 implicitly deﬁning 푝
푁 allows for the continuity of 푝푁 compared
to 푤1. Thus
∂푝푁
∂푤1
≤ 0.
2.7.3 C-Proof of Proposition 7:
Case 푝표푢푡푚푎푥 < 푝
푁
푚푖푛:
In the case where 푝표푢푡푚푎푥 < 푝
푁
푚푖푛, Lemma 1 leads to 푝 ∈ 푃푁퐸 if and only if E푃 (푤푖1 +
휋˜푖(푝, 푄(푝)푛 )) ≥ E푃 (푤푖1 + 휋˜푖(푝,푄(푝))) that is equivalent to 푝 ∈ 푃푁퐸 if and only if 푝 ∈
[푝표푢푡푚푎푥, 푝
푁
푚푖푛]. Let us suppose that 푝 > 푝
푁
푚푖푛. The ﬁrm 푗 that has the minimum Nash
price 푝푁푚푖푛 may lower the price and then catch the whole market. Thus 푝 is not a Nash
Equilibrium. Then let us consider a deviation of ﬁrm 푖 when all ﬁrms set a common price
푝 ∈ 푃푁퐸 . If 푖 raises her price, then it obtains no demand, as all the residuals ﬁrms meet
the demand. If 푖 lowers her price, she serves the whole market, and decreases its proﬁt. 푝
deﬁnes then a Nash equilibrium
The extension to an oligopoly of 푛 ﬁrms is immediate and when 푝표푢푡푚푎푥 > 푝
푁
푚푖푛. However
other Nash equilibrium may exists that consider less ﬁrms. In fact, for 푝 < 푝표푢푡푚푎푥, only
푛− 1 ﬁrms stay on the market. Let us deﬁne for the remaining ﬁrms 푝푛−1푚푎푥 the maximum
of the prices for which the ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between serving 1/n-1 th of the market or
their outside option. If 푝푛−1푚푎푥 < 푝표푢푡푚푎푥, there still exists a continuum of equilibrium prices
for a 푛− 1 oligopoly.
For 푚 = 1..푛− 1, we deﬁne for the 푚 ﬁrms remaining in the market
푝푚푚푎푥 = max
푖=1..푚
{
푝표푢푡푖 : E푃 (푤
푖
1 + 휋˜
푖(푝,푄(푝)/푚)) = E푃 (푤푖1 + 휋˜
푖(푝,푄(푝)))
}
(2.16)
We note the following interval, that may be empty:
퐼푚 =
[
푝푚푚푎푥; max
푖=푚+1..푛
{푝푚푚푎푥}
[
(2.17)
When assumptions (A1) to (A5) hold, in the case of non-symmetric ﬁrms that diﬀers by
their risk aversion, there exist sub markets price equilibrium intervals 퐼푚 for each 푚-
oligopoly.
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2.7.4 D-Second order Derivatives of V(.):
1. Price-Taking Firms. For each set of strategies (퐾푖), we consider the variation of marginal
net value for the price-taking ﬁrms, at the price 푝푁 (퐾). We note this variation 푉 ′′푖푇푎푘푒푟(퐾
푖),
and as marginal cost is constant, we have the following expression:
푉 ′′푖푇푎푘푒푟(퐾
푖) = −
(
−푅11(1+ ∂휋¯
∂퐾
)−푅12 ∂푄
∂퐾
)
푃푤+
(
1+
(1−푅1)∂휋¯
∂퐾
−푅2 ∂푄
∂퐾
)
푃푤푤 (2.18)
2. Price-Taking Firms. For each set of strategies (퐾푖), we consider the variation of marginal
net value for the price-making ﬁrms. The second-order derivative is given by
푉퐿푒푎푑푒푟푖
′′(퐾푖) =
[(
∂2푝푁
∂퐾푖2
∂휋
∂푝푁
+
∂푝푁
∂퐾푖
∂휋2
∂푝푁2
)
(1−푅1)− 푇
(
푇푅11 +
∂푝푁
∂퐾푖
푄′(푝푁 )푅12
)
−
(
∂2푝푁
∂퐾푖2
푄′(푝푁 ) +
∂푝푁
∂퐾푖
푄′′(푝푁 )
)
푅2
−∂푝
푁
∂퐾푖
푄′(푝푁 )
(
푇푅12 +
∂푝푁
∂퐾푖
푄′(푝푁 )푅22
)]
푃푤
+
[
(1−푅1)− 푃푀(퐾¯)
]2
푃푤푤
where 푇 = 1 + ∂푝
푁
∂퐾푖
∂휋
∂푝푁
2.7.5 E-Proof of Proposition 8
Consider an unilateral deviations of a ﬁrm 푖 in the case of an 푛 oligopoly of symmetric
ﬁrms from the symmetric Nash equilibrium candidate (퐾¯, 퐾¯). Under Assumption (A6) we
only need to look at marginal deviations. We ﬁrst note that:
푉 ′푖푇푎푘푒푟(퐾
푖) = 푉 ′푖퐿푒푎푑푒푟(퐾
푖) +푀퐶푠푡푟푎푡푊 (퐾
푖) +푀퐶푠푡푟푎푡퐷(퐾
푖) (2.19)
Increasing capital: 퐾푖 > 퐾¯.
If ﬁrm 푖 chooses to increase its level of capital form the symmetric situation, it becomes
the leader of the game, thus determines the market price 푝푁 (퐾푖). Considering Assumption
(A6):
∙ ∀퐾¯ < 퐾∗, 푉 ′푖퐿푒푎푑푒푟(퐾¯) > 0. Hence 퐾¯ < 퐾∗ cannot be a Nash equilibrium.
∙ ∀퐾¯ ≥ 퐾∗, 푉 ′푖퐿푒푎푑푒푟(퐾¯) ≤ 0. Hence all 퐾¯ ≥ 퐾∗ are candidates to be a Nash
equilibrium.
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Decreasing capital: 퐾푖 < 퐾¯.
If ﬁrm 푖 chooses a lower level of capital than the other ﬁrms then the market price remains
equal to 푝푁 (퐾¯), which is determined by the more capitalized ﬁrms. Considering the
previous discussion:
∙ ∀퐾¯ < 퐾∗, −푉 ′푖푇푎푘푒푟(퐾¯) = −푉 ′푖퐿푒푎푑푒푟(퐾¯)−푀퐶푠푡푟푎푡푊 (퐾¯)−푀퐶푠푡푟푎푡퐷(퐾¯) ≤ 0, Hence
a marginal decrease in capital is not proﬁtable.
∙ ∀퐾+ ≥ 퐾¯ ≥ 퐾∗, −푉 ′푖푇푎푘푒푟(퐾¯) = −푀퐵(퐾¯)+푀퐶푑푖푟푒푐푡(퐾¯) ≤ 0 following assumption
(A6b).
∙ ∀퐾 > 퐾¯, −푉 ′푖푇푎푘푒푟(퐾¯) = −푀퐵(퐾¯) +푀퐶푑푖푟푒푐푡(퐾¯) ≥ 0 thus a marginal decrease of
capital is unilaterally proﬁtable.
We thus conclude that the symmetric couples of capital (퐾¯, 퐾¯) are a Nash equilibrium for
퐾∗ ≤ 퐾¯ ≤ 퐾+.
2.7.6 F-Proof of Proposition 9
Consider 2 ﬁrms 푙 respectively ℎ, with a low, resp. high, level of initial capital: 푤푙0 < 푤
ℎ
0 .
If 푉푙퐿푒푎푑푒푟 follows (A6a) Assumption, then 푉
′
푙퐿푒푎푑푒푟 is decreasing. For all 퐾푙, let us deﬁne
퐾ℎ such that 푤
푙
0 +퐾푙 = 푤
ℎ
0 +퐾ℎ, 퐾푙 < 퐾ℎ. Thus 푉
′
ℎ퐿푒푎푑푒푟(퐾ℎ) = 푉
′
푙퐿푒푎푑푒푟(퐾푙 +푤
푙
0−푤ℎ0 ),
is also decreasing in 퐾ℎ. And 푉ℎ퐿푒푎푑푒푟 follows assumption (A6a). Both ﬁrms rach their
maximum net value (for leader) for the same level of capital 푤푙0 + 퐾
∗
푙 = 푤
ℎ
0 + 퐾
∗
ℎ where
퐾∗ℎ < 퐾
∗
푙 .
We use the same logic as in the proof of Proposition 8. Consider ﬁrm ℎ. For all 퐾ℎ ≤ 퐾∗ℎ,
ﬁrm ℎ when being the leading ﬁrm has the interest for increasing her level of external
capital. In this situation, ﬁrm 푙 has always interest to increase as well her level of external
capital up to 퐾∗푙 , where the Nash price is 푝
푁 (푤ℎ0 +퐾
∗
ℎ).
For all 퐾∗ℎ ≤ 퐾ℎ ≤ 퐾+ℎ , ﬁrm ℎ, as the leading ﬁrm, has no interest to increase her level of
external capital, neither has she interest to lower it price-taking ﬁrm. For all 퐾∗푙 ≤ 퐾푙 ≤
퐾+푙 , ﬁrm 푙 as the leading ﬁrm has no interest to any deviation, when 푤
푙
0 +퐾푙 = 푤
ℎ
0 +퐾ℎ.
Let us note 퐾푀ℎ : 푤
푙
0 +퐾
+
푙 = 푤
ℎ
0 +퐾
푀
ℎ . For all 퐾ℎ > 퐾
푀
ℎ , ﬁrm ℎ is the leading ﬁrm, as
she is less risk averse. 푙 chooses the level of external capital maximizing her net value as
a follower, 퐾 < 퐾+ℎ , and ﬁrm ℎ thus beneﬁts from lowering her level of capital. So for all
퐾ℎ > 퐾
푀
ℎ , there are no Nash equilibrium.
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2.7.7 G-Proof of Corollary 2:
We provide the proof of the corollary for the case of 푛 symmetric ﬁrms. We consider 푛+ 1
ﬁrms with the same initial wealth 푤1 that compete on price. We note 푝
푁
푛 the maximum
Nash price of the competition of 푛 of these ﬁrms, and 푝푁푛+1 the maximum Nash price for
푛+ 1 ﬁrms. By deﬁnition
E푃
(
푤푖1 + 휋˜
푖(푝푁푛 ,
푄(푝푁푛 )
푛
)
)
= E푃
(
푤푖1 + 휋˜푖(푝
푁
푛 , 푄)
)
that is E푃 (푤푖1 +
1
푛(푝
푁
푛 − 퐿˜)푄(푝푁푛 )) = E푃 (푤푖1 + (푝푁푛 − 퐿˜)푄(푝푁푛 )).
Let us consider a multiplicative factor of risk 휆. E푃 (푤푖1 + 휆(푝
푁
푛 − 퐿˜)푄(푝푁푛 )) is a concave
function of 휆. Then, as 1푛+1 <
1
푛 < 1,
E푃
(
푤푖1 +
1
푛+ 1
휋˜푖(푝푁푛 , 푄(푝
푁
푛 ))
)
< E푃
(
푤푖1 + 휋˜푖(푝
푁
푛 , 푄(푝
푁
푛 ))
)
Thus all ﬁrms prefer serving the whole market to (푛 + 1)푡ℎ of it at 푝푁푛 . As all functions
are continuous, a small decrease in price will not violate the condition of equilibrium for
a market with 푛 + 1 symmetric ﬁrms that is E푃
(
푤푖1 + 휋˜
푖(푝푁푛+1,
푄(푝푁푛+1)
푛+1 )
)
= E푃
(
푤푖1 +
휋˜푖(푝
푁
푛+1, 푄)
)
. Thus, using (A3), 푝푁푛+1 < 푝
푁
푛 .
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Chapter 3
Crop Insurance and Pesticides in
French Agriculture: an Empirical
Analysis of Integrated Risk
Management1
Abstract
This paper investigates the determinants of rapeseed hail insurance and pesticide decisions using indi-
vidual panel data set of French farms covering the period from 1993 to 2004. Economic theory suggests
that insurance and prevention decisions are not independent due to risk reduction and/or moral hazard
eﬀects. We propose a theoretical framework that integrates two statistically independent sources of risk
faced by farmers of our sample hail risk and pest risk. Statistical tests conﬁrm that pesticide and insurance
demands are endogenous to each other and simultaneously determined. An econometric model involving
two simultaneous equations with mixed censored/continuous dependent variables is thus estimated for
rapeseed. Estimation results show that rapeseed insurance demand has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on
pesticide use and vice versa. Insurance demand is also positively inﬂuenced by the yield's coeﬃcient of
variation and the loss ratio, and negatively inﬂuenced by proxies for wealth (including CAP subsidies) and
activity diversiﬁcation. The analysis of marginal eﬀects shows that elasticities of insurance demand are
greater for the yield's coeﬃcient of variation (0.255), CAP subsidies (-0.192), and activity diversiﬁcation
variables (-0.161).
Keywords: Crop insurance, Pesticide use, Simultaneous equations.
3.1 Introduction
In recent years, agricultural risk management has become a key issue of agricultural policy
reforms. The context has indeed changed deeply. Price support policies2, which provide
farmers an economic safety net in addition to income support, tend to disappear under
the pressure of world trade liberalization and environmental concerns, raising the issue of
price risk management in a liberalized world (World Bank, 2005). At the same time, a
substantial number of production risks due to climatic and phytosanitary hazards remain
1This chapter is coauthored with Raja Chakir.We thank the Centre de Gestion et d'Economie Rurale
de la Meuse/CER FRANCE ADHEO for their database.
2through public storage in the European Union or Target Prices in the United States
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uninsurable without government support in favor of crop insurance (World Bank, 2005).
Under free trade, production shocks are no longer compensated by rises in prices, a natural
hedge of farmers' revenues that renders useless the need for crop insurance in autarky.
The importance of climatic and phytosanitary risks as well as price volatility are thus call-
ing for policy responses. The usual argument for risk policies in agriculture relies on the
incompleteness of contingent claims markets that makes competitive markets ineﬃcient in
the short term. Such ineﬃciency provides a theoretical argument, in certain circumstances,
for second-best Pareto improving government interventions that would mimic such absent
contingent claims markets and restore the correct price incentives (Newbery and Stiglitz,
1981; Innes, 1990). In the long term, incomplete insurance and/or credit market lead to a
too high, socially ineﬃcient farm turnover, some viable agricultural ﬁrms being artiﬁcially
unable to survive to temporary shocks (Kirwan, 2009). Despite these well-founded theo-
retical justiﬁcations3, the consensus is far too be reached about the true costs and beneﬁts
of government crop insurance programmes that take place in real world. Crop insurance
markets are usually plagued by various kinds of market failures, making the distinction
between welfare-enhancing and redistributive objectives particularly uneasy. Since in de-
veloped countries crop insurance programmes often involve substantial ﬁnancial support
from governments, this raises the issue of disguised subsidies. In addition to being highly
controversial in terms of their pure risk-sharing beneﬁts, it is frequently pointed out that
government risk management programmes (in particular crop insurance ones) may have
adverse environmental consequences. In particular, they would incite farmers to produce
more, on more degraded lands, by using higher levels of risk-increasing inputs such as
fertilizers and selecting shorter crop rotations, the same crucial critics that were already
addressed to the classical, price-support based, agricultural policies of the 70's-80's .
The United States provide an interesting illustration of this debate. In this country, gov-
ernment crop insurance programmes constitute after nearly three decades of existence a
growing component, if not one of the building block of the Farm Bill. Crop insurance pro-
grammes take the form of a public-private partnership between the Federal Government,
3Such normative result must be qualiﬁed. Indeed, the welfare gains, eventually losses, from risk policies
have been shown to be highly sensitive to changes in parameters, especially supply and demand elasticities
(Newbery and Stiglitz (1981), Innes (1990)). More profound is the critics by Dixit, who considers that
welfare gains coming from government interventions may be highly overestimated because classical models
implicitly assume governments to be immune to the fundamental causes that make market collapse, such
as moral hazard, adverse selection or imperfect observability
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through the Risk Management Agency (United States Department of Agriculture) and pri-
vate primary insurers. Government support include substantial premium subsidies, Federal
Reinsurance of last resort and reimbursement of primary insurers' administrative costs. In
spite of such ﬁnancial support, provided through various channels, farmers' participation
has always been low and diﬃcult to boost, but recent increases in premium subsidies lead
to reach a participation rate of nearly 80% (Glauber, 2004). Several empirical analysis of
U.S. crop insurance programmes tend to show that crop insurance programmes have nega-
tive environmental consequences through the production distortions they create (Roberts
et al., 2004). Moreover, a recent paper by Kirwan (2009) shows that the farm failure rate
has increased by 1.7 percentage points (30 percents) after the 1994 Crop Insurance Reform
Act, that replaced ad-hoc disaster reliefs by crop insurance subsidies as the major form of
government intervention. Last but not least, expanded crop insurance programmes did not
succeed in eliminating Disaster Bills, i.e. ad-hoc transfers made by the Federal Government
to support farmers in times of ﬁnancial distresses due to adverse climate shocks.
In the European Union, growing attention is also being paid to weather risks in agriculture
in a context of profound reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (hereafter CAP). The
European system diﬀers from the U.S. one. Price risks were managed at the EU level
through guaranteed prices while weather risks and crop insurance programmes, when they
exist, are under the responsibility of Member States. Guaranteed prices have decreased
due to CAP reforms and have been replaced by decoupled agricultural subsidies to support
farm revenues, with an a priori ambiguous impact in terms of farmers' risk aversion (more
risk due to less price protection but less risk aversion due to a wealth eﬀect). This has lead
Member States to assess the possibility of a crop insurance programme at the E.U. level.
Enlarging the perimeter of mutualization for risks that are considered as systemic at the
National scale has undoubtedly some economic sense, but the lessons from the costly U.S.
experience certainly incite regulators to prudence.
This paper deals with multiple risks decision making in agriculture by investigating the
determinants of rapeseed hail crop insurance and pesticide use, using an individual panel
data set of French farms covering the period from 1993 to 2004. We ﬁrst propose a theo-
retical background, and then follow the reduced form approach and build an econometric
model involving two simultaneous equations with a mixed censored/continuous dependent
variables to account for potential endogeneity, which we estimate.
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Related literature. The relation between production and insurance/hedging deci-
sions is a central aspect of the welfare and redistributive impacts of crop insurance pro-
grammes. There is a large empirical literature on farmers' choices involving risk that intend
to estimate how risk preference do indeed aﬀect farmers' production and ﬁnancial choices,
and how these choices interact (Just, 2000; Just and Pope, 2003). Most papers concern the
U.S. case, in part because several reforms of Federal risk management programmes have
stimulated empirical research on this topic. Garrido and Zilberman (2005), Ogurtsov et al.
(2008) and Velandia et al. (2009) estimate the simultaneous demand for crop insurance and
other risk management instruments (forward contracts, etc.) as a function of farms' char-
acteristics. Another group of related papers focus on the relation between insurance and
production choices, providing some empirical testing of the possible distorsive eﬀects of risk
management instruments (eventually magniﬁed by public subsidies): Horowitz and Licht-
enberg (1993) results suggest that crop insurance has encouraged pesticide and fertilizer
input uses for corn producers in the U.S. Midwest. This contrasts with Smith and Baquet
(1996), whose estimations show that fertilizer and pesticide inputs for Kansas wheat pro-
ducers tend to be negatively correlated with insurance purchases. Wu (1999) is the ﬁrst
to extend the analysis to acreage decisions as a risk diversiﬁcation tool. In his estimation
of the eﬀect of crop insurance on crop acreage allocation and pesticide use in Central Ne-
braska Basins, he shows that crop insurance participation encourages producers to switch
to crops in higher economic values. In a more recent paper, Goodwin et al. (2004) study
the acreage eﬀects of crop insurance using the samples of corn and soybeans production
in the U.S. Corn Belt and wheat and barley production in Northern Great Plains. They
estimate a simultaneous equation model to take into account a larger set of endogenous
risk decisions of agricultural producers to simulate the possible eﬀects of large premium
changes. Their results suggest a relatively modest acreage responses to expanded insurance
subsidies. In a very recent study on insurance and acreage decisions, O'Donoghue et al.
(2009) conduct an empirical analysis of the interaction between specialization and the price
of crop insurance, which has been lowered through an increase in Federal premium sub-
sidies by the Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act. They found a statistically signiﬁcant
but small positive relation between the degree of specialization and the level of premium
subsidies.
Some general conclusions can be drawn from the existing literature. First, risk management
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choices are generally endogenous, suggesting possible substitutions or complementarities
between risk management instruments. Second, typical explanatory variables that may
inﬂuence farmers' risk aversion such as yields' coeﬃcients of variation, ﬁnancial ratios
(an imperfect measure of liquidity constraint), farmers' wealth, land ownership are most
of the time statistically signiﬁcant. This tends to support that risk do indeed matter in
farmer's production decisions. Third, although statistically signiﬁcant, some variables have
in some cases a small quantitative eﬀect (O'Donoghue et al., 2009), in other cases strong
quantitative eﬀects, suggesting prudence in drawing too general policy conclusions at the
national scale. Fourth, results may be qualitatively contradictory and unexpected with
regards to theoretical prediction, in particular the relation between insurance and input
uses. Theory suggests that the demand for risk-reducing inputs should be lower for those
who buy insurance than for those who do not buy because of a standard moral hazard
eﬀect. This moral hazard argument, which has been the cornerstone of empirical studies
and discussions on the subject in the U.S.A, is particularly relevant in this country because
of the nature of crop insurance contracts. These contracts are multiple peril, which means
that they provide coverage against any source of yield risk, including pest risk, which is
manipulable by the farmer. Theory predicts a negative relation between the demand for
insurance and the consumption of risk-reducing inputs.
Preceding empirical studies4, mainly based on U.S. data, did not lead to clear cut con-
clusions concerning the sign of the correlation between pesticide and insurance decisions5,
although the fact that both decisions are made endogenously are rarely challenged6. Since
many producers' decisions involve risk considerations, it is diﬃcult to build a theoretical
model that would capture an exhaustive analysis of their interactions (Goodwin et al.,
2004) and yield unambiguous results, even in a static model. The classical moral hazard
4Another group of papers also deal with farmers' risk-taking decisions but diﬀer in their econometric
approach of the cited ones by building structural instead of reduced-form models. The advantage of such
approach is to allow for simultaneous estimation of production technology parameters and risk preferences.
Examples of papers ﬁtting with this approach are Chavas and Holt (1996) and more recently and Kondouri
et al. (2009) to evaluate the risk and wealth eﬀects of agricultural policy changes towards decoupling in
the European Union.
5Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993) have found a positive correlation between crop insurance and chemical
input use for corn producers in the U.S. Midwest. However, Smith and Goodwin (1996) demonstrated that
fertilizer and chemical use for Kansas wheat producers tended to be negatively correlated with insurance
purchases. Wu (1999) and Goodwin, et al. (2004) suggest no clear relationship between crop insurance
demand and input use.
6Using Hausman-Wu test, Goodwin et al. (2004), Smith and Baquet (1996) and Wu (1999) have found
that insurance, crop mix, and chemical use decisions are not exogenous and should be estimated using a
simultaneous equations approach.
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framework does not include multiple sources of risks, adverse selection, price risk, which
may be potential explanations of these contradictory results.
The current paper contributes to the existing literature in three ways. First, instead of
relying on aggregated time-series or cross-section data as in most of previous studies, we use
farm-level data. This is expected to provide us with a more precise description of individual
decisions. Second, the current study uses panel data, which possess several advantages over
conventional cross-sectional or time-series data sets, while exploiting genuinely observed
regime transitions. At last, this paper contributes to the growing literature on the empirical
analysis of risk management decisions in the case of France and other European countries
(Kondouri et al., 2009; Mosnier et al., 2009).
This paper is organized as follows. Some key facts concerning cereal production, weather
risks and crop insurance in France are described in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 presents the
theoretical background of simultaneous input and insurance decisions. In section 3.4 we
present the empirical model followed by a description of the data and estimation results.
We conclude in section 3.5 with a summary of our results and research perspective.
3.2 Policy context for crop insurance in France
3.2.1 The French system before 2005: duality between private and pub-
lic coverage
The French agricultural sector is characterized by production diversity at the national level
and a high degree of regional specialization. Most of the French farms are specialized in
a narrow set of crops. The main climate risks are frost, hail and drought. Frost and hail
risks mostly concern wine-growing and arboricultural, while hail and drought are the ﬁrst
causes of crop losses for non perennial crops (cereals essentially). Like other countries
aiming at stabilizing farmers' revenues, France is doted with a speciﬁc agricultural insur-
ance system against agricultural climate risks, which can be described as follows. First,
risks are classiﬁed in two categories: insurable and uninsurable. Insurable risks are cov-
ered by private markets without any government intervention (or a very limited one) while
uninsurable risks are covered by a public guarantee fund, the Fonds National de Garantie
des Calamités Agricoles (FNGCA), created by the law of 1964. Private and public cov-
erage thus coexist without competing with each other. The insurability criteria are not
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explicitly deﬁned in the law of 1964, although it states that the set of insurable risks is
susceptible to evolve if the private sector becomes able to develop its own supply. The fund
profoundly diﬀers from private insurance market. First it is not ﬁnanced by actuarially fair
premiums, but by the mix of a mandatory contribution on farmers' property/liability in-
surance contracts and a government subsidy, with approximately an equal sharing between
the two sources (the "parity principle"). Thus premiums are not risk based and govern-
ment participation implies a positive redistribution, in average, from taxpayers to the farm
sector. Second, indemniﬁcations are upper-bounded by the amount available in the funds,
and so are not contractually prespeciﬁed as it is the case in a typical insurance contract.
Third, the fund pools several risks (drought, hail...) for several products (wheat, maize,
fruits...) which without practicing risk-based premiums is a source of cross-subsidization
across farms with diﬀerent specializations (between maize producers and wine-growers, for
example) since mandatory contributions are not actuarially fair. The system has clearly
some advantages, notably the fact that mandatory participation implies a large pooling of
diversiﬁed risks, but also defaults: premiums are not functions of risks, which is a source
of distortional choices, and the levels of indemniﬁcations are low, even with the presence
of a large amount of government subsidies. Hence the paradox: if redistribution from
taxpayers to farmers is positive in the mean, farmers often criticize the low levels of in-
demniﬁcations (around 30% of expected losses are indemniﬁed). Moreover farmers are not
free to choose between diﬀerent levels of coverage if they diﬀer in their risk preferences and
their opportunities to diversify risks.
3.2.2 The private crop insurance market in France
Until the reform of 2005, hail was the main risk covered by a private insurance market
in France, i.e. without government subsidies nor government reinsurance of last resort
interventions. Hail insurance contracts are proposed by several insurance companies spe-
cialized in ﬁnancial products for the agricultural sector. The proposed contracts can be
described as follows. Indemnities are provided when the ﬁnal yield is under a threshold
value, which is freely chosen by the producer as a percentage of his reference yield. The
reference yield is the mean of the ﬁve preceding years, leaving apart the higher and the
lower values. When no yield data is available for an individual producer (which can occur
if he has never cultivated the crop), the mean departemental yield is used as a proxy. Some
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standardized values of deductibles are proposed, which are typically 5%, 10% and 15% of
reference yields for cereals such as wheat and maize, and 10% and 15% for rapeseed. In
addition to choosing their deductible, producers are free to choose the price at which they
will be indemniﬁed, up to a maximum price ﬁxed by the insurer. The latter provides infor-
mation about prices forecast to help farmers to make their choice. In case of yield losses,
indemniﬁcations are based on plots, not on the total farm output for the given product.
Thus if total farm yield per acre is higher than the yield that triggers indemniﬁcations but
lower on a given plot, indemniﬁcations will be made for this plot (this is not the case for
other risks included in the package of the reform of 2005). In order to control for potential
moral hazard problems, audits are made in order to verify that appropriate agricultural
practices were followed, in particular the use of phytosanitary products.
3.2.3 The recent reforms: towards a public-private partnership?
The system has been reformed strongly in recent years. The reform of 2005 aimed at ex-
tending the set of insurable risks, i.e. risks covered by private insurers. Before this date,
mainly hail risk was insured through the private market in a sustainable way without gov-
ernment support. The reform of 2005 introduced for the ﬁrst time large scale premium
subsidies in order to stimulate farmers' demand and incite private insurers to expand their
agricultural insurance supply to a larger set of risks. Subsidized contracts are targeted
to cereal producers and provide coverage against multiple risks, as in the United States
(twelve risks including drought, frost etc.). The basket of risks covered by these new insur-
ance contracts can be chosen by the producer. Contrary to the traditional hail insurance
contract, these contracts are now subsidized by the government at a rate of 35% of the
premium. After a few years of existence, participation is not negligible but still limited.
Although it seems to be inspired by the U.S. system, important diﬀerences subsist. First,
premium subsidies are considered as temporary. The underlying idea is to encourage learn-
ing on both supply and demand sides: on supply side, since insurers propose new contracts
that may be susceptible of high ﬁnancial exposure due to correlated risks (drought in par-
ticular); on the demand side since farmers were not used to making free choices before.
Second, although the debate remains open, the French government does not play the role
of reinsurer of last resort as in the U.S. system. The current trend of reforms provide
strong justiﬁcations for empirical analysis of the role of risk in farmers' choices and welfare
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in France. Unfortunately, it is too early to study the impact of the reform of 2005, since
our data set goes to 2004. Moreover, the ﬁrst years of application are heavily driven by
learning from both sides of the market, which renders any comparison uneasy to interpret.
Thus our objective here is to study the relation between insurance and input decisions in
the pre-reform period.
3.3 Theoretical background
We focus our study on two typical risk management instruments of farmers7: insurance
and pesticides. The direct factors that aﬀect the demand for insurance are the farmer's
coeﬃcient of risk aversion, the cost of insurance, and the characteristics of the insured risk
such as the size of the risk and other characteristics of the risk probability distribution
(Henriet and Rochet, 1991; Alarie et al., 1991). The optimal insurance coverage increases
with risk aversion and the size of the risk, and decreases with the cost of insurance. Other
factors inﬂuence the demand for insurance indirectly through their impact on the farmers'
coeﬃcients of risk aversion: wealth, the presence of one or several background risks (Eeck-
houdt and Kimball, 1991), and the presence of a liquidity constraint (Gollier, 2001). Under
the reasonable assumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA), risk aversion de-
creases with farmers' wealth, thus so does the optimal insurance coverage. The presence
of an exogenous background risk increases the optimal insurance coverage if the agent
displays prudence in the sense of Kimball. DARA itself implies prudence. For identical
reasons, all the factors cited above are also susceptible to aﬀect the use of risk-increasing
and risk-reducing inputs such as pesticides.
Analyzing the farmers' choices of insurance and input uses also requires to take into ac-
count endogeneity between insurance demand and pesticide use. In the long run, pesticide
use and insurance demand are taken jointly in order to maximize the farmer's utility. Sev-
eral theoretical papers examine the consequences of the introduction of a crop insurance
contract on the ﬁrms' input uses (or the dual output decision). Machnes (1995), Gollier
(1996) and Machnes and Wong (2003) consider a price-taking ﬁrm's simultaneous decisions
of production and insurance coverage when yield is aﬀected by a multiplicative risk, i.e.
7There is an absent risk management tool in our analysis. Because of unavailable data, price hedging
decisions on futures markets have not been taken into account in the analysis. Since what matters to
producers is income risk, and price risk is certainly not less important than production risk, incorporating
price hedging into the set of risk management tools could have enriched the analysis.
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proportional to the expected production; comparing the production decisions with and
without insurance, they show that, under reasonable assumptions, in particular these of
prudence, the optimal production level tends to increase after insurance is introduced8.
Since multiplicative production risk is formally identical to price risk, this result recalls
the traditional underproduction result of Sandmo (1971) obtained in a context of price
risk. Ramaswami (1993) generalizes the analysis by considering a richer set of interactions
between controllable inputs and climatic factors, considering both risk-reducing and risk-
increasing inputs. He shows that the change in input use coming from the introduction of
insurance can be decomposed into a risk-reduction eﬀect and a moral hazard eﬀect. The
direction of these changes depend on the nature of the interaction between inputs and
climatic factors. Hau (2006) extends the analysis by examining a single non-multiplicative
risk9. Chambers and Quiggin (2000) propose a general state-space approach that allow for
more tractable analysis of production insurance and hedging decisions under risk.
This literature shows that gaining access to insurance tends to modify input use but the di-
rection of the change is ambiguous since it combines risk-reduction and moral hazard eﬀects.
Most of the U.S. empirical papers described in the introduction base their interpretation
on the moral hazard eﬀect, i.e. the fact that insurance participation tends to decrease the
use of risk-decreasing inputs (pesticides). But as we have shown, qualitative results contra-
dict each other. Moreover theoretical models of simultaneous insurance-pesticide decisions
consider a single source of risk 10.
We now present the theoretical model that is the frame of our econometric estimation. The
single risk framework does not ﬁt well with the present case, since farmers of our sample
face in fact not a single but two distinct risks: hail risk and pest risk, against which they
8Gollier (1996) provides counterexamples. Machnes and Wong (2003) show the necessity of prudence
to obtain unambiguous eﬀect of deductible insurance on production. Such assumption was unnecessary in
Sandmo (1971)'s underproduction result.
9The traditional approach in the literature has been to use a stochastic production function of the
form 푓(x, e), where x is a vector of controllable inputs (fertilizers, pesticides etc.) and e a vector of
environmental inputs (rainfall, moisture, temperature etc.) that are stochastic when x is chosen by the
farmer. The two most used speciﬁcations assume a single input, single risk production: the multiplicative
risk model, with 푓(푥, 휀˜) = 푥휀˜ and the Just-Pope model, with 푓(푥, 휃˜) = 푓(푥) + ℎ(푥)휃˜, with 퐸휀˜ = 휀¯ > 0 and
퐸휃˜ = 0, 푥 being a singleton.
10Moreover, this literature compares the situations with and without insurance and is therefore
adapted to the analysis of an exogenous change in the insurance regime, such as the creation of a crop
insurance programme by the government. The issue is however diﬀerent in our region study : we analyze
the simultaneous insurance and production decisions by farmers for a given insurance regime which has
been stable during the period covered in our sample. Thus, some people insure while others do not, but
everyone has access to insurance.
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use two independent risk management tools: hail insurance and pesticides. In order to
take into account the presence of two risks, we extend the Just-Pope production function,
which considers a single risk, by adding a multiplicative climate risk.
푦(푥, 휃˜, 휀˜) = [푓(푥) + 휃˜ℎ(푥)]휀˜ (3.1)
where 푥 is the input, 휃˜ the pest risk and 휀˜ the climatic risk. These two risks are assumed
to be statistically independent. This model includes the multiplicative risk model and
the Just-Pope model as a special case, when 휀˜ = 1. We assume that risk 휀˜ has a binary
distribution (푞, (1 − 푙); (1 − 푞), 1) where 푞 denotes the probability of loss and 푙 ∈ [0, 1]
is a coeﬃcient that measures the extent of the yield loss, considered as given (i.e. non
manipulable). The pest risk 휃˜ is characterized by 퐸휃˜ = 0. It is uninsurable but can
be mitigated through the use of a self-insurance input 푥, which unitary cost equals 푐. We
adopt the usual assumption that pesticides are risk-reducing inputs with decreasing returns
to scale, which corresponds formally to ℎ′(.) ≤ 0 and ℎ′′(.) ≥ 0 respectively. The climatic
risk 휀˜ can be covered by a private insurance contract denoted [푃 (훼, 푥), 훼], where 훼 ∈ [0, 1]
is the coverage rate and 푃 (훼, 푥) the insurance premium as a function of coverage and input
choice. Hail insurance contracts are structured as follows. A reference yield is calculated
as the last years mean yield excluding the worst and best year. Thus the reference yield
is equal to the expected yield (1 − 푞푙)푓(푥). Insurance coverage 훼 is then deﬁned as the
fraction of the reference yield. An indemnity equal to 훼(1− 푞푙)푓(푥)− (1− 푙)[푓(푥) + 휃ℎ(푥)]
is thus paid when a hail shock occurs 11, with probability 푞. Assuming the output price 푤
non-stochastic, exogenous and normalized to unity, the insurance premium can be written
as:
푃 (훼, 푥) = (1 + 휆)푞(훼(1− 푞푙)− (1− 푙))푓(푥) (3.2)
where 휆 ≥ 0 is the usual loading factor, 휆 = 0 corresponding to the actuarially fair
premium. With unit costs of input being equal to 푐 and normalizing the output price to
one, the stochastic farm's proﬁt is equal to
휋˜(푥, 훼) =
{
훼(1− 푞푙)푓(푥)− 푐푥− 푃 (훼, 푥) with probability 푞
푓(푥) + 휃˜ℎ(푥)− 푐푥− 푃 (훼, 푥) with probability 1− 푞 (3.3)
11휃 is written without a tilde when it corresponds to realization of 휃˜
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Moral hazard is not considered since it is controlled through audits. A risk-averse farmer
whose preferences are characterized by the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function 푢(.)
with the stochastic production function presented above solves the following programme:
max
훼,푥
푈(푥, 훼) = 퐸푢[푊˜0 + 휋˜(푥, 훼)], (3.4)
where 푊˜0 is the initial wealth, which could also represent exogenous income or, if negative,
ﬁxed costs. The optimal choices 푥∗ and 훼∗ are given by the ﬁrst-order conditions for
input and coverage. When 휃˜ = 0, the problem is reduced to the multiplicative risk case
studied in the literature presented before. The introduction of 휃˜ complicates the analysis.
The combination of a risk-reducing and multiplicative model has been analyzed by Liu
and Black (2004) in their two-shock model, where the multiplicative risk is assumed to
represent a price risk. They show that the introduction of insurance has ambiguous eﬀects
on input use when input is risk-decreasing. However, their framework is diﬀerent than ours
since the insurable risk corresponds to 휃˜ in our model. In our case, the presence of two
independent risks can lead to a non-monotonic marginal eﬀect of 푥 on the reduction of
variance. Appendix 3.6 studies this aspect in the case of mean-variance preferences.
In addition to insurance and pesticides, acreage decisions could also be considered as a
risk management tool at the farm level. It is however assumed that acreage is long-term
decision and so does not enter into the year-to-year multiple risk-taking decision of the
farmer12. This can be justiﬁed on technical grounds: switching from a rotation to another
can incur costs (yield losses, ﬁxed costs) as well as time lags. Moreover, the decision
to diversify can be the result of expected proﬁt maximization due to positive production
externalities between crops, as analyzed by Hennessy (2006). From an agronomic point
of view, these externalities come from nitrogen carry-over eﬀects and/or reduction of pest
infestations, and can be a way to maintain or increase the soil's production potential
over time. To a certain extent, crop production externalities qualify the traditional view
of acreage allocation as a standard portfolio problem, and thus the role played by risk
aversion13.
12Our data show that the typical three years rotation rapeseed-wheat-barley is the most observed in
the Meuse area. This is due to the fact that the considered area is homogeneous from the pedo-climatic
conditions and that the observed rotations are a long-term choice made in the past by farmers. This justify
our hypothesis that acreage choice is exogenous in our empirical application.
13There are other arguments for this qualiﬁcation: the allocation of labor time across crops, the farmer's
use of its own crop product for livestock, the impossibility to cultivate certain crops on a subset of plots
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To sum up, it is generally recognized that pesticides not only reduce risk but also increase
expected production, thus increasing exposure to the second, multiplicative risk. It seems
to be intuitive that producers with higher expected production will tend to buy more
insurance because the expected value of the output, and so the potential loss, is higher.
The underlying economic mechanisms at stake in these interactions may however be quite
diﬀerent depending on the theoretical framework which is considered.
In the following section we estimate the reduced form relationship between demand for
insurance and pesticide use with an econometric model involving simultaneous equations.
3.4 Empirical model
3.4.1 Econometric model
We now turn to the econometric model in order to examine hail insurance and pesticide use
decisions. Our data set does not include insurance coverage itself but insurance expenses,
for each crop. The usual way in the literature is to consider the demand for insurance
as a binary variable identifying whether the farmer participates or not (Horowitz and
Lichtenberg, 1993; Smith and Baquet, 1996; Wu, 1999). This is a limitation of these
studies which focus on the decision of insurance purchase only and not take into account
the level of coverage in the analysis. In spite of absent data, we choose to approximate
the demand for insurance by the premium per unit area divided by the mean product per
unit area, i.e. crop yield times crop price, calculated on the total years available. Such
normalization by the mean product allows to eliminate the mechanical increase in premium
coming from an increase in the value of the insured output, as shown by equation (3.2) in
the case of a linear transaction cost function.
Our approach follows the empirical literature on crop insurance and production decisions,
such as pesticide use (Horowitz and Lichtenberg, 1993; Smith and Baquet, 1996), culti-
vation practices (Goodwin et al., 2004) and cropping patterns (Wu, 1999). We thus ﬁt
into the simultaneous equation approach framework. To investigate the determinants of
crop insurance demand under endogenous input use decision, we estimate our model using
individual farm panel data covering the period from 1993 to 2004 instead of the usual cross
sectional dataset. Our dataset allows us to capture individual farmers eﬀects and also to
follow the evolution of farmers' choices over a long period of time. Panel data, by taking
because of soil quality.
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into account the inter-individual diﬀerences and intra-individual dynamics have several
advantages over cross-sectional or time-series data. In our case the two most important
advantages14 are to have more accurate inference of model parameters and to control the
impact of farmer's individual heterogeneity.
Following theoretical analysis and the empirical literature, we consider in this analysis that
the farmers's crop insurance and pesticide input use decisions are made simultaneously.
Our econometric model thus corresponds to two simultaneous equations with a mixed cen-
sored/continuous dependant variables and panel data. The simultaneous equation system
can be written as follows
퐼∗푖푡 = 푋
′
1푖푡훽1 + 푃푖푡훾1 + 푤1푖푡, (3.5)
푃푖푡 = 푋
′
2푖푡훽2 + 퐼
∗
푖푡훾2 + 푤2푖푡, (3.6)
and the observed counterpart is:
퐼푖푡 =
{
퐼∗푖푡 if 퐼
∗
푖푡 > 0,
0 otherwise.
where 퐼∗푖푡 is the latent variable for the farmer's 푖 insurance demand at time 푡, 퐼푖푡 is the
observed demand insurance for the farmer 푖, 푃푖푡 is the pesticide input demand of farm 푖 at
time 푡, 푋 ′1푖푡 and 푋
′
2푖푡 are vectors of explanatory variables, 훽1, 훾1, 훾2, 훽2 are parameters to
be estimated,푤1푖푡 and 푤2푖푡 are error terms, 푖 = 1, ...., 푁 indexes the farmers and 푡 = 1, ..., 푇
indexes time period of observation. The error term 푤푚푖푡 (푚 = 1, 2) is decomposed as
푤푚푖푡 = 휇푚푖 + 휀푚푖푡, 푚 = 1, 2, 푖 = 1, ...푁, 푡 = 1, ...푇, (3.7)
where 휇푚푖 is the individual eﬀect for the farm 푖 and the variable of decision 푚 and 휀푚푖푡 is
an i.i.d. error term for equation 푚.
We make the following distributional assumptions:
휇푚푖 ↪→ 푁(0, 휎2휇푚), 휀푚푖푡 ↪→ 푁(0, 휎2휀푚), 퐸(휇푚푖휀푚푖푡) = 0, for all 푚 = 1, 2, ...,푀
with
14See Hsiao(2007) for a survey of advantages of Panel data.
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퐸(휇푚푖휇푘푗) =
{
휎휇푚푘 if 푖 = 푗,
0 otherwise,
퐸(휀푚푖푡휀푘푗푠) =
{
휎휀푚푘 if 푖 = 푗 and 푡 = 푠,
0 otherwise,
for all 푚, 푘 = 1, 2, 푖, 푗 = 1, ...푁 , and 푡, 푠 = 1, ...푇 .
The model (3.5-3.6) has a mixed structure since it includes both a latent variable and
its dichotomous realization. Procedures for estimating simultaneous equation models in
which one or more equation contains limited dependent variable have been developed by
Amemiya (1974), Amemiya (1979) and Nelson and Olson (1978). This literature shows that
the FIML (Full Information Maximum Likelihood) is computationally diﬃcult and may be
infeasible. Nelson and Olson (1978) propose a simple two stage estimation procedure where
endogenous variables are replaced by predicted values obtained at ﬁrst stage by regression
upon an instrument set. This two-step procedure has the advantage to give consistent
estimates of the coeﬃcients of the model, however Amemiya (1979) shows that this two-
steps procedure misrepresents the true variances of parameters. Bootstrapping methods
were proposed in the literature to estimate consistently the parameters of the matrix of
variance covariance.
Following the literature, we estimate our model by a two-stage procedure (Maddala, 1983)15.
In order to obtain consistent estimates of the parameters of the variance-covariance matrices
we use bootstrap methods proposed by Efron (1979) and Efron (1987). The bootstrapping
approach consists in drawing with replacement a large number of pseudo-samples of size N
(which correspond to the number of observations in the observed data). For each sample
the two-step procedure is applied in order to generate a distribution of consistently esti-
mated parameters. Such an approach provides consistent variance-covariance parameter
estimates that are robust to heteroscedasticity.
Since our sample consists of panel data, we have to choose between a random eﬀect and
a ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁcation. We assume a random eﬀect model because the ﬁxed eﬀect
speciﬁcation suﬀers from the incidental parameters problem16 in the case of Tobit model,
Greene (2004) shows that the incidental parameters problem causes a downward bias in
15Our model corresponds to the model 2 in Maddala (1983).
16The incidental parameters problem of the maximum likelihood estimator in the presence of ﬁxed eﬀects
(MLE/FE) was ﬁrst analyzed by Neyman and Scott (1948) in the context of the linear regression model.
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the estimated standard deviations in the Tobit model speciﬁcation. Such problem might
lead to erroneous conclusions concerning the statistical signiﬁcance of the variables used
in the regressions.
The ﬁrst step of the two-stage procedure consists in estimating the reduced form of the
system (3.5-3.6) which can be written as follows 17:
퐼∗푖푡 = 푋
′
푖푡Π1 + 휉1푖푡, (3.8)
푃푖푡 = 푋
′
푖푡Π2 + 휉2푖푡, (3.9)
where 푋 ′푖푡 includes all the exogenous variables in 푋
′
1푖푡 and 푋
′
2푖푡. This ﬁrst step of the
procedure provides us with estimates of the parameters Π1, Π2 as well as the matrix of
variance covariance of individual eﬀects and iid error terms. In our case, we estimate the
equation in (3.8) by a random eﬀect Tobit model and the equation in (3.9) by ML-RE
model. In the second step, we estimate the equation (3.5) by RE-Tobit after substituting
푃ˆ푖푡 for 푃푖푡 and the equation (3.6) by RE-ML after substituting 퐼ˆ
∗
푖푡 for 퐼
∗
푖푡. This two stage
procedure gives consistent estimates of the model coeﬃcients (Maddala, 1983), but the
estimates of variance of the coeﬃcients may be inconsistent because predicted values of
the endogenous variables are used in the second stage of the estimation procedure.
Marginal eﬀects. Computation of elasticity measures requires calculation of marginal
eﬀects from the RE-Tobit model18. Given the censored nature of insurance demand equa-
tion diﬀerent marginal eﬀects can be computed for each explanatory variable. For each
explanatory variable 푥푗 , we have calculated at the mean of the sample, the three elastici-
ties19:
1. Conditional elasticity: which measure for each explanatory variable the elasticity of
the expected insurance demand given that the farmer holds an insurance contract.
퐸푙푎푐표푛푑푖푡푖표푛푎푙 =
∂ ln퐸(퐼∣퐼 >, 푥 = 푥)
∂ ln푥푗
= 훽푗
푥푗
퐸(퐼∣퐼 >, 푥 = 푥) (3.10)
17See the appendix 3.6.3 for more details.
18As proposed by Wooldridge (2002) the marginal eﬀects were estimated by making the normalization
of the individual-speciﬁc eﬀects such as 퐸(휇) = 0.
19see Greene (2008).
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2. Probability elasticity: which measure for each explanatory variable the elasticity of
the probability that a farmer holds an insurance contract.
퐸푙푎푝푟표푏푎 =
∂ ln푃푟(퐼 > 0∣푥 = 푥)
∂ ln푥푗
=
∂푃푟(퐼 > 0∣푥 = 푥)
∂푥푗
푥푗
푃푟(퐼 > 0)
(3.11)
3. Unconditional elasticity: which measure for each explanatory variable the elasticity
of the expected insurance demand
퐸푙푎푢푛푐표푛푑푖푡푖표푛푎푙 =
∂ ln퐸(퐼∣푥 = 푥)
∂ ln푥푗
= 훽푗 × 푃푟(퐼 > 0∣푥 = 푥) 푥푗
퐸(퐼∣푥 = 푥) (3.12)
As we have
퐸(퐼∣푥 = 푥) = 푃푟[퐼 > 0∣푥 = 푥]× 퐸[퐼∣퐼 > 0, 푥 = 푥], (3.13)
we can easily show that for each explanatory variable, the total elasticity is the sum of the
probability elasticity and the conditional elasticity:
퐸푙푎푢푛푐표푛푑푖푡푖표푛푎푙 = 퐸푙푎푐표푛푑푖푡푖표푛푎푙 + 퐸푙푎푝푟표푏푎 (3.14)
3.4.2 Data description
The study is conducted on a sample of French farmers from the Departement of Meuse.
Our data are provided by the Management Centre (Centre de Gestion de la Meuse). Our
sample is an unbalanced panel observed between 1993 and 2004. We consider in this paper
the most important crops in terms of cultivated area: rapeseed, wheat and barley. One
interesting feature of our database is that it contains detailed information for each crop on
major inputs: fertilizers ( N, P, K), pesticide inputs (herbicides, fungicides, insecticides,
and growth regulators) and insurance.
As shouwn in table 3.1, approximately 88% of farmers in our sample hold a hail insurance
contract . This proportion remained almost constant over the observation period 1993-
2004, varying between a minimum of 81.90% in 1993 and a maximum of 91.25% in 2002.
Summary statistics presented in table 3.2 show that on average the farmers who hold a
rapeseed hail insurance contract had less CAP subsidies than farmers without hail insurance
contract. They are also more specialized in rapeseed production and have less animal
production revenues (related to their total revenues).
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Table 3.1: Farms who hold a hail insurance contract
Year Total number % of farmers who hold
of farmers hail insurance contract
1993 442 81.90%
1994 432 83.56%
1995 450 85.33%
1996 451 85.36%
1997 483 87.78%
1998 489 88.34%
1999 487 90.14%
2000 481 89.39%
2001 459 89.10%
2002 446 91.25%
2003 392 89.79%
2004 161 89.44%
Total 5173 87.55%
Table 3.2: Summary statistics
Variable Deﬁnition
primassph_col premium per unit area / mean yield
col_pacph CAP subsidies per ha
sanim_produit share of animal revenue
scol_produit share of rapeseed production
loss_ratio sum of indemnities / sum of premium
ratio_liq debts / assets
ind_ferm =1 if land renting
puthf percent of family labor
cvrdt_col CV of rapeseed yield
col_laglnprix log rapeseed lagged price
sau Total farm area
Insurance=0 Insurance=1
Mean
(std. dev.)
0
(0)
4.734
(0.917)
0.564
(0.226)
0.246
(0.099)
0.259
(0.74)
0.158
(0.131)
0.991
(0.096)
0.933
(0.132)
0.399
(0.457)
-3.166
(4.455)
16593.073
(7645.564)
Mean
(std. dev.)
0.008
(0.005)
4.672
(0.788)
0.455
(0.259)
0.287
(0.099)
0.791
(1.409)
0.183
(0.138)
0.995
(0.073)
0.906
(0.158)
0.275
(0.278)
-2.447
(3.309)
19764.295
(9979.700)
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Choice of explanatory variables
According to the literature and to our theoretical discussion, the demand for crop insur-
ance and risk-reducing input could be inﬂuenced by farms' characteristics such as farm's
diversiﬁcation, wealth, and liquidity constraints. We hereafter construct some proxies for
these variables as explanatory variables of insurance demand.
Diversiﬁcation. The degree of farm's diversiﬁcation is expected to have a negative
eﬀect on insurance and pesticide demands since it can be considered as a substitute to
insurance as a risk management instrument. We consider two forms of farm diversiﬁcation:
crop diversiﬁcation which refers to the classical rotation choice, and activity diversiﬁcation
which refers to the relative shares of crop activities taken as a whole with other sources of
farms' revenues, i.e. livestock in our sample. Several index provide consistent measures of
the degree of diversiﬁcation, namely the Herﬁndahl index and Theil index of entropy. With
two activities only, relative shares in the farm's total output constitute a simpler measure
of diversiﬁcation. Computation of these index revealed that they are highly correlated.
We thus choose to restrict to a single measure. Since we have only three crops and two
activities (crop and livestock), we deﬁne crop diversiﬁcation as the share of rapeseed in
the total crop product (푠푐표푙_푝푟표푑푢푖푡) and activity diversiﬁcation as the share of livestock
in the total farm product (푠푎푛푖푚_푝푟표푑푢푖푡). Note that since livestock activity is assumed
exogenous, the activity diversiﬁcation index can also be interpreted as a wealth eﬀect.
Wealth. If farmers display decreasing absolute risk aversion, then wealthier farmers
may perceive less of a need to insure. There is not any real consensus in the literature in
building a proxy for wealth in similar studies (farms' net present values, size index such as
land area). The following proxies for farmers' wealth are included.
Non-crop revenues. As livestock activities provide returns that are independent to crop
ones, we can interpret the activity diversiﬁcation index as a proxy for wealth in addition
to a diversiﬁcation one.
Farm size. Many studies in the literature include a measure of farm size as a proxy for
wealth. It also captures the eﬀect of size economies on the demand for insurance. We thus
include the agricultural area (SAU) as an explanatory variable.
CAP income support. Agricultural income support policies are also a major part of farmers'
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revenues, and can therefore be a strong component of the farmers' wealth eﬀect. Hence
CAP subsidies are also included as a proxy of farmers' wealth(푐표푙_푝푎푐푝ℎ) as an explanatory
variable.
Financial characteristics. Financial characteristics of the farm such as debt and liq-
uidity constraints are strongly expected to aﬀect insurance and input choices through their
impact on farmers' risk aversion. More liquidity constrained farmers would insure more
ceteris paribus. We have built the three following ratios in order to capture such liquidity
constraint: the total debt ratio, the land debt ratio and the liquidity ratio (푟푎푡푖표_푙푖푞).
These three ratios are expected to have a positive eﬀect on insurance and input uses. For
the same liquidity constraint reason, farmers who rent land are expected to buy more in-
surance and use more pesticides because they are more leveraged (Wu, 1999). We thus
include a rent index (푖푛푑_푓푒푟푚).
Loss ratio. The demand for insurance is expected to depend on the expected return
from insurance (usually negative), which includes premiums and expected indemnities. To
capture such factor, we use individual farmers' loss ratios (푙표푠푠_푟푎푡푖표), a variable that
is equal to the total indemnities divided by total insurance premiums for the available
years. Since our panel is unbalanced, diﬀerences due to catastrophic events that arise some
years can be a source of bias between farmers (Goodwin, 1993). However, excluding these
years from our analysis would also create some bias and weaken the analysis so we kept
all available years in our sample. Heterogeneity in loss ratios can be due to by asymmetric
information if farmers are more informed that insurers about the distribution of their yield
risk. Goodwin (1993), Just et al. (1999) and more recently Goodwin et al. (2004) provided
empirical evidence of the importance of such factor on the incentive to insure in the U.S.
agricultural context.
Yield variation. In order to catch the eﬀect of crop risk on insurance and pesticides,
we include as it is usually the case in the literature20, the individual coeﬃcient of variation
of yield (푐푣푟푑푡_푐표푙). Intuitively, a high coeﬃcient of variation reﬂects a higher crop risk
exposure, thus an incentive to get insured.
20See for example Goodwin et al. (2004).
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Labor composition. Total labor includes hired labor and family labor. The compo-
sition of the total labor could give us an idea of the nature of farm management. We build
an index, 푝푢푡ℎ푓 , which is equal to the share of family labor in the total farm labor (Wu,
1999).
3.4.3 Estimation results
We estimate a simultaneous equation model of crop insurance demand and pesticide de-
mand using the two-stage procedure proposed by Nelson and Olson (1978) with a boot-
strapping method to estimate consistent parameters of the variance-covariance matrices.
Estimations are made on rapeseed only because this crop exhibits the higher coeﬃcients
of variation than wheat and barley.
Are insurance demand and pesticide use endogenous? The Durbin-Wu-Hausman
test. To test the simultaneous equation speciﬁcation adopted in our model, the Durbin-
Wu-Hausman21 test was performed to test the hypothesis that: (1) crop insurance decisions
are exogenous to pesticide input demand and (2) pesticide input demand is exogenous to
crop insurance decisions. Results of these tests are presented in table 3.3 and show that
the exogeneity hypothesis is rejected for the variable pesticide input in the insurance de-
mand equation and for the insurance demand in the pesticide input equation. These results
suggest that the two variables pesticide input and insurance demand are simultaneously
determined. This result shows that insurance and pesticide choices are made jointly and
thus provides a strong reason for our simultaneous equation model.
Table 3.3: Durbin-Wu-Hausman test results
Null Hypothesis DWH statistic DF Test result
crop insurance demand is 14.05 7 Rejected at 5% level of conﬁdence
exogenous to pesticide use
pesticide use is exogenous 19.43 9 Rejected at 2% level of conﬁdence
to crop insurance demand
Model estimation. The estimation results are presented in Tables 3.4 and 3.5. Table
3.4 displays the insurance model as a function of our explanatory variables and 3.5 displays
21The "Durbin-Wu-Hausman" (DWH) test is numerically equivalent to the standard "Hausman test"
obtained using in which both forms of the model must be estimated. Under the null hypothesis, it is
distributed Chi-squared with m degrees of freedom, where m is the number of regressors speciﬁed as
endogenous in the original instrumental variables regression.
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the pesticide choice equation. As can be seen by inspecting the results the signiﬁcant
variances of individual random eﬀects conﬁrms the advantage of using panel data and
modeling individual eﬀects. We conclude that the classical regression model with one single
constant term is inappropriate and that there exist in the data individual heterogeneity
captured by individual random eﬀects. The elasticities 퐸푙푎푢푛푐표푛푑푖푡푖표푛푎푙,퐸푙푎푐표푛푑푖푡푖표푛푎푙 and
퐸푙푎푝푟표푏푎 (equations 3.10-3.12) are computed at the means of all variables and are presented
in Table 3.6. The signiﬁcant variables in Table 3.4 also have signiﬁcant marginal eﬀects
(elasticities) in Table 3.6.
Concerning the parameters estimates, a ﬁrst important result is that the quantity of
pesticides (푐표푙_푞푝ℎ푦푡표푝ℎℎ푎푡) used by farmers increases with the demand for insurance
(푝푟푖푚푎푠푠푝ℎ_푐표푙). Moreover, the demand for insurance increases with pesticides. As we
have noted earlier, the empirical literature provided no consensus on the sign and magni-
tude of the eﬀects on insurance on pesticide demand. Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993)
results suggest that crop insurance has encouraged the chemical input use for corn produc-
ers in the U.S. Midwest. However, Smith and Goodwin (1996) demonstrated that fertilizer
and chemical use for Kansas wheat producers tended to be negatively correlated with in-
surance purchases. That means that the insured Kansas wheat producers tend to use less
chemical input than the non-insured ones. Wu (1999)) has focused on the eﬀect of crop
insurance on crop patterns and chemical use in Central Nebraska Basins. The results show
that crop insurance participation encourages producers to switch the crops in higher eco-
nomic values. Thus, the expected relationship between insurance participation and input
use is unclear. The results of Goodwin, et al. (2004) suggest a relatively modest acreage
responses to the increases in crop insurance participation.
Our estimation results concerning the eﬀects of diversiﬁcation on insurance demand are in
line with our expectations. The variable 푠푐표푙_푝푟표푑푢푖푡, which measure the share of rapeseed
in total crop production has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on insurance demand. This
means that farmers that planted more rapeseed are less diversiﬁed and need more crop
insurance protection. In the same way, the variable 푠푎푛푖푚_푝푟표푑푢푖푡 which measure the
share of livestock activities in the farm revenue has a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect on
insurance demand. This conﬁrm the fact that activity diversiﬁcation reduce risk aversion
and so insurance demand of farmers. Wu (1999) and O'Donoghue et al. (2009) ﬁnd a
statistically signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of crop diversiﬁcation on crop insurance demand.
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Concerning activity diversiﬁcation, Goodwin (1993) does not ﬁnd a statistical negative
relationship between the extent of diversiﬁcation into livestock and the tendency to insure.
Results concerning diversiﬁcation must be interpreted with caution. Indeed, a negative
correlation can be explained by a substitution eﬀect between risk management tools, but
a positive correlation, if arises, can be explained by heterogeneity in farmers' risk aversion:
ceteris paribus, more risk averse farmers would diversify more, buy more insurance and use
more risk-reducing inputs. Therefore, which of these eﬀects dominates is likely to depend
on the particular application and data set.
As expected, the CAP subsidies 푐표푙_푝푎푐푝ℎ have a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the in-
surance demand, which can be interpreted as a wealth eﬀect. The eﬀect of direct payments
on farmers' risk preferences has been recently estimated by Kondouri et al. (2009) using a
structural model to estimate simultaneously risk preferences and technology parameters.
Direct payments were shown to substantially decrease farmers' degrees of risk aversion.
Estimation results show that a higher yield coeﬃcient of variation of rapeseed (푐푣푟푑푡_푐표푙)
appears to be positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with greater demand for insurance.
Such a positive relationship is conform to the intuition. However, the coeﬃcient of variation
is in part endogenous due to input uses (in particular pesticides) and crop diversiﬁcation.
For example, more risk averse farmers could insure more against hail risk while using more
pesticides to reduce pest risk, and so exhibit a lower coeﬃcient of variation of yield, calling
for cautious interpretation.
The parameter estimate on the composition of total labor (푝푢푡ℎ푓=family labor /profes-
sional labor) has the expected sign but is statistically insigniﬁcant at 10%. As expected,
land ownership also aﬀect farmers' insurance decisions 푖푛푑_푓푒푟푚. Farmers who rent land
tend to exhibit a higher demand for insurance.
Another interesting but not surprising result is that higher loss ratio is signiﬁcantly and
positively correlated with greater demand for insurance. As discussed in Goodwin et al.
(2004), the fact that both higher loss ratios and higher yield coeﬃcients of variation are
positively correlated with insurance demand suggest that the cost of insurance as well
as size of the risk reduction do indeed matter in farmers' insurance decision. Finally,
the parameter estimates of the liquidity ratio 푟푎푡푖표_푙푖푞 has the expected sign but is not
signiﬁcant.
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Table 3.4: Rapeseed insurance demand
primassph_col
col_qphytophhat 0.00344∗∗∗
(5.34)
col_pacph -0.000211∗
(-2.04)
sanim_produit -0.00312∗∗∗
(-4.13)
scol_produit 0.00218∗
(2.32)
loss_ratio 0.000664∗∗
(2.96)
ratio_liq -0.000857
(-0.93)
ind_ferm 0.00360∗∗∗
(3.67)
puthf -0.000660
(-1.31)
cvrdt_col 0.00838∗∗∗
(6.49)
_cons -0.00348
(-1.74)
sigma_u 0.00811∗∗∗
(12.08)
sigma_e 0.00317∗∗∗
(22.85)
(푁 × 푇 ) 5127
t statistics in parentheses
∗ 푝 < 0.05, ∗∗ 푝 < 0.01, ∗∗∗ 푝 < 0.001
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Table 3.5: Rapeseed pesticide use
col_qphytoph
primassph_colhat 4.850∗
(2.00)
col_laglnprix 0.0105∗∗∗
(5.27)
sau 0.00000445∗∗∗
(5.03)
ann3 -0.296∗∗∗
(-15.74)
ann4 -0.129∗∗∗
(-7.99)
ann5 0.0220
(1.25)
ann6 -0.0638∗∗∗
(-4.07)
ann11 0.108∗∗∗
(4.55)
_cons 1.575∗∗∗
(66.19)
(푁 × 푇 ) 5127
t statistics in parentheses
∗ 푝 < 0.05, ∗∗ 푝 < 0.01, ∗∗∗ 푝 < 0.001
Marginal eﬀects. We now compute elasticities to get some insight about the magni-
tudes of the relations between variables. The results are presented in Table 3.6. First, we
note that this magnitude is quite small concerning the relation between insurance and pes-
ticides: the probability to buy insurance increases by 0.026% when pesticide use increases
by one percent. Unconditional elasticity, which sums up the probability to buy insurance
with insurance demand when positive, is equal to 0.056 %. Such ﬁgures should be inter-
preted cautiously since they may be the result of several eﬀects, some of them acting in
opposite directions: the moral hazard eﬀect, which predicts a negative relationship between
insurance demand and pesticide use, and the risk reduction eﬀect, which predicts a posi-
tive one. In the present region study, it seems however reasonable to think that the moral
hazard eﬀect is not very important in practice because of the presence of insurers' auditing
concerning input uses. Moreover, the fact that the insured risk displays low geographical
correlation at the departement level, the perceived probability of being audited by farmers
may be suﬃciently high to deter the moral hazard incentive. The positive, although quite
modest, elasticity value of pesticide use and provides some support to the risk reduction
eﬀect of insurance.
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Heterogeneity in farmers' risk aversion can also explain such positive correlation but is
unobservable. In this case, a low value for elasticity could be explained by unobservable
heterogeneity in pesticide productivity. Indeed, pesticides not only reduce risk but also
increase expected yields. The latter motive may be predominant in farmers' pesticide use
decisions, explaining low values of elasticities.
These elasticity results shed some light on the complex interaction between insurance and
pesticide choices at the farm level. Although the estimated ﬁgures seem to be small,
they may be the result of countervailing incentives and/or unobservable heterogeneity.
Therefore making predictions about the consequences of crop insurance reforms in France
on pesticide use should take these limits into consideration. During the period 1993-2004,
available private insurance contracts protected against hail risk only. Other production
risks such as drought were managed through the public fund FNGCA. Expanding the
number of risks insured by private insurance contracts would give farmers more freedom
to choose their combination of risk management tools at the farm level. This may increase
the magnitude of the relation between insurance demand and pesticide use.
We now discuss the other factors aﬀecting insurance demand. Classifying them with respect
to the value of the probability elasticity and unconditional elasticity in decreasing order, we
get 1. the rent index (푖푛푑_푓푒푟푚, 0.140 and 0.305 respectively), 2. the yield's coeﬃcient
of variation , 3. CAP subsidies per ha , and , 4. activity diversiﬁcation and 5. the loss
ratio.
The values of elasticities for the yield's coeﬃcient of variation (푐푣푟푑푡_푐표푙, 0.117 and 0.255)
conﬁrms the role of farmers' heterogeneity in risk exposure on insurance demand.
The other explanatory variables have interesting consequences for agricultural policy. First,
CAP subsidies (푐표푙_푝푎푐푝ℎ) have a negative but quite small impact on the probability to
insure (-0.088), but a rather high one on total insurance demand (-0.192). This suggests
that the wealth eﬀect due to farmers' income support plays a non-negligible role in reducing
the consequences of income shocks due to weather events. If such income support decreases
due to forthcoming CAP reforms, farmers of our sample would be more disposed to increase
their demand for risk-management tools such as insurance against weather events.
Estimated elasticities for activity diversiﬁcation (푠푎푛푖푚_푝푟표푑푢푖푡) have the same order
of magnitude than these for CAP subsidies (-0.074 and -0.161), suggesting that income
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diversiﬁcation is also a substantial substitute for crop insurance in our region study.
Estimated elasticities for loss ratios (푙표푠푠_푟푎푡푖표), considered as a proxy for the cost of in-
surance, are rather small (0.023 and 0.049 respectively). This suggests that a crop insurance
policy based on premium subsidies should not lead to strong changes in insurance demand
against hail risk. These results are in line with similar studies in the United States. In this
country, only large levels of premium subsidies allowed to increase the rate of penetration of
insurance at the national scale. Moreover, in many cases expected indemnities are higher
than premiums, rendering insurance contracts valuable even for risk-neutral producers.
The situation is quite diﬀerent in France, where hail insurance is a mature market, with
a large rate of penetration rate and decades of existence without any government subsidy
(the average loss ratio of our sample is 0.791). Hence it is not so surprising that the impact
of a change in the cost of insurance has modest eﬀects on insurance demand. Intuitively,
such impact could be more substantial for multiple peril crop insurance contracts, intro-
duced through a public-private partnership in France in 2005, since they provide coverage
against an extended set of risks, some of them displaying strong spatial correlation, hence
higher premiums. From a theoretical perspective, shows that a risk-averse individual22 al-
ways insurance against a low probability-high loss event if he buys insurance for any other
risk having the same expected loss. This suggests that crop insurance contracts extended
to low frequency risks (typically drought) would always be bought by farmers who already
have a hail insurance contract under identical transaction costs. However several factors
are susceptible to curb insurance demand for this extended set of risks. First, these risks
may not only diﬀer in their distribution but also in their transaction costs. Insurance
premiums are more diﬃcult to calculate for less frequency risks, and spatial correlation as
well as ambiguity may imply premium overloading by insurers. Second, there is substantial
empirical evidence that shows individuals are reluctant to buy insurance against low prob-
ability events, or even do not consider at all risks under a certain probability threshold.
At last, the insurance decision requires processing information and learning, so emerging
insurance contracts may require a time lag for adaptation.
22In fact, any individual having preferences that display the second-order stochastic dominance property.
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Table 3.6: Marginal eﬀects: elasticities at the sample mean
푥푗
∂ ln퐸(퐼∣푥=푥)
∂ ln푥푗
∂ ln퐸(퐼∣퐼>0,푥=푥)
∂ ln푥푗
∂ ln푃 (퐼>0∣푥=푥)
∂ ln푥푗
col_qphytophhat 0.056** 0.030** 0.026**
(2.36) (2.35) (2.36)
col_pacph -0.192*** -0.104*** -0.088***
(-5.77) (-5.76) (-5.67)
sanim_produit -0.161*** -0.087*** -0.074***
(-4.40) (-4.43) (-4.32)
scol_produit -0.023 -0.012 -0.010
(-0.84) (-0.84) (-0.84)
loss_ratio 0.049*** 0.026*** 0.023***
(3.75) (3.76) (3.71)
ratio_liq 0.004 0.002 0.002
(0.35) (0.35) (0.35)
ind_ferm 0.305** 0.164** 0.140**
(2.29) (2.29) (2.29)
puthf -0.079 -0.043 -0.037
(-1.49) (-1.49) (-1.49)
cvrdt_col 0.255*** 0.138*** 0.117***
(13.34) (13.75) (11.81)
t statistics in parentheses
∗ 푝 < 0.05, ∗∗ 푝 < 0.01, ∗∗∗ 푝 < 0.001
3.5 Conclusion and discussion
This paper investigates the determinants of hail insurance and pesticide use decisions using
an individual panel dataset of French farms covering the period 1993-2004. Statistical
tests show that the pesticide use and insurance demand are endogenous to each other and
simultaneously determined. An econometric model involving two simultaneous equations
with a mixed censored/continuous dependent variables is then estimated.
The results of our estimation are twofold. First, it is conﬁrmed that insurance demand has
a positive eﬀect on pesticide use and vice versa, providing empirical support for the inter-
dependence of technical choices and insurance decisions. However, it is also shown that the
magnitude of this relation, measured by elasticities, is quite small. Several explanations are
proposed for this result: the presence of countervailing incentive eﬀects of insurance (risk
reduction and moral hazard), the ambiguous role of risk-decreasing inputs on the variance
of yield, or the preponderance of the expected proﬁt motive versus the risk-reducing one in
pesticide use decisions by farmers. From an environmental policy perspective, this suggests
that reforms aiming at facilitating the access to insurance against an expanded set of risks
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or reducing the cost of insurance may have positive but modest eﬀects on pesticide use.
With monoperil hail insurance contracts, moral hazard temptations concerning the use of
pesticides may be more easy to control than for multiperil crop insurance contracts, for
two reasons. The ﬁrst one is that estimating the relative impact of pest and climate shocks
on the ﬁnal yield may be more diﬃcult when multiple climate shocks enters the insurance
contract. Another problem associated with multiple peril insurance contracts is that in-
creasing the number of covered peril could possibly increase correlation across individual
claims (drought), thus lower the probability of audit.
Second, the analysis of the explanatory factors of insurance demand conﬁrm some theo-
retical predictions and have interesting consequences for agricultural policy analysis. CAP
subsidies have been shown to have a statistically signiﬁcative and negative inﬂuence on
insurance demand, and in turn on pesticide use. This is in line with the assumption
that farmers' preferences are characterized by decreasing absolute risk aversion, conﬁrming
results of several other studies in France and abroad. From an agricultural policy perspec-
tive, this suggests that decrease in CAP subsidies would increase the farmers' propensities
to pay for risk management instruments, underlying the need for an integrated approach
between income support and risk management policies in this sector. Activity diversiﬁca-
tion has also a statistically signiﬁcant and negative inﬂuence on insurance demand, which
conﬁrms the assumption that whole-farm diversiﬁcation is a substitute to insurance and
risk-reducing inputs. More surprising is the fact that crop diversiﬁcation is not statistically
signiﬁcant. This suggests that diversiﬁcation is more an issue at the whole-farm level than
at the crop acreage level. This points out interesting questions in terms of environmental
policy in the agricultural sector. Indeed, our results suggest that encouraging crop rota-
tions against monoculture would have no statistically signiﬁcant impact on the intensity of
pesticide use per hectare. Crop rotations thus may be chosen for other reasons than risk.
They can be more proﬁtable in expectation due to positive external eﬀects between crops
that follow each other, or be the result of other constraints such as soil qualities, which are
not included in our data set. Our results show that farmers with riskier yields tend to buy
more insurance, which is in line with theoretical predictions. The loss ratio, has a signiﬁ-
cant eﬀect but of small magnitude on insurance demand, suggesting a low price elasticity
of demand for insurance. Crop insurance premium subsidies could thus have small impacts
on insurance demand. However, it should be noted that the insurance contracts that are
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analyzed in the present study are not the same than those that are actually subsidized in
France, which cover multiple risks. Finally, we have shown that ﬁnancial ratios are not
statistically signiﬁcant, which is also surprising.
Future challenges. The results of this study could be enhanced and continued in
several ways.
First, we do not consider price risk in our analysis. This is clearly a shortcut since the-
ory suggests that production and insurance decisions are distorted when prices risk is
introduced. Moreover, the CAP reforms of the 90's and beginning of 2000's signiﬁcantly
decreased price ﬂoors for major crops in the European Union, leading to a potential in-
crease of real or perceived price risk for farmers. However, futures and forward markets
were also available in France during the period covered by our sample, allowing farmers to
transfer price risks to ﬁnancial markets and so signiﬁcantly reduce the importance of price
risk. Unfortunately, farmers' positions on futures and forward markets are not available in
our database, preventing us to include price hedging decisions in our analysis.
Second, our data concerning phytosanitary products are aggregate expenses, which include
a set of speciﬁc inputs targeted to diﬀerent sources of risks (moisture, etc.). It is possi-
ble that some producers are more exposed to some speciﬁc risks that are more costly to
self-insure than others. We have assumed a continuous relation between the quantity of
pesticides used (measured by the expenses) and the magnitude of loss reduction. In reality,
the timing of application may be also determinant, so equal applied quantities with diﬀer-
ent fractioning can lead to diﬀerent results in terms of loss reduction, but these actions are
not observable. Phytosanitary (as well as fertilizer) decisions have in fact a dynamic na-
ture, which can include observation and learning by the producer. Such ingredients would
suggest a more subtle theoretical framework but is out of the scope of this paper.
Third, we foresee to carry out estimations by generalizing this exercise to the two major
crops in the sample: wheat and barley, as well as considering the simultaneous demands
for insurance for the three crops and including fertilizers in our analysis. This would allow
to generalize our analysis of multiple risks management by farmers.
Fourth, it would be interesting to build a structural model that would allow joint estimation
of technology and preferences. This requires to deepen the theoretical analysis of the joint
demand for insurance and pesticides with two independent risks. This would allow us to
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conﬁrm our results concerning the shape of farmers' preferences as well as making useful
comparisons with results obtained elsewhere, in particular Mosnier et al. (2009) in the
French case.
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3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Theoretical model
In order to get some insights about basic intuitions concerning the role of pesticides, let us
consider the case of a quadratic utility function:
푢[푊˜0 + 휋˜(푥, 훼)] = 푎+ 푏(푊˜0 + 휋˜(푥, 훼)) + 0.5훾(푊˜0 + 휋˜(푥, 훼))
2
where 푎, 푏 and 훾 are parameters such that 푏+훾(푊˜0+휋˜(푥, 훼)) > 0. The farmer's preferences
display risk aversion if 훾 < 0 (respectively risk loving if 훾 > 0 and risk neutrality if 훾 = 0).
Under such speciﬁcation, expected utility can be written as a function of expected wealth
and the variance of wealth only. Indeed,
E푢[푊˜0 + 휋˜(푥, 훼)] = 푎+ 푏E(푊˜0 + 휋˜(푥, 훼)) + 0.5훾E(푊˜0 + 휋˜(푥, 훼))
2
i.e.
E푢[푊˜0 + 휋˜(푥, 훼)] = 푎+ 푏E(푊˜0 + 휋˜(푥, 훼)) + 0.5훾
[
(E푊˜0 + 휋˜(푥, 훼)))
2 +Var(푊˜0 + 휋˜(푥, 훼))
]
Thus expected utility can be rewritten as a non-linear function of these two arguments,
푧(., .)
E푢[푊˜0 + 휋˜(푥, 훼)] = 푧
[
E(푊˜0 + 휋˜(푥, 훼)),Var(푊˜0 + 휋˜(푥, 훼))
]
To keep things simple, assume that 푊˜0 = 0 and that insurance is unavailable, i.e. 훼 = 0.
With our production function speciﬁcation involving two risks, expected proﬁt and the
variance of proﬁt can be written as, respectively,
E푦(푥, 휃˜, 휀˜) = 휀¯푓(푥)
and
Var[푦(푥, 휃˜, 휀˜)] = 휎2휀 [푓(푥)]
2 + 휎2휃(휎
2
휀 + 휀¯)[ℎ(푥)]
2
Proof.
Computing expected yield, we get
E푦(푥, 휃˜, 휀˜) = 휀¯푓(푥) +E(휀˜휃˜)ℎ(푥)
= 휀¯푓(푥) +
(
E(휀˜)E(휃˜) +Cov(휀˜, 휃˜)
)
ℎ(푥) (3.15)
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Since by assumption E(휃˜) = 0 and Cov(휀˜, 휃˜) (휀˜ and 휃˜ being two independent random
variables), we thus get that
E푦(푥, 휃˜, 휀˜) = 휀¯푓(푥)
Turning to the variance of yield, we have
Var[푦(푥, 휃˜, 휀˜)] = Var[휀˜푓(푥) + 휀˜휃˜ℎ(푥)]
= Var(휀˜푓(푥)) +Var(휀˜휃˜ℎ(푥)) + 2Cov(휀˜푓(푥), 휀˜휃˜ℎ(푥)) (3.16)
We consider each term of this sum:
Var(휀˜푓(푥)) = 휎2휀 [푓(푥)]
2 (3.17)
Var[휀˜휃˜ℎ(푥)] =
{
E(휀˜2휃˜2)− [E(휀˜휃˜)]2}[ℎ(푥)]2
=
{
E(휀˜2)E(휃˜2) +Cov(휀˜2, 휃˜2)− [E(휀˜)E(휃˜) +Cov(휀˜, 휃˜)]2}[ℎ(푥)]2 (3.18)
We know that E(휃˜) = 0. Moreover, the fact that 휀˜ and 휃˜ being two independent random
variables implies that Cov(휀˜, 휃˜) = 0 and Cov(휀˜2, 휃˜2) = 0. Hence this expression reduces
to
Var[휀˜휃˜ℎ(푥)] = E(휀˜2)E(휃˜2)[ℎ(푥)]2
= 휎2휃(휎
2
휀 + 휀¯)[ℎ(푥)]
2 (3.19)
Hence we get
Var[푦(푥, 휃˜, 휀˜)] = 휎2휀 [푓(푥)]
2 + 휎2휃(휎
2
휀 + 휀¯)[ℎ(푥)]
2 (3.20)
End of proof.
The farmer's input choice is thus given by the following programme:
max
푥
푈(푥, 0) = 푧
[
휀¯푓(푥)− 푐푥, 휎2휀 [푓(푥)]2 + 휎2휃(휎2휀 + 휀¯2)[ℎ(푥)]2
]
(3.21)
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Assuming an interior solution, the optimal choice of input use, 푥∗ is given by the ﬁrst-order
condition
휀¯푓 ′(푥∗)푧1 −
{
휎2휀푓
′(푥∗)푓(푥∗) + 휎2휃(휎
2
휀 + 휀¯
2)ℎ′(푥∗)ℎ(푥∗)
}
푧2 = 푐 (3.22)
Looking at the ﬁrst-order condition, we see the double impact of a marginal increase in
푥 on the variance of yield. On the one hand, since by assumption ℎ′(.) ≤ 0 it reduces
the farmer's exposure to risk 휃˜ (risk-decreasing input). On the other hand it increases
the exposure to the other risk, 휀˜. Without further speciﬁcations of 푓 and ℎ and imposing
conditions on the values of the parameters 휎2휀 , 휎
2
휀 and 휀¯
2, there is no clear cut conclusion
on the fact that a marginal increase in 푥 increases or reduces the variance of yield. For
some values of parameters, the variance of yield can be a non-monotonic function of 푥. For
small 푥, the variance decreases, and up to a certain level of 푥, it increases. This is explained
by the relative strengths of the risk-reduction eﬀect of 푥 on 휃˜ and its risk-increasing eﬀect
on 휀˜. To see this, consider the following speciﬁcations: 푓(푥) = 푘1
√
푥 and ℎ(푥) = 11+푘2푥
where 푘1 and 푘2 are two positive parameters. Computing the variance as a function of 푥,
we obtain:
Var[푦(푥, 휃˜, 휀˜)] = 휎2휀푘
2
1푥+ 휎
2
휃(휎
2
휀 + 휀¯)
1
(1 + 푘2푥)2
Thus we get
∂Var[푦(푥, 휃˜, 휀˜)]
∂푥
= 휎2휀푘
2
1 −
푘2휎
2
휃(휎
2
휀 + 휀¯)
(1 + 푘2푥)3
and
∂2Var[푦(푥, 휃˜, 휀˜)]
∂푥2
=
3푘22휎
2
휃(휎
2
휀 + 휀¯)
(1 + 푘2푥)3
≥ 0
Hence the variance is convex in 푥. The sense of variation depends on the values of param-
eters. More precisely, if 휎2휀푘
2
1 − 푘2휎2휃(휎2휀 + 휀¯) ≥ 0, then the variance is increasing with on
the interval [0,+∞[. If 휎2휀푘21 − 푘2휎2휃(휎2휀 + 휀¯) < 0, the variance is decreasing on the interval
[0, 휎2휀푘
2
1 − 푘2휎2휃(휎2휀 + 휀¯)[ and increasing on the interval [휎2휀푘21 − 푘2휎2휃(휎2휀 + 휀¯),+∞[. In the
latter case, for small values of 푥, the ris-reduction eﬀect dominates while for higher values
the risk-increasing eﬀect dominates due to the fact that 푥 increases the production scale.
Thus the eﬀect of 푥 on the variance of yield is non-monotonic.
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3.6.3 Econometric model
퐼∗푖푡 = 푋
′
1푖푡훽1 + 푃푖푡훾1 + 푤1푖푡, (3.23)
푃푖푡 = 푋
′
2푖푡훽2 + 퐼
∗
푖푡훾2 + 푤2푖푡, (3.24)
Then,
퐼∗푖푡 = 푋
′
1푖푡훽1 + (푋
′
2푖푡훽2 + 퐼
∗
푖푡훾2 + 푤2푖푡)훾1 + 푤1푖푡 (3.25)
푃푖푡 = 푋
′
2푖푡훽2 + (푋
′
1푖푡훽1 + 푃푖푡훾1 + 푤1푖푡)훾2 + 푤2푖푡, (3.26)
퐼∗푖푡 = 푋
′
1푖푡훽˜1 +푋
′
2푖푡훽˜2훾1 + 푤2푖푡훾˜1 + 푤˜1푖푡 (3.27)
푃푖푡 = 푋
′
2푖푡훽˜2 +푋
′
1푖푡훽˜1훾2 + 푤1푖푡훾˜2 + 푤˜2푖푡, (3.28)
where 훽˜푘 =
훽푘
1−훾1훾2 and 푤˜1푖푡 =
푤푘푖푡
1−훾1훾2 , for 푘 = 1, 2.
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Chapter 4
Inequity Aversion, The Samaritan's
Dilemma and Risk Prevention
Abstract
We reconsider the Samaritan's dilemma game in the case of a prevention activity against risk. Agents
are risk-neutral and inequity averse in the sense of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). They choose a level of pre-
vention that reduces the probability of wealth loss. Once the state of Nature is realized, individual outputs
are mutually observable inequity averse agents make transfers to the unlucky. In contrast to the previous
literature on the Samaritan's Dilemma which mainly assumes pure altruism preferences, we show that
inequity aversion may lead to multiple prevention equilibria. We also discuss the traditional normative
conclusion concerning the welfare-enhancing role of in-kind transfer of prevention.
Keywords: Inequity aversion, the Samaritan's Dilemma, risk prevention
4.1 Introduction
Understanding people's motivations to buy insurance and invest in prevention activities is
a major issue for insurance practitioners, policy makers and researchers. From a public pol-
icy perspective, two fundamental issues arise: are natural-related risks eﬃciently allocated
across people under the current institutional arrangements? Do people face the appropri-
ate incentives to undertake prevention and mitigation measures, at both individual and
collective levels? The two issues are closely related since a good allocation of risks implies
fair pricing that internalizes the true cost of risk into individual decisions (Picard, 2008)1.
There is however some empirical evidence showing that insurance and prevention cannot
be explained by the canonical model of expected utility maximization alone. In particular,
a signiﬁcant fraction of people tends to forgo any of these forms of risk coping. Several ex-
planations have been proposed in the literature to solve this puzzle. A ﬁrst one relies on the
1In this case, the insurance industry provides the good price signals to risky individuals. Since fair
pricing can hurt individuals that are characterized by a high cost of prevention, some form of redistribution
by the governement can cope with the equity issue (Picard, 2008).
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lack of information. Potential insurees/prevention buyers are expected utility maximizers
but poorly informed about the nature and the precise quantiﬁcation of the risks they face.
Moreover information is costly to acquire and is itself subject to some form of cost-beneﬁt
analysis. If it can be diﬀused without restrictions, information has the characteristics of
a public good, and therefore is likely to be undersupplied. A second explanation relies on
psychological grounds. People tend to distort probabilities, putting more or less weight on
some states of Nature. For example, people may consider probabilities as being equal to
zero under a given (small) probability threshold (Kunreuther and Pauly, 2006). Therefore,
for low probability risks, the fraction of uninsured and underprotected individuals could be
explained by the heterogeneity of such threshold in the population, or even the perception
of it.
A third explanation may also explain underprevention and underinsurance that is observed
in several risk and prevention markets: social preferences. Although several deﬁnitions and
formalizations are possible, the notion of social preferences broadly refers to the fact that
the individuals' utilities are interrelated. Social preferences may have important economic
consequences, in particular the incentive to redistribute goods or wealth to needy people.
This incentive may in turn modify the economic environment in which individuals take
decisions, and thus have consequences on both social eﬃciceny and wealth redistribution.
At ﬁrst sight one may be tempted to think that social preferences have in most cases a
positive eﬀect on economic decisions, at worst a neutral one. But this is not necessarily
the case. Perhaps the most known story of a negative role of social preferences is the
Samaritan's dilemma. It tells that altruism, by providing agents free mutual help through
ﬁnancial charity tranfers in cases of need, reduces their incentives to invest in prevention,
insurance and savings, or incites them to overinvest in too risky projects. The problem
with altruistic agents is their inherent inability to commit to not help when other agents
of the groups they belong to are in need. Being aware of this lack of commitment power,
some agents have an implicit incentive to free-ride on the Samaritan's social concern.
We examine this argument in the case of risk prevention. We consider a two-stage game
between two risk neutral agents that display inequity aversion in the sense of Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) and produce a risky output. There are two states of Nature: a high output
state and a low ouput one. At the ﬁrst stage, agents choose or not to invest in a costly risk-
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prevention technology that reduces the probability of the low output state. At the second
stage, the state of Nature is realized, agents mutually observe their outputs at no cost,
and choose a level of solidarity transfer to the unlucky driven by their inequity aversion
preferences.
Related literature. A growing body of litterature intents to study and incorporate
social preferences into economic models . Moral sentiments the term used by Adam Smith
such as altruism, fairness, or conformism are by now considered by economic analysis as
an important component of individuals' well-being, and therefore a potentially important
driver of individuals' choices in certain contexts, such as teamwork, ﬁnance, industrial
organization, public goods, and externalities (Sobel, 2005). Once it is recognized that
social preferences may matter for economic decisions, it is thus useful to improve our
understanding on the way they interplay with pure economic incentives, in theory and
in practice, and in ﬁne to analyze their consequences on economic outcomes and social
eﬃciency.
The story of the Samaritan's dilemma has been ﬁrst told by James Buchanan. It has been
later formalized in a game-theoretic framework in several papers. Lindbeck and Weibull
(1988) consider a two-agent, two-periods game where mutually altruistic agents make a
saving decision in the ﬁrst period and provide charity transfers in the second period, if
they wish to do so. Characterizing the subgame perfect equilibria of this game, they show
that undersaving is likely to occur in terms of Pareto eﬃciency. Kotlikoﬀ (1987) con-
siders a similar problem and suggests that the ineﬃciency result provides a rationale for
public provision of social security. Bruce and Waldman (1991) study a close model of sav-
ing/investment but with one-sided altruism only. The Pareto ineﬃciency result still holds,
and the authors also suggest that in-kind transfers of saving and/or productive investment
can be a solution to overcome the lack of commitment of the altruist. Coate (1995) also
assumes one-sided altruism but reconsiders the problem in a context of uncertainty and
redistribution. A poor individual make insurance and prevention choices instead of sav-
ing/investment, and can be helped by two rich who want to redistribute a part of their
wealth to the poor. The fundamental logic of the Samaritan's Dilemma remains: instead
of anticipating to free-ride in the future, agents anticipate to beneﬁt from an implicit safety
in bad states of Nature. In addition to the ex-ante ineﬃciency due to forgoing insurance,
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Coate (1995) also considers ex-post ineﬃciency, i.e. the too low levels of charity transfers
that are frequently observed in real life. This is due to the fact that charity transfers
are decentralized actions of rich altruist, thus subject to free-riding. For example, in an
international context, when a shock occurs in a given country, the diﬀerent countries that
provide relief may not be able to coordinate themselves on the socially optimal (from their
point of view) level of aid, leading to underprovision. Hence, not only charity deters insur-
ance, which is ex-ante ineﬃcient, but it also provides an ineﬃcent safety net instead. This
justiﬁes on Pareto eﬃciency grounds in-kind redistribution of insurance and prevention
(eventually a package including both instruments) from the rich to the poor. It is often
used as a metaphor for describing a variety of real-life situations at very diﬀerent scales,
such as mutual help in communities, national solidarity between citizens, international aid
and so on2.
In all these cases, unconditional altruism generates social ineﬃciency in a strategic contexts.
The Samaritan's dilemma has strong normative implications in terms of public economics,
calling for government intervention to restore Pareto eﬃciency. The most direct response is
indeed to force free-riding agents to undertake the socially optimal choices, which necessary
involves the intervention of a third party having enforcement power. This constitutes a
potential rationale for government mandatory insurance, prevention, savings programmes,
and social security on eﬃciency ground. Government intervention can also include subsidies
in favour of prevention and insurance, as well as taxation of risky activities3.
Despite its implacable logic, the ineﬃciency result of the Samaritan's dilemma calls for
scrutiny. In particular, its normative implications, when taken literally mandatory sav-
ings, investments, insurance etc., seem too strong to be realistic as a policy advice. This
would require a very large intervention of the State in the economy, which could itself
create new sources of ineﬃciency (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1988). Recently, several papers
have enriched the traditional framework in diﬀerent ways and suggest that the ineﬃciency
result may not be as robust as it appears. Lagerlöf (2004) considers the case of asym-
metric information and signalling in a two-period model of savings similar to Bruce and
2Lindbeck and Weibull (1988) note that it is also a way to interpret the soft budget constraint problem
of Kornai.
3In the international aid context, in the absence of a central government, a potential solution is the
delegation of the provision of aid to an independent agency with more commitment power ex-post (for
example a less altruistic third party). See Svensson (2000) and Hagen (2006) for such analysis. But
this does not necessary eliminates the commitment problem. Moreover this can create other sources of
ineﬃciency.
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Waldman (1991). He assumes that selﬁsh recipient has private information concerning his
discount factor. Because the altruistic transfers increases with the discount factor, the
selﬁsh agent has incentive to signal a high discount factor through his ﬁrst-period saving
decision. This tends to countervail the typical undersaving eﬀect. In a diﬀerent vein,
Ghosh and Karaivanov (2008) reconsiders the dilemma in a trilateral relationship between
a principal, an agent, and an altruist and show that eﬀort undeprovision is mitigated.
Another recent result by Alger and Weibull (2008) tackles the puzzle of mutual altruism,
i.e. the surprising result that people that count for each other can ﬁnish worse oﬀ than
selﬁsh agents. They consider the case of two mutually altruistic agents that face uncertain
output and can invest in prevention that reduces the probability of low output. Altruism
generates ex-post transfers from the lucky to the unlucky, which allows implicit risk sharing
across agents (positive eﬀect), but also free-riding on the prevention eﬀort (negative eﬀect).
They show that, for certain values of altruism, the free-riding eﬀect is countervailed by an
empathy eﬀect, due to the fact that each agents want to be able to help the other one if
the latter gets a low output. Furthermore, an evolutionary analysis shows that altruism
can be sustainable at intermediate levels.
These recent studies call for investigating further reﬁnements of the standard (if it exists
such one) model. The fact that close but diﬀerent models yield diﬀerent results calls for
studying diverse strategic settings, but also diﬀerent speciﬁcations of social preferences.
The objective of this paper is to propose another look at the Samaritan's dilemma problem
by considering the impact of an alternative speciﬁcation of social preferences. To our
knowlege, almost all models of Samaritan's dilemma assume pure altruism for modelling
social preferences. Pure altruism refers to utility functions of the form 푈푖(푢푖, 푢푗), where
the utility of agent 푖 is a function of his own material utility 푢푖 and the material utility
of the other agent 푢푗
4. The pure altruism assumption for social preferences has however
been criticized over the last decades (Sobel, 2005). Several authors have thus proposed
alternative models of social preferences, which put the emphasis on relative payoﬀs between
agents. Perhaps the two most known models of such type are the Fehr-Schmidt model of
inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) and the Bolton and Ockenfels' model of
equity, reciprocity and cooperation (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). These models have
their origin in the ﬁeld of experimental economics. The objective was to ﬁnd a common
4Many papers assume separability, i.e. the utility function takes the form 푈푖 = 푓(푢푖) + 훿푔(푢푗).
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framework for explaining a recurrent pattern of observed behaviors in standard experiments
such as the dictator game or the ultimatum game (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002). Another
strand of literature, the economics of happyness, also stresses the importance of relative
wealth in individuals' well-being (Clark et al., 2008). The objective of this chapter is thus
to reconsider the Samaritan's dilemma in the case of inequity averse preferences in the
context of risk prevention.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the game is presented, in section 3. it is
solved and analyzed. Section 4 concludes.
4.2 The model
Consider an economy composed by two risk-neutral agents, producing a single good 푦.
Production is risky, with two possible states of Nature, a low output state where production
is equal to 푦퐿 and a high output state where it is equal to 푦퐻 > 푦퐿. Let us denote
Δ = 푦퐻 − 푦퐿 the diﬀerence of production levels across the two states of Nature. Agents
can invest in a costly prevention technology that increases the probability that the good
state occurs. Formally, denote 푝푖(푒푖) (respectively 1−푝푖(푒푖)) the probability of a low output
푦퐿 (respectively a high output 푦푁 ) for a given agent 푖, where 푒푖 ∈ 퐸푖. More eﬀort reduces
the probability of low output, that is for all 푒1푖 ≤ 푒2푖 with (푒1푖 , 푒2푖 ) ∈ 퐸2푖 , 푝푖(푒1푖 ) ≥ 푝푖(푒2푖 ).
Agents are assumed to be risk-neutral over their private consumption and to have social
preferences formalized by the non-linear version of the Fehr and Schmidt's model of inequity
aversion. Formally, if one considers a group of 푁 agents with a consumption vector denoted
w = (푤1, ..., 푤푖, ...푤푁 ), the utility of agent 푖 is deﬁned as follows
푢푖(w) = 푤푖 −
∑
푗 ∕=푖
1
푁 − 1푣푖
(
푤푖 − 푤푗
)
(4.1)
where for all 푖 푣푖(0) = 0 and for all 푧 ∈ ℜ, 푣푖(푧) ≥ 0, 푣푖(.) is assumed to be twice
diﬀerentiable, with 푣′푖(푧) ≥ 0 (respectively ≤ 0) for 푧 ≥ 0 (respectively for 푧 ≤ 0), 푣′′푖 (.) ≥ 0.
In this model, an agent's overall utility is deﬁned as the sum of his own consumption 푤푖
and a term that reﬂects the average degree of consumption inequalities between him and
the 푁 − 1 other agents. In contrast to pure altruism, inequity aversion is a self-centered
concept based on interpersonal comparisons of consumption levels. Because 푣푖 is convex,
the disutility arising from consumption inequalities exhibits decreasing returns to scale.
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That is the marginal disutility from inequality increases as the gap between consumption
levels increases. Agents are assumed to dislike both favourable (they are richer than their
fellows) or unfavorable (they are poorer than them) inequity but some kind of asymmetry
between these two types of inequalities are possible. To capture this in a simple manner
we introduce the following speciﬁcation as a special case:
푣푖(푧) =
⎧⎨⎩
훼푖푣(푧) if 푧 < 0
훽푖푣(푧) if 푧 > 0
0 if 푧 = 0
and 푣 exhibits the same properties than 푣푖. Parameters 훼푖 ≥ 0 and 훽푖 ≥ 0 measure the
disutility from, respectively, favorable and unfavorable inequity for agent 푖. This quasi-
linear speciﬁcation generalizes the model of Fehr and Schmidt, which corresponds to the
case 푣(푧) = 푧. Considering non-linear inequity aversion has ever been proposed by these
authors as a natural generalization of their piecewise-linear initial formulation5. It is how-
ever crucial in our context since it allows for eventual transfers between agents. Convexity
has already been assumed in a contract theory context by Englmaier and Wambach (2005),
and the subject of an axiomatic analysis by Neilson (2006). It has also consequences in
terms of risk preferences toward social outcomes y: agents not only dislike inequitable
outcomes ex-post, but are in addition averse to inequitable outcomes ex-ante. That is,
between two lotteries that yield the same level of expected inequity, the agent prefers the
less inequity variability, in the sense that they have a positive willingness to pay ex-ante
to reduce the risk of inequitable outcomes ex-post.
We consider the following two-stage game:
∙ At stage 1, each agent chooses a level of investment in costly prevention,
∙ At stage 2, the state of Nature is revealed. Agents observe each other payoﬀs and
choose a level of transfers to make to the other agents.
We make the following assumptions:
∙ (A1) Outputs 푦푖 are perfectly and commonly observable by the two agents.
∙ (A2) The cost of prevention is not included in the inequity aversion function.
The following section characterizes the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game.
5The Fehr-Schmidt model is written as 푢푖(w) = 푤푖 −∑푗 ∕=푖 훼푖{max[0, 푤푗 − 푤푖] + 훽푖 max[0, 푤푖 − 푤푗 ]}.
131
CHAPTER 4. INEQUITY AVERSION, THE SAMARITAN'S DILEMMA AND RISK
PREVENTION
4.3 Equilibria characterization
4.3.1 Stage 2: transfers
Looking at the second stage transfer game, I denote 푦푖 and 푦푗 the respective output of
agents 푖 and 푗 before transfers between agents are made and 푇푖푗 the net transfer from
agent 푖 to agent 푗. Suppose that agent 푖 has produced more than agent 푗, i.e. 푦푖 > 푦푗 . The
optimal transfer from 푖 to 푗, 푇푖푗 , maximizes the utility of 푖, thus the following programme
푢푖(푤푖, 푤푗) = 푤푖 − 훽푖푣
(
푤푖 − 푤푗
)− 푐푖(푒푖) (4.2)
s.t. 푤푖 = 푦푖 − 푇푖푗 (4.3)
푤푗 = 푦푗 + 푇푖푗 (4.4)
In case of interior solution, the optimal transfer from 푖 and 푗 is thus deﬁned by the ﬁrst-
order condition
1 = 2훽푖푣
′(푦푖 − 푦푗 − 2푇 ∗푖푗) (4.5)
The optimal net transfer equalizes the cost of giving, equal to one, with the marginal gain
of inequity reduction. In case of corner solution, the marginal cost of giving is always
higher than the marginal gain from inequity reduction and we have 푇푖푗 = 0. In sum the
optimal transfer from 푖 to 푗 can be explicitely written as
푇 ∗푖푗(훽푖) =
1
2
max
[
0, 푦푖 − 푦푗 − 훾푖
]
(4.6)
with
훾푖 = 푣
′−1
(
1
2훽푖
)
(4.7)
Inequity aversion lead to a strictly positive transfer if the income gap between the two
agents is greater than 훾푖. A certain degree of tolerance towards favourable inequity is thus
acceptable, and this is measured by the term 훾푖 = 푣
′−1( 1
2훽푖
)
which is increasing with the
inequity aversion parameter 훽푖. Using the insurance vocabulary, 훾푖 is a kind of inequity
deductible. When realized output are such that a positive net transfer from 푖 to 푗, the
indivuals' ﬁnal wealths, 푤푖 and 푤푗 are equal to, respectively
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푤푖 = 푦푖 + 푇
∗
푗푖 =
푦푖 + 푦푗
2
+
훾푖
2
(4.8)
푤푗 = 푦푗 − 푇 ∗푗푖 =
푦푖 + 푦푗
2
− 훾푖
2
(4.9)
The ﬁnal consumptions are the the sum of two terms: the equally shared output of the
group and a term that depends on 훽푖 only. Because 푣 is increasing and concave, for
훽푖 → +∞, 푤푖 = 푤푗 = 푦푖+푦푗2 , i.e. there is equal sharing of outputs. For lower values
of 훽푖, inequity aversion only leads to incomplete sharing. This in in line with Englmaier
and Wambach (2005) who show that in a principal agent model convex inequity aversion
leads to proportional contracts with slope 1/2 between the principal and the agent. The
following proposition deﬁnes the ﬁnal wealth of agent 푖 once transfers are made.
Proposition 11. The ﬁnal wealth of agent 푖 after transfers, 푤˜푖 is deﬁned as follows
푤˜푖(푒푖, 푒푗) =
⎧⎨⎩
푦˜푖(푒푖)+푦˜푗(푒푗)
2 −
훾푗
2 if 푦˜푖(푒푖) < 푦˜푗(푒푗)− 훾푗
푦˜푖(푒푖) if 푦˜푖(푒푖) ∈ [푦˜푗(푒푗)− 훾푗 , 푦˜푗(푒푗) + 훾푖]
푦˜푖(푒푖)+푦˜푗(푒푗)
2 +
훾푖
2 if 푦˜푖(푒푖) > 푦˜푗(푒푗) + 훾푖
Transfers driven by inequity aversion provide an implicit safety net to agents. However
this safety net is itself risky because a transfer from 푖 to 푗 is activated only when agent 푖
gets a high level of output. If all agents are hurt by a production shock that leaves them
with a low, identical disposable income, no transfers will arise. The safety net can only
be active when some agents within the group have a suﬃciently high level of disposable
income.
4.3.2 The full game
At the ﬁrst stage, agents choose their levels of prevention in order to maximize their
expected utility, which is equal to their expected private wealth (including net transfers)
minus the expected disutility from inequality aversion. We assume a Nash behavior, i.e.
they take as given the level of prevention of the other individual. The programme of
individual 푖 is thus
max
푒푖
푈푖(푒푖, 푒푗) = E
[
푤˜푖(푒푖, 푒푗)− 푣푖
(
푤˜푖(푒푖, 푒푗)− 푤˜푗(푒푖, 푒푗)
)]− 푐푖(푒푖) (4.10)
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Let us consider a binary prevention choice 푒푖 ∈ {0, 1}. Investing in prevention reduces the
probability of loss. Formally 푝(1) = 휃푝 ≤ 푝(0) = 푝, with 휃 ∈ [0, 1[ being an eﬃciency
parameter of the prevention technology. The lower 휃 is, the most eﬃcient prevention is.
Selﬁsh agents . As a benchmark, suppose that both agents are selﬁsh, i.e. 훼푖 = 훼푗 =
훽푖 = 훽푗 = 0, Then the individual 푖 choice is 푒
푠
푖 = 1 (respectively 푒
푠
푖 = 0) if
(1− 휃)푝Δ− 푐푖 ≥ (respectively <) 0 (4.11)
Inequity averse, symmetric agents . Now consider the case of inequity averse
agents. Assume that 훼푖 = 훼푗 = 훼 ≥ 0 and 훽푖 = 훽푗 = 훽 > 0, identical technologies
휃푖 = 휃푗 = 휃 and unitary cost of prevention 푐푖 = 푐푗 = 푐, and that Δ > 훾 = 푣
′−1( 1
2훽
)
, which
simply means that gaps in ﬁnal output are suﬃciently high to always induce transfers
when one indivual succeeds (gets 푦퐻) and the other fails (gets 푦퐿). Let us denote (푒∗푖 , 푒
∗
푗 )
a pure Nash equilibrium of the stage 1 prevention game. With a binary prevention choice,
there are four Nash equilibrium candidates: (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0) and (1, 1). The following
proposition characterizes the Nash equilibria as a function of the parameters' values:
Proposition 12. Let us deﬁne 훿(푧, 훼, 훽) as follows:
훿(푧, 훼, 훽) =
Δ + 훾푗
2
+
훾푖 − 훾푗
2
푧푝− 푧푝훽푣(훾푖) + (1− 푧푝)훼푣(훾푗) (4.12)
In the symmetric equilibrium,
1. If 훿(휃, 훼, 훽) < 푐(1−휃)푝 , then there is a unique Nash equilibrium (0, 0)
2. If 훿(1, 훼, 훽) < 푐(1−휃)푝 < 훿(휃, 훼, 훽), then both equilibria coexist: (0, 0) and (1, 1)
3. If 푐(1−휃)푝 < 훿(1, 훼, 훽), then there is a unique Nash equilibrium (1, 1)
Proof. To characterize the Nash equilibria of this game, we study the incentives for 푖 to
deviate given 푗's choice. The incentives to invest in prevention for 푖 given 푒푗 = 1 and
푒푗 = 0 are given by, respectively
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푈푖(1, 1)− 푈푖(0, 1) = (1− 휃)푝훿(휃, 훼, 훽)− 푐푖 (4.13)
푈푖(1, 0)− 푈푖(0, 0) = (1− 휃)푝훿(1, 훼, 훽)− 푐푖 (4.14)
Simple computation gives
푈푖(1, 1)−푈푖(0, 1)− [푈푖(1, 0)−푈푖(0, 0)] = (1−휃)푝(훾푖−훾푗)+푝(1−휃)훼푖푣(훾푖)+(1−휃)푝훽푖푣(훾푗)
Assuming identical preferences, this expression reduces to (1−휃)푝(훼+훽)푣(훾) > 0 which is
strictly positive for 훼 + 훽 > 0. Thus 푈푖 : 퐸1× 퐸2→ 푅 has strictly increasing diﬀerences
in (푒푖, 푒푗) so the game is supermodular.
The prevention decision is driven by two disctinct although interrelated incentives: the free-
riding incentive due to output sharing, and the desire to minimize the expected disutility
arising from inequity. The free-riding incentive is captured by the two ﬁrst terms of 4.12.
Indeed, since by assumption 훾푖 ∈ [0,Δ[ we have
Δ
2
≤ Δ + 훾푗
2
< Δ
So the diﬀerence between outputs in the two states of Nature,
Δ+훾푗
2 is always lower with
social preferences than without, Δ. Moreover, since 훾푗 decreases with 훽,
Δ+훾푗
2 decreases
with 훽푖, which reﬂects the intensity of free-riding as a function of the aversion to favourable
inequity. The third and fourth terms of 4.12 correspond to the expected disutility of agents
from residual inequity (i.e. following transfers). The fact that multiple equilibria may
arise for intermediate cost parameters is due to the nature of inequity aversion preferences
and can be explained as follows. If one individual increases the probability to produce a
high output, the others are incited to do as well. Inequity aversion over wealth generates
some form of conformism in prevention choices. Inequity aversion thus makes prevention
choices strategic complements, generating a standard coordination problem between agents.
Therefore two Nash equilibria can coexist for a given subset of parameters6.
In order to analyze in more depth the role of social preferences on prevention equilibrium
determination, we study the equilibria in the space (푐, 훼) (4.1).
6It may be also linked to the ﬁxed cost nature of the prevention technology. We are not ensured that
multiple equilibria arise for all speciﬁcations of the prevention technology and cost function. Intuitively,
S-shape prevention functions or ﬁxed cost may favorize the existence of muliple equilibria (see Appendix
4.5)
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Figure 4.1: Equilibrium determination the (푐, 훼) space
The two increasing and linear curves are graphical representations of the equilibrium con-
ditions exposed in proposition 12 for a given value of 훽. Above the thin curve, there is
a single no investment equilbrium. Between the thin curve and the thick curve, we are
in the presence of multiple equilibria. Below the thick curve, there is a single equilibrium
with positive investment in prevention. The horizontal line represents the investment con-
dition in the absence of social preferences, which by deﬁnition is independent of 훼. This
ﬁgure clearly shows that aversion to unfavourable inequity, measured by 훼 increases the
likelihood of risk prevention investment, and thus mitigate the underinvestment result by
reducing the maximal cost at which investment (thick curve) or multiple equilibria (thin
curve) arise. For 훼 = 0, the thin curve is below the horizontal line, which illustrates the
classical underinvestment result of the Samaritan's Dilemma for any value of 훽 such that
Δ > 훾 = 푣′−1
(
1
2훽
)
. For 훼 ∈ [0, 훼 ∗ [, inequity aversion leads to underinvestment. For
훼 ∈ [훼∗, 훼∗∗[, both equilibria arise. Finally, for 훼 ∈ [훼∗∗,+∞[, there is no underinvestment
compared to the case without social preferences.
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4.3.3 Welfare analysis
We now consider the optimal prevention choice from a social welfare point of view. We
have seen that three situations can arise: a no-investment equilibrium, an investment
equilibrium, and a case where the equilibrium is undeterminated. To examine the social
value of risk prevention in the case of identical agents, we compute the diﬀerence in expected
utility between the two situations the two agents invest and none of the agents invest
for symmetric agents. After simple computation, we obtain the following result.
푈(1, 1)− 푈(0, 0) = (1− 휃)푝Δ− [휃푝(1− 휃푝)− 푝(1− 푝)](훼+ 훽)푣(훾) (4.15)
푝(1 − 푝) reaches a maximum for 푝 = 1/2. Since 휃 ∈]0, 1], if 푝 ≤ 1/2 (which is the most
natural case), then 휃푝(1−휃푝)−푝(1−푝) ≤ 0. Hence 푈(1, 1)−푈(0, 0) > (1−휃)푝Δ. In other
words, it is always socially optimal to invest in risk prevention with social preferences, i.e.
훼 > 0 and/or 훽 > 0 when it is optimal to invest without, i.e. 훼 = 0 and 훽 = 0. The
ﬁrst term of equation (4.15) represents the expected material wealth of each individual.
The second term represents the expected disutility from inequity, which is reduced by
prevention. Hence with inequity averse preferences, investing in prevention is not only
driven by expected wealth but also by the desire to reduce the expected disutility from
inequity.
Mandatory prevention fund. Comparing social welfare with the outcome of the
game, it is straightforward that there exists some ranges of parameters 훼 and 훽 for which
there is no investment in risk prevention although it is socially optimal to do so. Following
Lindbeck and Weibull (1988) and Coate (1995), this may be solved by a social planner
through the mean of a mandatory prevention fund. This would consist in subsidizing
prevention at a certain fraction 푠 using a contribution 푡 < 푦퐿 from each individual. Hence
equation 4.12 would remain unchanged, while the cost of prevention payed by individual
would become equal to (1− 푠)푐, with the budget constraint 푡 = (1− 푠)푐. Starting from a
situation where there is a single equilibrium (0, 0), a prevention subsidy such that
훿(1, 훼, 훽) <
(1− 푠)푐
(1− 휃)푝 < 훿(휃, 훼, 훽)
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allows to reach the case where both equilibria coexist, while a prevention subsidy charac-
terized by
(1− 푠)푐
(1− 휃)푝 < 훿(1, 훼, 훽)
ensure a positive investment in risk prevention by agents.
4.4 Conclusion
We have reconsidered the Samaritan's dilemma in a context of risk prevention with mu-
tual inequity aversion. Because inequity aversion captures a form of reciprocal behavior,
it generates conformism in agents' choices, which gives rise to the possibility of multiple
equilibria. In the case of a discrete prevention choice, positive investment can occur even
in the presence of the free-riding eﬀect due to the countervailing incentive driven by un-
favourable inequity aversion. The usual argument for in-kind redistribution of prevention
to solve the commitment problem remains valid, and can take the form of a mandatory
prevention fund. The usual criticisms also apply, namely the fact that subsidies can create
other forms of ineﬃciency, or may be diﬃcult to calibrate under private information.
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4.5 Appendix
4.5.1 Continuous prevention choices
Let us consider the case of continuous prevention choices. The probability function 푝푖(.)
is assumed to have the following properties: 푝′푖(.) ≤ 0, lim푒푖→+∞ 푝푖(푒푖) = 푝, 푝(0) = 푝, and
푝 > 푝. The cost of self-protection is denoted by 푐푖(푒푖), 푐 being characterized by 푐
′
푖(.) ≥ 0.
Given 푒푗 , agent 푖 maximizes
푈푖(푒푖, 푒푗) = [1− 푝(푒푖)][1− 푝푗(푒푗)]푦퐻 + 푝푖(푒푖)푝푗(푒푗)푦퐿
+[1− 푝(푒푖)]푝푗(푒푗)
(
푦퐿 + 푦퐻
2
+
훾푖
2
)
+푝푖(푒푖)[1− 푝푗(푒푗)]
(
푦퐿 + 푦퐻
2
− 훾푗
2
)
−[1− 푝푖(푒푖)]푝푗(푒푗)훽푖푣(훾푖)
−푝푖(푒푖)[1− 푝푗(푒푗)]훼푖푣(훾푗)
−푐푖(푒푖) (4.16)
The ﬁrst-order condition is
−푝′푖(푒푖)
[
Δ
2
+
훾푗
2
+
훾푖 − 훾푗
2
푝푗(푒푗)− [훽푖푣(훾푖) + 훼푖푣(훾푗)]푝푗(푒푗)
]
= 푐′푖(푒푖) (4.17)
With symmetric agents this reduces to
−푝′푖(푒푖)
[
Δ
2
+
훾푗
2
− (훼+ 훽)푣(훾)푝푗(푒푗)
]
= 푐′푖(푒푖) (4.18)
Under continuous prevention eﬀorts strategic complementarity still holds: if 푝(.) and 푐(.)
are convex, then prevention eﬀorts are strategic complements. Indeed, diﬀerentiating the
ﬁrst-order condition with respect to 푒푗 , we get
−푒∗′푖 (푒푗)푝′′푖 (푒∗
′
푖 (푒푗))
[
Δ
2
+
훾푗
2
− (훼+ 훽)푣(훾)푝푗(푒푗)
]
+푝′푖(푒
∗′
푖 (푒푗))푝
′
푗(푒푗)
(
훼+ 훽
)
푣(훾)− 푒∗′푖 (푒푗)푐′′푖 (푒∗푖 (푒푗)) = 0 (4.19)
Rearranging terms,
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푒∗
′
푖 (푒푗) =
푝′푖(푒
∗′
푖 (푒푗))푝
′
푗(푒푗)
(
훼+ 훽
)
푣(훾)
푐′′푖 (푒
∗
푖 (푒푗)) + 푝
′′
푖 (푒
∗′
푖 (푒푗))
[
Δ
2 +
훾푗
2 − (훼+ 훽)푣(훾)푝푗(푒푗)
] > 0 (4.20)
It is not ensured however that multiple equilibria arise. In particular, for linear probabilities
and quadratic cost, it is not the case.
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This thesis has analyzed several aspects of the economics of insurance and prevention
markets and the role of public policy.
Chapter 1 has considered the problem of optimal risk prevention in agricultural markets.
Following the literature on agricultural policy analysis under incomplete markets, we have
considered a closed economy with two exchanged goods, food and the numeraire, and a
competitive farm sector and a representative consumer-taxpayer. Farmers face a systemic
risk they can reduce through a prevention technology available at an exogenous unitary
price. We have shown that at the market equilibirum, risk prevention decreases with the
representative farmer's coeﬃcient of risk aversion. This is in line with the idea of natural
hedge: price shocks compensate yield losses and thus protect the farmer's revenue. For a
price-inelastic demand, income risk increases with prevention for a price-taker farmer. We
have also characterized the socially eﬃcient level of prevention and compared it with the
market outcome. We have shown that underprevention is likely to occur in conditions that
are typical of agricultural markets, i.e. low price and income elasticities of demand, risk
averse farmers and risk-averse consumers. We have also shown the existence of a Pareto
improving prevention subsidy ﬁnanced by the representative consumer-taxpayer. With
such a programme, yield risk, thus price risk are reduced at the socially optimal levels.
Because he is risk-averse, the consumer-taxpayer has a propensity to pay for reducing price
risk. Similarly, the risk-averse farmer also beneﬁts from risk reduction. The programme
has redistributive consequences that are managed by the government through lump-sum
transfers. At last, we have discussed the consequences of opening trade on risk prevention
choices in the case of symmetric countries, and shown two countervailing eﬀects: on the
one hand, opening trade reduces the expected proﬁt from prevention, on the other hand it
eliminates the natural hedge and so exposes farmers to production risk, inciting them to
invest more in prevention.
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Chapter 2 has dealt with pricing and capital choices of re(insurance) ﬁrms in the oligopoly
context. Considering a line of risk displaying aggregate risk and risk-averse insurers due to
costly external ﬁnance, we have built a two-stage game to analyze the strategic choices of
price and capital. At the ﬁrst stage, (re)insurance ﬁrms choose their levels of internal cap-
ital, at the second stage they compete in price. Having characterized the subgame-perfect
equilibria of this game, we have demonstrated the existence of multiple capital equilibria.
Moreover, we have shown that each capital level leads to multiple price equilibria. We
have analyzed this multiplicity, which ﬁnds its origin in the reluctance of risk-averse ﬁrms
to catch a whole market that is characterized by aggregate risk. This prevent ﬁrms to cut
price for the set of price equilibria, each ﬁrm having a greater value equal market shar-
ing than under monopoly. For a given anticipated second-stage equilbrium price, the ﬁrst
stage capital choice results from a trade-oﬀ that includes three terms: the marginal direct
beneﬁt from reducing the cost of risk, the marginal cost of capital, and a strategic term.
We have shown that this strategic term is itself the sum of two terms: the strategic wealth
eﬀect and the strategic demand eﬀect. This can be explained as follows. By increasing its
level of internal capital, a deviant ﬁrm commits to be able to catch to whole market for a
lower price, i.e. to be more agressive at the second stage. A lower price means lower ex-
pected proﬁt, which decreases the value of the ﬁrm (strategic demand eﬀect) and increases
the ﬁrm's cost of risk because of a wealth eﬀect (strategic wealth eﬀect). Analyzing this
three terms trade-oﬀ, we have shown that multiple capital equilibria arise. For each of
this equilibrium, a positive deviation is not proﬁtable because the marginal strategic and
direct costs of capital more than oﬀset the marginal direct beneﬁt from reducing the cost
of a risk. A negative deviation is not proﬁtable because the marginal direct beneﬁt from
risk reduction is greater than the marginal cost of capital. Finally, we have characterized
the second-best (without price control) socially optimal level of capital, and have shown
that undercapitalization may occur. We have thus proposed an alternative view for cap-
ital regulation on competition grounds. Capital regulation can increase social welfare, in
particular consumers' welfare through its impact on price competition.
In chapter 3 we have conducted an empirical investigation of the determinants of insur-
ance demand and pesticides use for a sample of French farmers. We have underlined the
importance of understanding farmers' risk management decisions in the current context of
agricultural policy reforms and trade liberalization. First, because of policy reforms the
144
GENERAL CONCLUSION
need for insurance may increase in the future, raising the issue of insurability for several
climatic risks in the sector. Second, insurance, as well as other risk management tools (fu-
tures markets, savings), can interact with farmers' production decisions that often include
risk management motives: crop diversiﬁcation, the use of risk-reducing inputs (pesticides,
irrigation water, drought-resistant seeds etc.) and have in turn impact on agricultural
markets and the environment. In this chapter we tackle these issues by the mean of an
empirical analysis that focus on two important risk management tools in our region study:
insurance and pesticides. We have ﬁrst recalled some theoretical predictions concerning
the factors inﬂuencing insurance demand and the mechanisms which make insurance and
pesticides use decisions interdependent. Several results emerge from the empirical anal-
ysis. First statistical tests have shown that insurance demand and pesticides use are
simultaneouly determined. We have thus estimated an econometric model involving two
simultaneous equations with mixed censored/continuous dependent variables for rapeseed.
Estimation results have shown that the relation between insurance demand and pesticides
is positive, but has a rather small magnitude. We have also characterized the statistically
signiﬁcant variables that inﬂuence insurance demand and evaluated their magnitude by
computing elasticities. We have found them in line with theoretical predictions for the
statistically signiﬁcant variables: insurance demand decreases with CAP subsidies (wealth
eﬀect), activity diversiﬁcation (diversiﬁcation eﬀect), increases with yield risk and the loss
ratio. The two ﬁrst variables exhibit the highest values for elasticity (respectively -0.192
and -0.161). This has interesting implications for agricultural policy, although one should
be cautious in the interpretation of our results. First, CAP subsidies seem to decrease
insurance demand, supporting the view that crop insurance programmes and agricultural
income support should not be analyzed separately. Second, our results suggest that less
diversiﬁed and more risky farms should be more concerned by crop insurance programmes.
Other aspects of our results concern environmental policy. We have found a positive and
signiﬁcant but rather modest relation between insurance demand and pesticide use. This
suggests that environmental policies aiming at limiting pesticide use should to a certain
extent interact with crop insurance programmes.
Chapter 4 has analyzed the role of inequity aversion on prevention decisions. Following
the growing strand literature that intents to incorporate social preferences into economic
models, we have reconsidered the Samaritan's Dilemma game in the case of inequity averse
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preferences. We have thus considered an economy composed by two symmetric risk-neutral,
inequity-averse agents that produce a risky output, with a costly prevention activity that
increases the probability of high output. We have analyzed the following two-stage game:
at the ﬁrst stage each agent chooses a level of prevention, at the second stage, transfers
driven by inequity aversion are made from the lucky to the unlucky. Our results are twofold.
First we have shown that for intermediate prevention costs, multiple equilibria may arise.
This is explained by the nature of inequity aversion preferences, that makes prevention
choices strategic complements. Second, the usual underprevention result may occur for a
given set of parameters, but can be mitigated by aversion to unfavourable inequity. Finally,
we have discussed the potential role of a mandatory prevention fund that would increase
social welfare.
These chapters have shed some new light on several issues of insurance and prevention
markets, and suggest research extensions. Chapter 1 could be extended by a more profound
analysis of risk prevention choices in the context of trade, in particular the determination
of optimal government policies in a context of free trade. Chapter 2 could also be extended
in several ways. First, it could be interesting to include several lines of risks instead of a
single one, and take into account correlations across lines. Second, including reinsurance
contracts as an alternative way to cope with risk would also enrich the analysis. Chapter
3 has raised important issues for agricultural and environmental policy making. A ﬁrst
natural extension of this analysis could consist in building a structural model in order to
reach a simultaneous estimation of technology and preferences. This would facilitate the
comparison with other studies based on structural models. A second extension would be
to include a larger set of risk management decisions. In addition to pesticide use and
insurance for all crops, acreage decisions could be included as a choice variable. Chapter
4 could be deepened in several ways: considering more general technologies, including
asymmetric information between individuals, and correlated risks.
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Résumé
This thesis consists in four independent essays on insurance, prevention and public policy. Chapter
1 investigates the issue of prevention in a partial equilibrium, competitive agricultural economy
with incomplete state-contingent claims markets. Under typical assumptions for agricultural mar-
kets (low price and revenue elasticities, risk aversion), it is shown that underprevention is likely to
occur at the market equilibrium and can be corrected through a government prevention subsidy.
Chapter 2 analyzes prices and internal capital choices of insurance ﬁrms in an oligopoly context.
Considering a two-stage game with capital choice followed by price competition, it is shown that
capital has a strategic cost for ﬁrms, leading to an equilibrium level of capital that is lower that
the social optimum. The rationale for capital regulation is discussed in this imperfect competition
context. Chapter 3 is an econometric analysis of insurance demand and pesticide use based on an
original panel dataset of French farms of Meuse covering the period from 1993 to 2004. Results
show that insurance and pesticide decisions are simultaneously determined and allow to character-
ize the explanatory variables that drive these choices. These results are put into perspective in the
context of current agricultural policy reforms. Chapter 4 studies the inﬂuence of social preferences
on prevention choices using a Samaritan's dilemma model in the case of mutually inequity averse
agents.
Keywords : Prevention, Insurance, Public Policy.
Cette thèse propose quatre chapitres indépendants sur l'assurance, la prévention des risques, et
les politiques publiques associées à ces marchés. Le chapitre 1 s'intéresse au choix de prévention
dans un marché agricole en équilibre partiel dans un contexte de marchés contingents incomplets.
Sous des hypothèses typiques de ces marchés (faibles élasticités prix et revenu, aversion au risque),
il est montré que l'équilibre concurrentiel se caractérise par un niveau de prévention inférieur à
l'optimum social. Cette sous-prévention peut être corrigé par une aide publique à la prévention.
Le chapitre 2 analyse les choix de prix et de capital interne des ﬁrmes d'assurance dans un contexte
d'oligopole. Considérant un jeu à deux étapes avec choix de capital puis concurrence en prix, il est
montré que le capital interne a un coût stratégique pour les ﬁrmes, ce qui conduit à un niveau de
capital à l'équilibre inférieur à l'optimum social. La régulation publique du capital est rediscutée
dans ce contexte de concurrence imparfaite. Le chapitre 3 est une analyse économétrique de la
demande d'assurance et de pesticides menée sur un panel non cylindré d'exploitations agricoles
françaises de la Meuse sur la période 1993-2004. Les résultats mettent en évidence la simultanéité
des choix d'assurance et de pesticides et permettent de caractériser les variables explicatives de
ces choix. Ces résultats sont mis en perspective dans le contexte actuel des réformes des politiques
agricoles. Le chapitre 4 s'intéresse à l'inﬂuence des préférences sociales sur les choix de prévention
dans le cadre d'un modèle de dilemme de Samaritain sous l'hypothèse spéciﬁque d'agents présen-
tant une aversion mutuelle à l'inégalité.
Mots-clés : Prévention, Assurance, Politiques Publiques.
